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Abstract
In this dissertation I defend the claim that Nietzsche’s middle period can be read as pre-
senting a theory of cultural flourishing that has as its foundation the project of incorpo-
rating truth. The consciously experienced world is the product of a number of interpretive
processes operating below the level of consciousness. The intentional structure of experi-
ence is universal to human beings, but the content of the resulting world is determined by
inherited norms and inculcated associations. Culture in one sense refers to these inherited
rules, but in another to the specific worlds that individuals are presented with as a result
of them.The experienced world is relative to the interpretation employing in producing it,
but experience is structured such that the world is presented as mind-independent.That is,
the world is perspectivally constituted, even if each perspective presents its own world as
the only one. This claim is what Nietzsche means by ‘truth’ in the project of incorporating
truth. To incorporate this amounts to a refusal to commit to any one perspective dogmati-
cally, which translates into the activity of continually altering one’s experienced world.This
is achieved by reordering the framework that forms culture. But this is not done because
truth has absolute value that demands that it be incorporated. Rather, it is done in the
name of health, which for Nietzsche amounts to realising to the greatest extent possible
the inherent forces that govern all living things. Continually changing perspectives intro-
duces diversity into one’s existence; being able to maintain an identity in the face of this
diversity is a demonstration of the strength of one’s vitality. This balance of stable identity
and maximum diversity is constitutive of great health at the individual level and at the
cultural level. Since incorporation at the individual level employs the cultural framework,
the activity involved automatically has the capacity to affect culture at large. Certain great
individuals, who themselves exhibit great health, are conscious of this relation to culture
and they use it both to maintain cultural diversity and to unite the community around and
ideal that helps engender cultural health. That ideal is science.
Abbreviations of Nietzsche’s Works
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HL
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D
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TSZ
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Original German word was Kultur.
Original German word was Bildung.
Citations for most works take the form D 20 for Daybreak aphorism (or section) 20. Pref-
aces are cited thus: D P:2 for Daybreak preface, section 2. GM is cited thus: GM 3.12 for
The Genealogy of Morals 3rd essay, section 12. EH and TI is cited thus: EH ‘Clever’ 2 for
Ecce Homo ‘Why I am so Clever’ section 2. FSW and UM are referred to in the singular
when abbreviated for ease of reading.
Unless otherwise stated, quotations are from the Cambridge University Press editions (see
‘Primary Sources’ in the bibliography). Some of the above are found in larger volumes. TL
is found in Writings from the Early Notebooks. DS, HL, SE and RWB are part of Untimely
Meditations.HHII (which is composed ofAOM andWS) is part ofHuman, All TooHuman.
TI , AC and EH are part of The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols and Other
Writings.
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References to the Nachlasse Fragmente take the form: NF 〈year〉 〈notebook〉[〈note〉]. For
example: NF 1872 19[25] corresponds to note 25 in notebook 19 in the year of 1872.
Unless otherwise stated, notes are my own translations of the Nachlasse Fragmente Digi-
tale Kritische Gesamtausgabe Werke und Briefe (eKGWB). This is a digitised and corrected
version of the original Colli-Montinari Kritische Gesamtausgabe and are the most accurate
available source of Nietzsche’s writing, published and unpublished. I have included the
original German in footnotes for all unpublished notes cited.
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http://www.nietzschesource.org/#eKGWB
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Introduction
In this dissertation I defend the claim thatNietzsche’s middle period can be read as present-
ing a theory of cultural flourishing that has as its foundation the project of incorporating
truth. The first chapter focuses on what I take to be three foundations of the Free Spirit
Works (FSW ), namely Untimely Meditations, Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense and
notebook 19 from the 1872 Nachlass. I read these as each contributing something to a po-
tential theory of cultural incorporation which is held back by the lack of overall material
and by Nietzsche’s cautious approach to knowledge. UM contains various commitments
to the nature of culture, but is limited by its scope, which only takes in contemporary and
Greek culture. TL is richer in theoretical insights that transcend particular time periods,
but only mentions culture in its final paragraph and the position there is unclear. Notebook
19 promises to connect the two essays, as it deals with culture as it pertains to the theo-
retical insights of TL. But as mere fragments, these notes are insufficient to flesh out that
connection adequately. This situation as a whole is compounded by Nietzsche’s caution
about science (understood asWissenschaft). FSW promises to fill in this cultural theory in
a way that embraces science.
The second chapter is an expansion on the account of experience constitution found in
TL. It builds on Paul Katsafanas’ claim that drives influence behaviour at least in part by
shaping the consciously experienced world that is the source of reasons to act. It extends
this claim by examining four kinds of interpretation that drives engage in to produce con-
scious experience from a manifold of sensations: causation, evaluation, transference, and
colouration. It concludes by proposing the notion of a perspective as a way to talk about
the combination of these interpretations.
Chapter 3 connects the findings of chapter 2 with the notion of culture. It addresses
Nietzsche’s anthropological commitments, which revolve around custom, before showing
how he sees custom as giving rise to conscious experience. Language is the result of custom
and the chapter explores the connection between language and consciousness, presenting a
position that is a synthesis of the positions of two prominent pieces of secondary literature,
one by Paul Katsafanas,1 the other by Mattia Riccardi.2 The final third of the chapter is
1Paul Katsafanas, ‘Nietzsche’s Theory of Mind: Consciousness and Conceptualization,’ European Journal of
Philosophy 13, no. 1 (2005): 1–31, doi:10.1111/j.0966-8373.2005.00220.x.
2Mattia Riccardi, ‘Nietzsche on the Superficiality of Consciousness,’ in Nietzsche on Consciousness and the
Embodied Mind, ed. Manuel Dries (Berlin: De Gruyter, Forthcoming).
dedicated to applying the previously developed understanding of culture to the notion
of culture as self-cultivation. It puts pressure on the idea of self-cultivation as the direct
management of the drives with the aim of producing an aesthetically valuable whole. The
alternative is to understand a great deal of this self-cultivation as directed at the world as an
externalisation of the self. This takes the form of engaging with one’s own artistic output,
which serves to highlight one’s perspectives. It also presents the opportunity to reorder the
associations one has and thus change one’s perspectives.
Chapter 4 looks at the notion of incorporation. It claims that to incorporate the truth
that the world is perspectivally constituted amounts to refusing to commit dogmatically
to a single perspective. This can involve adopting new habits such as honesty with oneself,
but it centres on the continual change in perspective that self-cultivation as previously de-
scribed makes possible. Here I engage with Ken Gemes on the notion of a perspective,
reinforcing the claim that perspectives – and therefore incorporation – has an irreducibly
conscious dimension. This is accompanied by a change in the individual’s self-conception.
They see themselves and their activity through the lens of powerful symbols that Niet-
zsche employs: free spirit, Columbus, the sceptic. So on the one hand, they undermine
the meaning provided by their stable experience; and on the other find meaning in this
very practice of undermining. This is the balance that Nietzsche takes to be constitutive of
great health, the subject of the next chapter.
Chapter 5 connects the project of incorporation to the notion of health. It traces Niet-
zsche’s conception of life to his biological commitments and sees great health as a maximi-
sation of the forces of life.The strongest, healthiest form of life for Nietzsche is that which
unifies the most diverse material. The more internal struggle, conflict and change there is
in an organism, while it is still able to maintain its identity, the healthier it is. This is the
criterion that Nietzsche uses to measure progress at the individual level. His ultimate value
in FSW is not, as some have claimed, knowledge, but rather life. The chapter ends with a
discussion of normativity that cites life-enhancement, revolving around will to power, as
Nietzsche’s normative foundation.
In the final chapter, I bring together the previous findings to present a theory of cultural
incorporation.This is positioned against the background of Jonathan Cohen’s study ofHH .
I claim that great health for a culture consists in its containing the most diverse range of
struggling perspectives and its turnover of perspectives. A scientific culture is most effective
at facilitating this. Moreover, the scientific enterprise, while encouraging diversity, unites
individuals in shared meaning. I claim that these are the moments of diversity and stability
that make culture healthy. All of this is overseen by a small group of individuals who not
only undermine perspectives to encourage diversity, but harness the investment people
have in cultural frameworks to produce the kinds of behaviours that aid cultural flourishing.
Producing this systematic narrative from FSW was a challenge for several reasons.The
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works that compose it3 have received less attention than his later works. Because there are
many continuities between middle and late Nietzsche, and because the later works offer
more organised, sustained treatment of issues, they have been seen as containing Niet-
zsche’s ideas in their most mature form. In many cases, this is a legitimate conclusion to
draw. But the themes of culture and incorporation, which are first raised even before FSW ,
take a back seat in the later works, at least until very late works. Looking to understand
culture in Nietzsche’s work as a whole requires that one look beyond the later essayistic
works. The natural refuge for those determined not to tackle FSW is UM , where culture
features prominently and where the traditional essay format is adopted. Much of the work
on culture in Nietzsche contents itself with these texts.UM offers a great deal to work with
on the topic of culture, but also leaves many gaps that make the construction of a cultural
theory difficult. They are also highly cautious with respect to the search for knowledge,
which makes their lessons difficult to transfer to anything written subsequently.
There are exceptions to this, with good studies of FSW being available. They are still
far fewer than number than studies of the later works. It is notable, for example, that there
has not been a single monograph published onDaybreak,4 and only one onHuman, All Too
Human.5 Ruth Abbey’sNietzsche’sMiddle Period is of great scholarly value, but lacks a solid
theoretical core.6 This is understandable given that it was the first book to tackle the works
together. Similarly, Paul Franco’sNietzsche’s Enlightenment traces the subtle changes across
the works, and dedicates a chapter to incorporation in The Gay Science.7 But like Abbey,
Franco prefers to stick closely to the texts at the expense of more persistent philosophical
engagement. His work is, however, an excellent way to get a grip on the structure and
themes of the works. I see this thesis as a supplement to, rather than a replacement of,
these approaches.
What is it about FSW that deters commentators? For one thing, the works are not
consistent with one another. Nietzsche’s position on various topics changes in the period
that he writes these texts. For another, there are many inconsistencies within each text.
The aphoristic style, which Nietzsche adopted for various reasons, is inherently disjointed.
Since writing these aphorisms was not an exercise in gradually building a convincing case,
there is nothing to keep Nietzsche from introducing whatever idea he happened to be
entertaining at a given time. Moreover, he deliberately engages in disorder, although I
think the degree to which he intentionally contradicts himself tends to be exaggerated.
3Human, All Too Human, The Wanderer and His Shadow, Assorted Opinions and Maxims, Daybreak and The
Gay Science.
4There is a forthcoming volume, however: Keith Ansell Pearson and Rebecca Bamford,Dawn: Philosophy as
a Way of Living (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, Forthcoming).
5Jonathan Cohen, Science, Culture, and Free Spirits: A Study of Nietzsche’s Human, All-Too-Human, Source is
eBook, therefore section numbers used instead of page numbers (New York: Prometheus, 2010).
6Ruth Abbey, Nietzsche’s Middle Period (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
7Paul Franco, Nietzsche’s Enlightenment: The Free-Spirit Trilogy of the Middle Period (London: University of
Chicago Press, 2011).
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Nietzsche does not want to be systematised. He wants readers to feel like they only get
glimpses, and that they must fill the gaps with their own insight. This cannot account for
all, or even most, of the contradictory nature of the works, but it certainly contributes to
making the works something about which trepidation is warranted.
In posting these warning signs, one must be careful not to exaggerate. Although not
systematic, the middle-period works do pursue a limited number of themes, continually
revisiting them from different angles. These various perspectives are not, for the most part,
contradictory or isolated: they overlap, compliment and reinforce one another. They can
also support systematic interpretation. Nietzsche does not order them systematically, often
isolating aphorisms that actually contribute something important to a theme that is dealt
with at more length in other places. But all that is required is that one try to bring these
wayward pieces together. Some might consider this precisely the kind of reconstruction
that Nietzsche would oppose, but if one does not subscribe to the reasons for avoiding
systematic appraisal, this reordering offers the chance to greatly clarify Nietzsche’s un-
derlying commitments. After all, it is these commitments that produced the consistency
between aphorisms, even if those same commitments might have led Nietzsche to scatter
them in the published texts. Again it should be noted that this picture of a mere bundle
of aphorisms is misleading. The works are mostly grouped into chapters that prioritise a
particular theme.8 The first chapter of HH , for example, far from being a collection of
sporadic thoughts, focuses on metaphysics and its origins.
Even in light of these considerations, FSW will always be a difficult body of texts from
which to extract a systematic theory. The works lead one to methodological crossroads.
Their contradictory nature is the source of most of the headaches. In the natural sciences,
one proceeds on the assumption that nature is regular and that one’s theory is falsified
when observations contradict it. But no such assumption can bemade of a text: authors can
and do contradict themselves. The choice is then between acknowledging and accepting
contradictions, disregarding some as irrelevant, or trying to read them in a way that makes
them consistent. This final option applied to Nietzsche’s middle period would require an
unacceptable degree of falsification of the texts. The second option of disregarding some
aphorisms is certainly possible. A point that is made several times in various extended
aphorisms, but only contradicted a few times in scattered maxims, has to be considered
a safe foothold in the context of these works. The first option of accepting contradiction
is an inevitability. One must accept at some point that there are several ways to carve up
the material and that each will yield outliers. The reader must assess whether the theory
presented is grounded enough in the texts to be acceptable.
In the end, the success of any theory drawn from FSW depends on one’s aims. The
main dilemma requires that one choose between a narrow and a broad focus. It is possible
to be more accurate about Nietzsche by restricting oneself to a very specific point, placing
8Franco’s book is the best place to find this structure examined. See Franco, Nietzsche’s Enlightenment.
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it in a rich historical context and scrutinising the concepts and their subtle etymology, both
within and outside of Nietzsche’s oeuvre. This is valuable work of the kind that Nietzsche
often praises. Studying one corner of the tapestry that is FSW delivers rich detail; but
when we step back to look at the entire work, we lose some detail. Subtle differences
between aphorisms are lost, but more importantly, many contradictions that in a narrow
study can be dealt with have to be ignored.Moreover, one is required to engage in a greater
degree of speculation because greater leaps need to be taken between aphorisms. This is
something of a disclaimer for the methodology employed in this thesis, which chooses
to engage in some of these speculative leaps in the course of rationally reconstructing a
theory of cultural incorporation. In my view, neither choice of focus is better, they just
serve different purposes. But one must be clear about where one stands on the issue.
An alternative to speculation is to fill in gaps in a systematic account using, where nec-
essary, additional primary sources. I have made use of Nietzsche’s unpublished notebooks,
but in doing so I have tried to include only that which is present in more than one note,
preferably from different notebooks. I have tried to use notes that have some parallel in the
published works. I have also employed ideas from the later works, especially in chapter 5.
I have sought in every case to show that the ideas I employ were already formulated, or in
the process of being formulated, in FSW . In chapter 5, for example, I dedicate a section
to arguing against the accusation of illegitimately reading will to power into FSW . I have
also used UM , TL and notebooks from 1872. In my first chapter, I argue that these form
the foundations for the middle-period project. As with the late additions, I bring these in
alongside evidence that the ideas are also present in FSW .
Although I consider the thesis to be systematic, I would resist its being labelled a philo-
sophical ‘system’. Quite what is meant by philosophical system is unclear to me, although
it is uttered regularly. My hesitation is due to the fact that I cannot claim what I present to
be exhaustive of Nietzsche’s middle-period philosophy.The reader will find no mention of
several key ideas: eternal return, amor fati, tragedy and comedy. I do not mean to deny that
these have cultural significance, only that I have not found a place for them in this limited
work. I am, moreover, willing to acknowledge that they might fit better in Nietzschean
theory that carves FSW along different lines. FSW is perhaps more eclectic than any other
trilogy of texts in the history of philosophy and making a theory out of it might be said to
do an injustice to this eclecticism. The renowned anthropologist Clifford Geertz, whose
own views are close to those I attribute to Nietzsche, once said of the many definitions of
culture in anthropology: ‘Eclecticism is self-defeating not because there is only one direc-
tion in which it is useful to move, but because there are so many: it is necessary to choose’.9
Faced in FSW with this conundrum, I chose cultural incorporation as the cornerstone of
a Nietzschean theory. This thesis is the outgrowth of that decision.
9Clifford Geertz,The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 5.
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Chapter 1
The Foundations of the Free Spirit
Works
Much has been made of the apparently radical change of approach and style between the
early and late 1870s. It only takes a few aphorisms ofHuman, All TooHuman to realise that
something different is taking place in FSW . But it is important not to overstate the case
for this being viewed as a ‘fresh start’. HH is not to the Untimely Meditations as Wittgen-
stein’s Philosophical Investigations is to his Tractatus. Style aside, the key difference between
the two periods is in Nietzsche’s view on knowledge. But even this can be understood as
the outcome of tendencies within his earlier work and as resolving certain tensions therein.
Nietzsche’s concern with culture definesUM and that which precedes it; and his obsession
with the conditions for the preservation and strengthening of life, which surfaces through-
out FSW , is central to his earlier work and continues to the end of his intellectual life.
Incorporation of truth, his great experiment for humankind in The Gay Science, is present
in the first UM . FSW is often seen as lacking any theory to speak of, its aphoristic style
not lending itself to the prolonged engagement with a single issue that an essay makes
possible. But although scattered among the texts, there is a great deal of detail to be found
in FSW on issues that UM moves quickly over. Despite a more traditional structure, it is
UM that lacks a coherent theoretical framework, and FSW that has the potential to pro-
vide one.The latter should be seen as continuing to engage with the concerns laid down in
the work preceding it. This chapter sets out these concerns, highlighting connections that
Nietzsche is yet to fully exploit and which predict the theory that I attribute him in FSW .
I take there to be three pillars on which this theory rests: UM , TL and notebook 19 of the
1872 Nachlass (all subsequent bracketed numbers in this chapter are references to notes in
this notebook).1
1These are taken from: Friedrich Nietzsche, Unpublished Writings from the period of Unfashionable Obser-
vations, ed. Ernst Behler, trans. Richard T. Gray, vol. 11, The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995).
1.1 Untimely Meditations
UM is a collection of four essays published between 1873 and 1876. This was a period of
upheaval in Nietzsche’s life and thought, which is reflected in the often inconsistent nature
of the essays. Although a deep understanding of them requires that each be treated as a self-
standing unit, there are clear and consistent strands that run through the entire collection.
The ‘untimely’ [unzeitgemässe] status of the essays arises from their engagement with and
criticism of a conception of cultureb which was fashionable at the time. What prominent
public intellectuals saw as a sophisticated progressivism, Nietzsche saw as an accelerating
descent from the heights of culture reached by the Ancient Greeks, heights to whichWag-
ner was supposed to restore Germany. Each meditation can be seen as approaching this
problem from a different angle. David Strauss, the Confessor and Writer is a personal attack
on one of the leading exponents of the fashionable conception of culture, David Strauss.
The Uses and Abuses of History for Life deals with the regulation of knowledge, particularly
historical knowledge, that threatens to erode culture despite being championed as progress
by some. Schopenhauer as Educator focuses on the production of individuals who both ex-
emplify high culture and enable humanity as a whole to celebrate its existence. Finally,
Richard Wagner in Bayreuth further cements Wagner’s role in the regeneration of culture
after The Birth of Tragedy first proposed the idea. To explore and connect all of the key
issues shared by these essays would be to pre-empt the theoretical work of the remainder
of the thesis. In what follows, I introduce them and highlight their incompleteness.
Nietzsche’s work at this time is basically limited to two eras: the Attic and the con-
temporary. The former serves as the frame for his entire critique. The way Nietzsche talks
about culture in the notebooks at times suggests that it only begins with Homer (e.g. 329).
To describe the Greeks as the pinnacle of culture is almost to understate the case: they
are the creators of culture. That it is possible to lack culture tells us that Nietzsche is not
concerned here with an anthropological definition. Culture is not a matter of customs and
habits passed on through teaching, but is rather something more elusive that these things
make possible. With the Greeks as his model and with modern culture as his target, there
is no need for Nietzsche to engage in the kind of deep historical speculation that defines
much of FSW .
The tasks of culture vary for Nietzsche, but they revolve around the idea of aligning
life with nature.HL is concerned with the conditions of life’s flourishing. He derives these
conditions from an appraisal of animals, seeing human beings as having strayed too far
from their animal existence. Knowledge, in the form of history, threatens to undermine
the conditions of life. To allow human life to flourish requires that humanity regulate the
pursuit of knowledge in various ways that mitigate its destructive effects. Man must ‘think
back to his real needs’, which are obscured by the maelstrom of information to which the
modern individual is exposed. The struggle to instigate genuine culture is the struggle to
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reverse the hierarchy of human needs and knowledge such that the former regulate the
latter, rather than the latter overwhelming the former. Although HL’s focus is history, its
content follows directly from the previous meditation, DS, where knowledge more gen-
erally is the problem. Nietzsche sees in Strauss’ cultural vision the creation of ‘cultural
philistines’ [Bildungsphilister]. To these individuals, culture amounts to the collecting of
artefacts from various other times and places and learning endless scientific facts with no
concern as to their relevance to their real needs. They engage in cultural activities only
so that they can return to their unreflective lives feeling edified by them. The individuals
produced by such engagement are ‘walking encyclopaedias’ (HL 4). They are simply repos-
itories of information, but lack anything that unifies that information. They lack a ‘the
unity of artistic style’, the very definition of culture inDS (DS 1). It is this unity forged in
line with one’s real needs that separates culture from the merely apparent culture.
Nietzsche’s later call to ‘translate man back into nature’ (BGE 230) is a variant of align-
ing oneself with nature in UM . But by then, ‘nature’ is being used in a broadly scientific
way. While this is pre-empted by the comparison of humans and animals inHL, both that
essay and SE focus more on the Ancient Greek word for nature, physis [φύσις], although
Natur is still part of the story. Physis was subject to various interpretations in the Ancient
world, most of which Nietzsche would have been familiar with. In HL, the definition of
culture that concludes the essay centres on this concept:
This is a parable for each one of us: he must organize the chaos
within him by thinking back to his real needs. . . . Thus the Greek
conception of culturek will be unveiled to him – in antithesis to
the Roman – the conception of culturek as a new and improved
physis, without inner and outer, without dissimulation and con-
vention, culturek as a unanimity of life, thought, appearance and
will. (HL 10)
In the notebooks, we get cryptic clues to further specifications of the physis concept:
Cultureb– not vital necessity, rather an overflow.
Art either convention or physis.
The attempt of our great poets to come to convention. Goethe and
the essence of drama.
The truth of nature and the pathological were too powerful.
They have not brought form to it. (266)2
2Bildung – nicht Lebensnoth, sondern Überfluß. // Die Kunst entweder Convention oder Physis. // Ver-
such unserer großen Dichter zu einer Convention zu kommen. Goethe und das Schauspielwesen. // Die
Naturwahrheit und das Pathologische war zu mächtig. // Sie haben es zu keiner Form gebracht.
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There is not much to go on here, but there are at least the core components of theUM nar-
rative. The fourth sentence describes the threat of knowledge, where ‘nature’ here is Natur
rather than physis. What this note adds is an opposition between physis and convention,
which suggests that Nietzsche is thinking in terms of the Ancient distinction between
physis and nomos [νόμος]. Noburu Notomi summarises the history of the distinction as
follows:
Nomos originally meant allotted order, but we now translate it as
law or custom. In the earlier period, as in Heraclitus, physis nor-
mally includes morality and social customs. Later, nomos began
its separation from physis, and the Sophists often contrast the two.
Nomos initially implied a positive evaluation of human progress in
civilization, but later came to have a more negative meaning, as
opposed to nature.3
In another notebook entry, Nietzsche distinguishes Greeks and Romans by the fact that,
for the former, art is physis, whereas for the latter, it is convention (290). Imposing form
on individuals through mere conventions – the ‘Roman’ conception of culture – does not
work. The Greek conception involves a retreat from nomos in order to rediscover physis.
Only then can the individual successfully impose form on themselves.
The idea of one’s nature as distinct from the form imposed on one by social convention
still leaves us with the question of what composes that nature. There is plenty of talk of
drives in the texts of this period and although Nietzsche is not using the term in the later
theoretical sense that he will adopt, there is a similar emphasis on controlling and balancing
drives. I will talk more about this in the next section, since it is mostly restricted to the
notebooks. Another possibility is that Nietzsche is thinking of one or more of Aristotle’s
uses of physis. In the Metaphysics, physis is, among other things, ‘the genesis of growing
things’ and ‘The primary immanent element in a thing, from which its growth proceeds’.4
Nietzsche does not explicitly endorse these Aristotelian claims, but they nonetheless share
the organic nature of his talk of physis. Genius in SE, for example, should, according to
Keith Ansell Pearson, ‘be heard in the Greek sense of “daimon” conceived as an individual
fate and organic potentiality’.5 There is also a resemblance here to Nietzsche’s later notions
of will to life and will to power. At times, ‘life’ in UM foreshadows will to power more
obviously, as when Nietzsche writes ‘life alone, that dark, driving power that insatiably
thirsts for itself ’ (HL 3). The strongest support for the notion of physis as this force that
3Noburu Notomi, ‘The Sophists,’ in Routledge Companion to Ancient Philosophy, ed. Frisbee C. C. Sheffield
and James Warren (New York: Routledge, 2014), 105.
4Metaphysics 1014b. As found in Aristotle, Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, ed.
Jonathan Barnes, vol. 2 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 1602.
5In the same article, Ansell Pearson tracks this idea throughGS andTI . See Keith Ansell Pearson, ‘“Holding
on to the Sublime”: Nietzsche on Philosophy’s Perception of the Search for Greatness,’ in Nietzsche, Power,
and Politics, ed. Herman Siemens and Vasti Roodt (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2008), 779.
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drives growth is found in HL 1, where Nietzsche talks about ‘plastic power’: ‘I mean by
plastic power the capacity to develop out of oneself in one’s own way, to transform and
incorporate into oneself what is past and foreign, to heal wounds, to replace what has
been lost, to recreate broken moulds’. Developing out of oneself in one’s own way suggests
the notion of physis as an active force as well as simply one’s constitution. It also fits with
the way thatThomas Buchheim reads Aristotle on physis, claiming that as ‘the principle of
growth, and so of the process of nutrition in the organism, φύσις must play a special role
in the constitution and preservation of form’.6
Vanessa Lemm has claimed that, at least as far as SE is concerned, ‘life cannot be given
a form because every attempt to give it a form is an intervention that risks de-forming and
destroying it. . . . culture acts negatively, acting against that which forces its form on life’.7
But Nietzsche’s criticism of giving form to life emphasises its external imposition rather
than its developing from the inside out. The division of ‘inner and outer’ in HL 10 is the
result of the inner power of physis being prevented from giving form to the individual’s
exterior; which is to say something to the effect that it does not govern their actions, utter-
ances, and general comportment to the world. The unification of the individual, inner and
outer, requires that we give some form to life; without this, it is not clear what Nietzsche
is actually asking us to do with respect to physis.
So far, physis has been discussed as an individual matter. But inDS, ‘unity of style’ refers
to the ‘life-expressions of a people’; and in HL, Nietzsche is clear that his analysis of the
requirements of life apply ‘whether this living thing be a man or a people or a culturek’ (HL 1).
But although he repeats this several times, the application of the notion of improved physis
to culture as a larger entity is never undertaken inHL. Further elaboration is left to SE, to
which we now turn.
In SE, Nietzsche says that ‘to acquire power so as to aid the evolution of the physis’ is
an ‘exalted and transfiguring overall goal’ (SE 3).This is of benefit ‘At first only for yourself,
to be sure; but through yourself in the end for everyone’. A significant part of enabling the
evolution of the physis is the removal of that which blocks its path; or, in Nietzsche’s words,
‘the removal of all the weeds, rubble and vermin that want to attack the tender buds of the
plant’ (SE 1).The source of many of these obstacles is the thirst for knowledge that has led
to cultural philistinism. There is positive content to the project, however. The title refers
to the fact that Nietzsche engages with Schopenhauer as one of his own formative figures.
He is upfront about the fact that he made of Schopenhauer that which he needed at the
time.This follows directly from the practice of monumental history inHL, which involves
interpreting historical figures falsely, but which help the individual to achieve greatness.
6Thomas Buchheim, ‘The Functions of the Concept of Physis in Aristotle’s Metaphysics,’ Oxford Studies in
Ancient Philosophy 20 (2001): 206.
7Vanessa Lemm, ‘Is Nietzsche a Perfectionist?: Rawls, Cavell, and the Politics of Culture in Nietzsche’s
“Schopenhauer as Educator”,’ The Journal of Nietzsche Studies 34, no. 1 (2007): 19, doi:10.1353/nie.2007.
0019.
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Nietzsche’s engagement with Schopenhauer served this function for him. His conception
of education centres on the process not of relaying facts or beliefs – he barely mentions
Schopenhauer’s philosophy itself – but on drawing out and cultivating the nature of the
student. In reflecting on his own education, Nietzsche seeks to better understand his physis:
that force in him that was waiting to be allowed to shape his exterior self.
I have proceeded as though physis were an unchanging essence in the individual, but
Nietzsche’s emphasis on improving and developing it suggest that physis is itself malleable.
There are a few ways that physis might be changed. First, it could simply be strengthened
as a force. Second, if it is not a single force but actually a set of forces, then a degree of
balance in those forces can be achieved; this might well be responsible for its strengthening.
Finally, it can be corrected in those instances where it forms the individual in the wrong
way. Evidence for all of these is present in UM .8 The final one is described immediately
after the quotation about the evolution of physis. Part of the treatment of one’s physis is ‘to
be for a while the corrector of its follies and ineptitudes’ (SE 3).
This suggests a criterion of correctness for the activity of physis that is not immediately
forthcoming in the text. When we dig deeper into the project of SE, however, we find
Nietzsche reintroducing nature [Natur] as a driving force: ‘nature presses towards man, it
thereby intimates that man is necessary for the redemption of nature from the curse of
the life of the animal. . .’ (SE 5). This passage illustrates the degree of instability in the
essays. In HL, humanity was threatened by losing the animal ability to forget; now it is
the unconsciousness of animality that is the cause of suffering and reflective awareness that
offers the solution. More remarkable is Nietzsche’s talk of redeeming nature, of nature as
having a purpose, and of that purpose being human beings. In SE, humanity stands as an
optimum future state of the organism. It is hard not to read this as a strong teleological
commitment. Thomas Hurka has argued that we should not attribute Nietzsche the kind
of teleological perfectionism that SE seems to present. ‘Teleological perfectionisms’ he
writes ‘are committed to some version of the claim that humans tend naturally to develop
their natures to the highest degree’.9 He proposes instead the view that will to power
can be realised to greater and lesser extents across nature. It is in this narrow sense that
Nietzsche should be viewed as a perfectionist. This argument will become central at the
end of chapter 5. In SE, although will to power is not present, this general idea it helps us
understand what nature’s ‘pressing’ amounts to. Nature fails repeatedly to realise its highest
form and only with the intervention of self-cultivation can it actually improve. Even so,
Nietzsche’s language here as confused. He implies that nature strives for something, but
he does not think that this striving is effectual on its own. So he is not strongly teleological
in the sense that we should understand nature in terms of an inherent tendency towards
8For the first two see Nietzsche’s two maxims of education in SE 1.
9Thomas Hurka, ‘Nietzsche: Perfectionist,’ in Nietzsche and Morality, ed. Brian Leiter and Neil Sinhababu
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 13.
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perfection; rather we should understand it as something with a potential to be higher,
where height is measured according to features inherent to life, but which requires us to
take action to bring about. This is an issue that will become much clearer in the middle
and later works, as well as in chapter 5 of this thesis.
In addition to elaborating on the development of physis, SE provides a way to under-
stand how such work connects with the larger community. You undertake that develop-
ment ‘At first only for yourself, to be sure; but through yourself in the end for everyone’
(SE 3).10 There are various ways that developing one’s physis benefits others, including
being a living example of what humanity can achieve, something at which the Greeks
excelled and which we have forgotten (see SE 2). But the overall task of culture – of im-
proved physis – is the production of genius. Physis and genius are linked in discussion of
Schopenhauer:11
The longing for a stronger nature, for a healthier and simpler hu-
manity, was in his case a longing for himself; and when he had con-
quered his age in himself he beheld with astonished eyes the genius
in himself. The secret of his being was now revealed to him, the in-
tention of his stepmother age to conceal his genius from him was
frustrated, the realm of transfigured physis was disclosed. (SE 3)
This fits with Ansell Pearson’s claim that genius should be read as ‘organic potentiality’. It
suggests a close connection between discovering one’s genius and employing it in giving
oneself form. This understanding of genius as individual potential has been invoked by
commentators seeking to diffuse the claim that SE is an elitist text. Rather than reading
the production of genius as a matter of individuals sacrificing themselves for the sake of
creating a few great figures, the essay should be understood as a call for every individual
to become their highest possible self.12 But it is hard to square the idea that everyone is
invested in such a process with other parts of SE, where there seem to be clear distinctions
between producers of genius and geniuses themselves. Take the following passage from
SE 6:
all who participate in the institution have, through continual pu-
rification andmutual support, to help to prepare within themselves
and around them for the birth of the genius and the ripening of
10Hurka rebutts readings of Nietzsche as egalitarian by quoting from SE, but here we see that, as with much
in UM , it is possible to find the opposite position sometimes within a few pages. See Hurka, ‘Nietzsche:
Perfectionist,’ 19.
11It should be noted that Nietzsche’s discussions of Schopenhauer in SE are almost exclusively based on the
character that Nietzsche extracts from Schopenhauer’s writings rather than biographical details.
12For example: Stanley Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhansome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfec-
tionism: The Carus Lectures, 1988 (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 52; Lemm, ‘Is Nietz-
sche a Perfectionist?,’ 14ff.
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his work. Not a few, including some from the ranks of the second-
and third-rate talents, are destined for the task of rendering this
assistance and only in subjection to such a destiny do they come to
feel they have a duty and that their lives possess significance and
a goal.
Referring to the genius as a ‘he’ certainly suggests an individual rather than a mere ideal.
The ‘second and third-rate talents’ are surely individuals. But what comes from this is not
a conventional form of elitism: those who seek to create the genius do so only because it
makes their lives meaningful.13 There is no obvious political compulsion operating here.
Rather, the enterprise looks like one in which everyone can derive meaning from the ‘per-
fection of nature’ (SE 5), whether or not it is they that achieve the status of genius. I take it
that both of these readings get something right. The cultivation of the self is necessary for
those who eventually become geniuses to realise that potential; but the same cultivation
is capable of helping those who derive meaning from the work of those geniuses. Certain
individuals recognise the special status of other individuals whose potential for develop-
ing physis both individually and collectively is very strong. Nietzsche’s collective cultural
project in SE is still somewhat mysterious. This is a key area to which my thesis will add.
Although there is more that could be said about UM , the basic framework that I sought
to lay down is present. It is time to see how the other works of this period fit in.
1.2 Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense and the
Nachlass: Summer 1872/Early 1873
I have chosen to cover TL and the relevant NF in the same section because much of
the theoretical detail of TL is repeated in FSW , and I have therefore tackled the essay
again in chapter 2. Nevertheless, there is something to be said now about the position
that TL occupies relative toUM . It distinguishes itself by virtue both of its content and its
approach. It deals with perception and experience, linking these to metaphor and language
use, and is more traditionally philosophical than UM , which is another way of saying that
it is more theoretically robust. Broadly speaking, it claims that what we call ‘truth’, or the
world that we take to be the ‘true’ world, results from the application of multiple layers of
interpretation, processing and organisation of nervous stimuli. This is compared with the
process by which metaphors are constructed. Every concept, for Nietzsche, is effectively a
metaphor.14 Culture is mentioned only twice and then only in the final paragraph. There
13Joe Ward makes a similar point, arguing that the distinction between individual greatness and cultural
greatness is blurred, since individual greatness is an achievement of the few but a benefit to humanity as
such. See Joe Ward, ‘Nietzsche’s Value Conflict: Culture, Individual, Synthesis,’ The Journal of Nietzsche
Studies 41, no. 1 (2011): 5.
14The details of this rather unclear statement will be given in the next chapter.
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is little to connect it with the discussions in UM , and what Nietzsche says about culture
in TL is of little help on its own. All we are told is that when a certain kind of individual,
whom he calls ‘intuitive man’, is dominant, ‘a culture can evolve and the rule of art over life
establish itself ’ (TL 2). A few sentences later, Nietzsche links intuitive man with culture
and redemption, a theme of SE, but does not go into detail. This is surprising given that
the notebook from which this essay emerges – Notebook 19: Summer 1872/Early 1873 –
mentions culture a number of times, connecting it to core ideas in TL. Unfortunately, the
scattered and incomplete nature of the notes is their limitation. Even having read them,
there are many missing pieces to the picture. Nonetheless, they are fertile ground for ideas
upon which the rest of this thesis builds.
In (310), Nietzsche defines culture as art dominating life. What this amounts to is
not obvious, but there are some clues as to possible ways this might be interpreted. The
first thing to note is that in the context of the Greeks, who serve as Nietzsche’s model,
the distinction between art and philosophy is slight; he even uses the term ‘philosopher-
artist’ (39). Nietzsche writes ‘the content of art and ancient philosophy is identical, but in
philosophy we see isolated elements of art being used to control the drive to knowledge’ (41).
This is what allows for the unity that Nietzsche is so invested in:
All the drives of the Greeks evince a controlling unity: let us call
it the Hellenic will. Each of these drives attempts to exist on its
own into infinity. The Ancient philosophers attempt to construct
a world out of them.
The culturek of a people reveals itself in the unifying control of this
people’s drives. . . (41)15
It is at this point that the connections between UM and TL start to surface. Nietzsche
claims that ‘the only thing philosophy can do now is emphasize the relativity and an-
thropomorphic character of knowledge, as well as the universally dominant power of illusion’
(37).16 These are precisely the points Nietzsche makes in TL, but we see now that their cul-
tural significance connects directly to that of UM insofar as they help to limit knowledge.
But there is more to philosophy than simply limiting the drive to knowledge. Emphasising
the anthropomorphic character of knowledge is a way for Nietzsche to claim that in adapt-
ing knowledge to the needs of life, we are simply extending the very nature of knowledge.
That is to say, knowledge is the product of the processes of life and not simply something
15In allen griechischen Trieben zeigt sich eine bändigende Einheit: nennen wir sie den hellenischen Willen.
Jeder dieser Triebe versucht allein in’s Unendliche zu existiren. Die alten Philosophen versuchen aus ihnen
die Welt zu construiren. Die Kultur eines Volkes offenbart sich in der einheitlichen Bändigung der Triebe
dieses Volkes.
16Jetzt kann die Philosophie nur noch das Relative aller Erkenntiß betonen und das Anthropomorphische, so
wie die überall herrschende Kraft der Illusion.
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opposed to it. To learn to work with rather than against our interpretive tendencies to
create illusions for life is the foundation of Greek culture.
The ‘art-philosophy’ of the Greeks is linked in a further way toTL by the claim that the
processes outlined in the latter are the condition of culture. Nietzsche tells us that ‘imitation
is the means of all culture’;17 but imitation does not refer to what anthropologists would
call ‘mimicry’. Rather, ‘imitation presupposes an act of apprehending and then a perpetual
translation of the apprehended image into a thousand metaphors’ (226).18 In the next
note, it is even clearer that these are the origins of the TL essay: ‘stimulus perceived –
then repeated, in many metaphors, whereby related images from various categories throng
together’ (227).19 Although culture is not a central theme in TL, notebook 19 shows that
UM and TL are both born of cultural concerns. That the mechanisms detailed in TL are
the condition of culture is iterated in the penultimate note of notebook 19:
First stage of culturek: the faith in language, as ubiquitous
metaphorical designation.
Second stage culturek: unity and coherence of the world of
metaphor, under the influence of Homer. (329)20
The first sentence is the story of the ‘invention of knowledge’ in TL.Through metaphor we
come to create concepts that designate various things. Having faith in language amounts, I
take it, to believing that its designations really exist as they are presented to us.21 Creating
this world enables Homer to arrive as a unifier of that world, which amounts to his creation
of the ‘Hellenic will’. This finally brings us back to physis at the end ofHL: we have arrived
at the ‘a unanimity of life, thought, appearance and will’ that constitutes culture. Will,
operating through concepts (thought), has come to construct appearances that serve and
express life.22
These connections bring UM and TL into dialogue in an interesting way, but they
are still fairly cryptic. Too much detail is missing for this to be considered a theory of
culture. Nonetheless, the three pillars, as I have called them, set up what I have attributed
to Nietzsche in FSW . Rather than directly reference all of the places that a given idea will
surface, I have tried to present a skeleton that can be born in mind while the flesh of the
theory is added.
17Das Nachahmen ist das Mittel aller Kultur.
18Das Nachahmen setzt voraus ein Aufnehmen und dann ein fortgesetztes Übertragen des aufgenommenen
Bildes in tausend Metaphern.
19Reiz percipirt – jetzt wiederholt, in vielen Metaphern, wobei verwandte Bilder, aus den verschiedenen
Rubriken, herbeiströmen.
20Erste Stufe der Kultur: der Glaube an die Sprache, als durchgehende Metapherbezeichnung. // Zweite
Stufe der Kultur: Einheit und Zusammenhang der Metapherwelt durch Anlehnung an Homer.
21As opposed, that is, to having faith that language is simply metaphor. This would be attributing a theory
of language to Homer that he is unlikely to have had.
22I concede the possibility that Nietzsche means ‘appearance’ here merely in the sense of outward appearance
of the individual, rather than as the opposite of things-in-themselves.
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1.3 Life, Knowledge, Science
Themajor discontinuity between the early and middle Nietzsche, and that which has been
most fervently studied, is found in his attitude to science.This does not necessarily refer to
the natural sciences – although Nietzsche’s interest in these also expands drastically at this
time – but to theGermanWissenschaft, which also encompasses the humanities.The details
of this transition can make it appear sudden, the classic narrative being that Nietzsche’s
experiences at the Bayreuth festival caused in him a sudden realisation that he was on the
wrong path. Those who have looked more closely at this period have found that this event
represented the culmination of various pressures and doubts that Nietzsche had been feel-
ing in his foregoing life and thinking.23 Nietzsche was becoming disillusioned with Wag-
ner and Schopenhauerian metaphysics before the completion of UM . It seems natural
that in this context he might turn to science. But long before this, he had lamented his
lack of scientific education. In Fate and History (1862), he describes the following feeling
when grappling with long-standing philosophical problems: ‘How often has the longing
for natural science and history crept over me in the course of my fruitless speculations!’.24
Nietzsche never totally abandoned this scientific interest even if it was quietened by the
influence of Wagner. In 1866 he read Friedrich Lange’sThe History of Materialism, which
deals with what was contemporary science, including Darwinism.Then there is a period of
very little scientific engagement before, in April of 1873, while his notebooks25 show that
he was preparing DS, he read no less than eleven books on natural scientific topics.26 This
immediately preceded Nietzsche’s first meeting Paul Rée in May of that year, with whom
he would later form a close friendship, and who influenced Nietzsche heavily in his apho-
ristic style, his scientific standpoint and his attacks on metaphysics and its accompanying
moral commitments.27
There is a great deal more that one can add to this biography as others have done.
But one can also discern within the texts that have been discussed in this chapter several
reasons why science came to occupy a greater role. We have seen that TL seeks to affect
the drive to knowledge by undermining its objective status. This follows from Lange’s neo-
Kantian philosophy, which employs findings in perceptual science to undermine possible
knowledge of things-in-themselves. Here, science delivers results that come to undermine
its own objectivity; it makes sense for Nietzsche to employ it in this way, since he is still
employing science for the purpose of protecting life. But it is in UM that the conflict
23See Julian Young, Friedrich Nietzsche: A Philosophical Biography (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2010), ch. 9–10; Cohen, Science, Culture, and Free Spirits, ch. 2 sec. 6.
24Friedrich Nietzsche, ‘Fate and History,’ in The Nietzsche Reader, ed. Keith Ansell Pearson and Duncan
Large (1862; Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 12.
25Notebook 27, 1873.
26See Rainer J. Hansche, ‘Nietzsche’s Library,’ Nietzsche Circle, 2007, 30f. Accessed May 25, 2015, http:
//www.nietzschecircle.com/Pdf/NIETZSCHE_S_LIBRARY.pdf.
27See Young, Friedrich Nietzsche, 212ff.
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between life and knowledge takes place and it is there that the tensions in Nietzsche’s
thought show. The majority of the remainder of this chapter is dedicated to these works.
Nietzsche’s internal struggle with the problem of knowledge is captured in a single sen-
tence of SE, where he writes ‘Nature needs knowledge and it is terrified of the knowledge
it has need of ’ (SE 5). The fear of knowledge has been raised already in this chapter, but
it is worth consolidating and elaborating on. We have seen that the drive to knowledge
threatens to pollute, weaken and obstruct physis. But in SE, there is a further threat to the
individual’s identity posed by knowledge. Ever since BT , Nietzsche has seen the task of
culture as one of finding ways to cover up the pure flux of reality – what Nietzsche refers
to as ‘becoming’. In BT , this was achieved through Greek tragedy, in which the Apol-
lonian element gave determinate, graspable content to the Dionysian. In SE, becoming is
something ‘in beholding which man forgets himself, the actual distraction which disperses
the individual to the four winds’ (SE 4). The worry for Nietzsche is twofold: first, that in
seeing himself as merely a link in an on-going developmental chain, the individual loses
his independent identity; and second, that in apprehending the infinitely complex series of
events that led to his current existence, his identity is no longer limited to by horizon that
he can grasp. This recalls a further understanding of physis in Aristotle: Buchheim claims
that, for Aristotle, physis ‘transmutes aggregated body stuff into unity and identity as a
definite “this”’.28 This helps frame what Nietzsche is doing in SE. The individual asserts
their identity through an exercise of physis. They make of themselves a definite being in
face of a stream of becoming. Only by limiting knowledge can the individual discover and
improve their physis; and only by limiting knowledge do they also limit that which they
have to fight against in asserting their identity.
This touches on the problem of incorporation, which has to do with the extent to which
an individual can find a place for that which they come to know in their life. Nietzsche
talks about this in terms of their ‘digestion’ of knowledge. Precisely what finding a place
amounts to is open to interpretation. It clearly has something to do with making things
relevant to the individual’s life and its projects. Furthermore, it involves falsification in line
with the needs of life. In HL, Nietzsche has the following to say about incorporation:
the most powerful and tremendous nature would be characterized
by the fact that it would know no boundary at all at which the
historical sense began to overwhelm it; it would draw to itself and
incorporate into itself all the past, its own and that most foreign
to it, and as it were transform it into blood. That which such a
nature cannot subdue it knows how to forget; it no longer exists,
the horizon is rounded and closed, and there is nothing left to
suggest there are people, passions, teachings, goals lying beyond
28Buchheim, ‘The Functions of the Concept of Physis in Aristotle’s Metaphysics,’ 210.
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it. (HL 1)
The preservation the horizon that constitutes identity is evident here, as is incorporation,
although the latter is not specified in detail.This passage also indicates thatNietzsche is not
entirely risk-averse regarding knowledge. There is the potential to eventually create indi-
viduals for whom knowledge is less of a problem than it is currently. Nonetheless, life takes
clear precedent over knowledge: the latter threatens the former when it cannot be incor-
porated. These are, in summary, the reasons that nature fears knowledge. The redemption
of nature that Nietzsche envisions requires individuals with determinate identities who
cultivate and nurture their physis; this is threatened by the eternal becoming presented by
knowledge/science.
The ways that nature needs knowledge are also manifold in UM . In HL, knowledge
serves a variety of cultural roles. Of the three kinds of historical engagement that Nietzsche
outlines, monumental history involves falsification, antiquarian serves to uncover and pre-
serve details of the past, and critical serves to undermine that which has become dogmatic
to the point of paralysing culture. Knowledge, properly controlled, can serve life. But even
understanding these roles requires knowledge of them. Knowledge might be the sickness
of culture, but it is also the means to its diagnosis and cure. Although Nietzsche does not
expressly address it, the ongoing regulation of culture will require individuals versed in
these meditations and their underlying theory. Furthermore, since Nietzsche presumably
does not take himself to present an exhaustive account of culture or of life, these issues de-
mand continual enquiry. This is precisely what Nietzsche will give them in the remainder
of his canon.
In SE there are a further two ways in which one might understand the claim that
nature needs knowledge. First, there is the very activity of reflecting on one’s educators,
which requires that one seek knowledge of one’s own past. This is an even bigger problem
when we consider that our past is defined by our ancestors, opening up the enquiry even
further, and thus threatening us with an overload of knowledge. Nietzsche writes in HL
‘we are the outcome of earlier generations, we are also the outcome of their aberrations,
passions and errors, and indeed of their crimes; it is not possible wholly to free oneself
from this chain’ (HL 3). This is a tricky subject, because it is not clear whether the aim is
to genuinely discover that past, whether it is to fabricate a past for oneself, or, most likely,
a combination of both. However this proceeds, what is clear is that reflection on one’s
nature goes far beyond one’s educators. In the opening of SE, we are told that every man
is ‘uniquely himself to every last movement of his muscles’ (SE 1). It is this unique nature
that one seeks to discover in the process of self-cultivation. Self-knowledge is still a form
of knowledge and therefore a potential threat. In a claim that predicts Nietzsche’s later
notion of the intellectual conscience, which applies to self-knowledge, he writes ‘how we
would like to hide our head somewhere as though our hundred-eyed conscience could not
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find us out there’ (SE 5). This is not a moral conscience, but rather one that implores us to
discover and live according to our true nature. The second way to understand how nature
needs knowledge arises from the idea of man as the pinnacle of nature. The project of
self-cultivation gives meaning to humanity by lifting us out of animal existence onto a self-
reflective plain. This requires in addition to self-cultivation an awareness of the various
manifestations of human life. We need to take in the whole picture of humanity, so to
speak, so as to be able to serve as nature’s self-reflection.
The struggle between life an knowledge is the main source of tension at this time, but
it is not the only one. There is also a struggle between individuality and collectivity. While
SE claims that individuals are unique down to the smallest level, Nietzsche relies on the
fact that they are communally determined.This is not as simple as convention versus physis,
where the former must be overcome in favour of the latter. The very practices of cultureb
that allow individuals to nurture their physis are conventional. The Greeks were not simply
a collection of self-cultivating individuals; they were a community bound by a conven-
tional understanding of self-cultivation of which Nietzsche clearly approved. Moreover,
they exhibited a unity of style and a world bound by a firm horizon. Such shared meaning
conflicts with the idea of pure individuality. If there is a way to reconcile these elements,
Nietzsche does not provide it at this stage.
This chapter set out to identify two things: a bare framework for a theory of cultural
flourishing and a number of unresolved tensions in the works of this period. Although
valuable in their own right, these features also make these works valuable as preparatory
for the later Nietzsche. In the remainder of this thesis, I will fill out this framework and
in doing so go some way towards resolving some of those tensions. To prepare the reader
for this, I end this chapter with a brief summary of its findings.
In UM we find a discussion of cultural flourishing that compares Greek and modern
cultures, but lacks sustained theoretical engagement. In TL, we find sustained theoretical
engagement with truth, world-construction, and language, but little being said about cul-
ture. In notebook 19 of theNachlass, we findmany hints as to how these connect, but in the
form of notes that quickly move on to other ideas. UM presents a risk-averse Nietzsche
whose main concern is with the conditions of flourishing life, which he sees as requiring
strict controls on the drive to knowledge. Although he hints at stronger natures who could
venture boldly into the world of becoming, he is far more concerned with strong, unified
cultures and individuals. These are the result of cultivating the inherent nature – physis – of
individuals so that it can shape them in its capacity as a form-giving, growing force. This
often fragile life force is all to easily dispersed into becoming, with individuals ending up
making nothing of their lives. But all of this requires knowledge insofar as the individual
takes it upon themselves to know themselves and insofar as they need to know the con-
ditions of flourishing for themselves and culture at large. Individuals and cultures need
knowledge but are afraid of it; but individuals also need communities and conventions,
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while being wary of them. These tensions present a great deal of work than an interpreter
needs to undertake to make Nietzsche’s vision viable. That is the work of this thesis.
The first aphorism ofHH 1 shows straight away that Nietzsche has come to a decision
about the tension of life and knowledge, now favouring maximal engagement with the
latter. As he had in 1862, Nietzsche finds himself engaged with old philosophical issues,
which he now reduces to one question: ‘how can something originate in its opposite?’. The
older Nietzsche, like the 17-year-old one, sees science as the way forward. He calls for
‘Historical philosophy’ which ‘can no longer be separated from natural science’. This takes
the form a ‘chemistry of concepts and sensations’, which traces the subtle interactions,
reactions and transformations that have occurred in the history of human consciousness.
The rise and structure of this consciousness is my starting point for the thesis; only later
will it become clear how this leads to a resolution of the tensions of UM .
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Chapter 2
The Constitution of Experience
Phenomenological approaches to Nietzsche have been slow in surfacing within the lit-
erature. Emphasis has been placed on his naturalism, which is often seen as dethroning
the conscious subject by undermining its unity and challenging its position as the guiding
force in human action. This project is undertaken under the rubric of ‘drives’, a concept
that Nietzsche first employs seriously inDaybreak. The drive concept has received far more
attention than topics that are arguably more important to FSW , e.g. culture and incorpo-
ration. It has also led to a move away from conscious experience as a topic of discussion.
The current thesis fits into the expanding tradition of those for whomNietzsche is as much
a phenomenologist as a psychologist.1 For the most part, I avoid discussion of the drives
themselves and make limited commitment as to their ontological status, although I do put
pressure on the idea that they are best characterised as dispositions. My focus throughou
is experience and the experienced world of meaningful, value-laden objects.2 How this
comes about and its relation to culture are the themes of this and the next chapter. Al-
though the material is segregated to the extent that it can be, a significant amount of the
argumentative work that pertains to this chapter is deferred to chapter 3 on the topic of
consciousness and chapter 5 on the topics of truth and interpretation in the context of
perspectivism. Chapter 6 places this in the context of pragmatism.
Although I mostly leave the discussion of drives to other commentators, there is one
paper that is particularly relevant to the current thesis: Paul Katsafanas’ Nietzsche’s Philo-
1Peter Poellner has been working in this tradition for some time and the first edited volume on the topic
has recently been published. See: Peter Poellner, ‘Perspectival Truth,’ inNietzsche, ed. John Richardson and
Brian Leiter (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 85–117; Peter Poellner, Nietzsche and Metaphysics
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000); Christine Daigle and Élodie Boublil, eds., Nietzsche and Phenomenology:
Power, Life, Subjectivity (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013).
2Theview that pre-conscious activity produces a world ofmeaningful, value-laden objects is shared by, among
others, Peter Railton. See Peter Railton, ‘Nietzsche’s NormativeTheory: The Art and Skill of LivingWell,’
inNietzsche, Naturalism, and Normativity, ed. Simon Robertson and Christopher Janaway (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2012), 41.
sophical Psychology.3 Katsafanas addresses the drives in such a way as to also do justice to
conscious experience. His paper is a response to a tension within drive theory. On the one
hand, Nietzsche claims that our actions are essentially unknown because they originate in
processes (the drives) to which we have limited access. On the other hand, we seem to be
able to consciously reflect and act on reasons. Katsafanas seeks to do justice to both sides
of this divide. His views on consciousness in Nietzsche, along with my own view, will be
spelled out in chapter 3. For now, it is in his solution to the aforementioned conflict that
his account sets up the remainder of the current chapter.
Katsafanas assumes that drives engage in interpretive activity below the level of con-
sciousness. The world as we experience it consciously is, in the broadest terms, affected by
that activity. Our rational decision making defers to constituents of the consciously expe-
rienced world, which feature as reasons to act. So the reasons for which we act reach us
through a channel that is under the influence of the drives. This is the key to resolving the
tension mentioned previously. Drives change the field of reasons, i.e. the world, that we
experience so that even if we make what seems like a free choice, the game of deliberation
is rigged, so to speak. Certain things do not become reasons for us if the drives do not allow
them to become conscious and others become reasons as a result of the drives’ activity.4
Katsafanas details a few ways in which drives influence our behaviour by altering the
conscious world. One consists in changing the salience of features of the world, making
some objects or properties stand out at the expense of others.5 This is a theory for which
there is a body of evidence. There is a phenomenon dating back to at least 1987 in the psy-
chology literature called the ‘Weapon Focus Effect’, which is defined as ‘the concentration
of a crime witness’s attention on a weapon, and the resultant reduction in ability to re-
member details of the crime’.6 So if a person is confronted by an armed robber, their focus
is automatically drawn to the weapon. Their experience is skewed such that the weapon
is given attention at the expense of other things. Subsequently, witnesses are less likely
to recall features of their assailant, making re-identification more difficult. A Nietzsche-
Katsafanas reading of this would be that there is a drive, say the survival drive, which shapes
our experience of the armed robbery according to its own ends. It makes that which threat-
ens us stand out. We do not experience this shaping process: the experience first becomes
conscious with the weapon made salient. That we take the weapon as a reason to flee or
cooperate is partly explained by its monopoly on attention. Salience is a factor even in the
3Paul Katsafanas, ‘Nietzsche’s Philosophical Psychology,’ ed. Ken Gemes and John Richardson (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2013), 727–55.
4Talks of drives as agents ‘allowing’ things is a necessary short-cut when talking about Nietzsche. In adopt-
ing this language I am not thereby committing myself to the view that drives are best characterised in
psychological or agential terms.
5Katsafanas, ‘Nietzsche’s Philosophical Psychology,’ 740.
6Although this is framed in terms of recall, the paper goes on to posit a failure to encode the relevant infor-
mation in the first place, rather than a failure to recall it. See: EF Loftus, GR Loftus, and J Messo, ‘Some
Facts about “Weapon Focus”,’ Law and Human Behaviour 11, no. 1 (1987): 55, doi:10.1007/BF01044839.
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more nuanced reasoning we engage in even when given time to reflect. Katsafanas goes on
to claim that drives also affect the content of experience.7 One’s judgement of an experi-
ence is a function of the drives. We interpret the meaning of behaviour, the value of things
and so on on account of drives. I might experience laughter as mockery or mirth depend-
ing on the drive that is currently ruling in me; I might experience a spider as scary or cute
depending on the arrangement of my drives. What appears in experience, how much of
our attention it occupies and how we interpret its meaning and value are all the result of
our drives. Even with the most careful deliberation, this is the world in which we have to
deliberate. In the remainder of this chapter I will extend Katsafanas’ views, arguing that
this interpretive activity does not simply affect our experience, but is entirely responsible
for constituting that experience.
2.1 Evaluation
Much ink has been spilt detailing the values that Nietzsche attacks and those that he pro-
poses in their place. Less has been said about what values are and how they function. The
general consensus is that evaluation is a natural phenomenon that arises in the evolution
of organisms with the capacity to respond to their environment. Organisms are selected to
be drawn to that which fulfils their needs and repelled by that which threatens them; the
pursuit of nutriment and the avoidance of predators are, in a very basic sense, expressions
of evaluative stances on the world.
In humans, evaluation becomes more complex. It can be involved in practices such as
moralising:
Is the origin of all morality not to be sought in the detestable petty
conclusions: ‘what harms me is something evil (harmful in itself );
what is useful to me is something good (beneficient and advanta-
geous in itself ). . .’ (D 102)
Whereas we might describe the primitive evaluations of lower organisms in terms of con-
sistent reaction to stimuli, human beings take values to inhere in the external world. Lower
organisms simply respond consistently with no capacity to make commitments as to the
nature of evaluation; with the rise of more sophisticated representation comes the posit-
ing of values as out there in the world.8 There are still ways of reading the passage that
attribute Nietzsche a range of positions with differentially strong commitments. A weak
position would be one on which the mistake we make is to believe in absolute essential
and eternal value. Morality provides the clearest examples. So the belief that stealing is
‘wrong in itself ’ would be an error; the correct thing to say would be that stealing is bad
7Katsafanas, ‘Nietzsche’s Philosophical Psychology,’ 743.
8In chapter 5, I argue that this externalisation only properly attributed to human beings.
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for me, it harms me, it harms my community. Moralising involves the failure to recognise
that stealing is only wrong relative to the interests of its victims or perpetrators. From
here, we might strengthen in two ways. Nietzsche could be using ‘morality’ here to refer
to something broader than we traditionally designate with the term. His claims about the
universalising tendencies of moral thinking might apply to a wider set, or even all, eval-
uations. In HH 42, Nietzsche links morality with ‘the order of rank of desirable things’,
which suggests that when he talks about morality, he actually refers to values more broadly.
Further, Nietzsche could be claiming that taking values to exist independently of acts of
evaluation is not simply a matter of belief or judgement, but of experience. That is to say,
the world as we experience it is value-laden. These two considerations can be applied to
yield a range of positions; I want to argue for the strongest, which is that values manifest
in our experience as inherent properties of that which we experience. To understand this
it is helpful to look at the phenomenology of value.
We are supposing that Nietzsche’s view of values is not restricted to moral values tra-
ditionally conceived. Let us take as an example a strongly affective value: disgust. A clear,
cross-cultural example of disgust is that experienced at the odour and appearance of rot-
ten meat. One common way to characterise my experience in this case would be to say I
experience the rotten meat and feel disgust towards it. I have an experience of the object
and feel in myself a response to that object. An alternative would be to say that I simply
experience the meat as disgusting. That is, my evaluation shows up as a property of that
which I experience. Another way of putting this is to say that my experience of disgust is
transparent: when I try to attend to the value of disgust in my experience, I find myself
only able to attend to the object in question as disgusting. I cannot separate properties of
an experience of disgust from my experience of the property of ‘being disgusting’ in the
object. That is not to say that there is no accompanying feeling of disgust experienced. I
can experience a reaction to the disgusting thing, but describing this misses a crucial part
of my phenomenology of disgust, namely the taking of something to be disgusting. More
will be said about transparency later.
Contrary to its presentation in experience, rotten meat is not disgusting in itself. To
someone accustomed to it, the meat might appear to contain no such property or feature.
Even if I believe that my attribution of the property disgusting is simply the way that
my disgust manifests, my experience does not necessarily change simply as a result of
having this belief. At this point, we might be tempted to say that my mistake is to take a
subjective evaluation as an objective fact, but I think the terms ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’
are best left out of the discussion for a couple of reasons. First, there is a way of making
sense of our disgust objectively. Disgust is an evolved response to things that could harm
us. If we think of the property disgusting as linked to the property harmful, then there
is a sense in which our experience can be true or false. Rotten meat really is harmful to
me, whereas something else that I find disgusting might not be. In other words, disgust
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might track certain features of the world in virtue of which it can be assessed for its truth
value.9 This does not change the fact that it is subjective in the sense of being relative to the
evaluating organism. I am not claiming that this is the correct way to characterise affective
states such as disgust, just that the possibility of it makes the language of ‘subjective’ and
‘objective’ both ambiguous and distracting in the discussion of Nietzsche’s position. The
second reason to avoid it is that Nietzsche himself seems to recognise that values might
be described as objective. In D 137, he claims that ‘we adjudge the value and meaning of
an event more objectively when it happens to another than we do when it happens to us’.
What Nietzsche presumably means here is that we judge more accurately how an event
affects someone from our third-person standpoint. The value in this case is still relative to
the needs or goals of the person involved, but there is a correct answer as to whether an
event helps or hinders them.
The language of subjectivity and objectivity distracts from the point that underlies
Nietzsche’s view on our experience of value: that we cannot separate in experience rela-
tive from non-relative properties.10 Having an experience of the latter is incoherent even
if we believe a property to be relative. What would it even mean to experience rotten meat
as having the property disgusting-for-me? How would this property differ phenomenologi-
cally from the property disgusting-as-such? We cannot conceive of such properties because
the structure of our experience is such that we experience values as mind-independent11
properties of external objects. That is not to say that I cannot imagine a piece of rotten
meat being alluring rather than disgusting. But then I have simply replaced in the imagi-
nation one property with another. I have not altered to structure of my experience, which
takes such properties to actually inhere in the object.12
Thequestion remains whether the evaluative component in such experiences is a feature
of all experience. Is it not conceivable that I might experience something that does not
elicit an evaluation?There is good evidence that Nietzsche denies this possibility. Take the
following passage from HH 32:
. . .if only it were possible to live without evaluating, without hav-
ing aversions and partialities! – for all aversion is dependent on
an evaluation, likewise all partiality. A drive to something or away
9Poellner allows for values to be something that we can be wrong about in this sense. See Peter Poellner, ‘Aes-
theticist Ethics,’ in Nietzsche, Naturalism, and Normativity, ed. Simon Robertson and Christopher Janaway
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 65.
10Poellner makes this point in reference to secondary qualities, e.g. colour. He writes ‘Nothing about the
appearance of scarlet marks it out as perceiver-relative’. See Poellner, ‘Perspectival Truth,’ 87.
11By ‘mind-independent’ I mean existing independently of interpretation or representation, and persisting
unseen. In this context, the term refers to the idea that properties of an object are represented as being
inherent in the object rather than as being the product of an interaction between the object and the subject.
We represent the properties as public and persisting when we are not experiencing them.
12John Richardson also takes values to be ‘the intentional objects of particular acts of valuing—in particular
by groups of persons’. John Richardson, ‘Nietzsche On Life’s Ends,’ in The Oxford Handbook of Nietzsche,
ed. Ken Gemes and John Richardson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 766f.
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from something divorced from a feeling one is desiring the benefi-
cial or avoiding the harmful, a drive without some kind of knowing
evaluation of the worth of its objective, does not exist in man. We
are from the very beginning illogical and thus unjust beings and
can recognize this: this is one of the greatest and most irresolvable
discords of existence.
The first claim here – that it is impossible to live without evaluating – is not enough to
secure that all experience is evaluative. It is compatible with only some experiences being
evaluative. The second claim regarding drives, however, suggests otherwise. Recall that for
Nietzsche, the drives are what give rise to experience. Every experience is built on drives,
which Nietzsche clearly links here with not only being drawn or repelled, but with tak-
ing that which the drive is towards or away from as beneficial or harmful in itself. Drive
theory commits Nietzsche to the view that all experience requires affectivity. There are
other arguments as to why experience requires evaluation. One is that to have any atten-
tional narrowing one needs some interest or value.13 Another has to do with the necessity
for there to be a will that accompanies consciousness.14 I leave these to other interpreters
who have done good work on theme. For now, I want to look at additional ways in which
experience is constituted, starting with causation.
2.2 Causation
Any discussion of causation, especially with reference to the 19th century, has to make
reference to the two poles of Kant and Hume. I will try to show in this section that Nietz-
sche’s view of causation in FSW cannot be reduced to either a Kantian or a Humean
picture, although it takes elements from both. In fact, this is really only true of one of
Nietzsche’s positions on causation, the one that has received the most attention, namely
causation between experienced objects. The two kinds of causation are:
1. Causation between objects or events: B is observed to follow A and A is taken
to be the cause, or one of the causes, of B.
2. Causation between mind and world: sensations are taken to be caused by an
external world.
In FSW , it is the second that receives more attention. The first is still an important part
of experience and I will address this first.
In the Enquiry, Hume offers a sceptical account of causation. He claims that we infer
causation from the experience of succession: we never experience causation itself nor does
13This is Brian Leiter’s view. See: Brian Leiter, Nietzsche on Morality (London: Routledge, 2002), 20.
14See Poellner, Nietzsche and Metaphysics, ch. 3.
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anything in an object or event we experience necessitate its producing a certain effect.
There is no knowledge of an object or event, A, from which we can deduce that B will
follow. Hume’s best-known example is of one billiard ball striking another. Nothing that
we can know about the first billiard ball’s properties or motion allows us to infer that, on
impact, a particular motion in the second billiard ball must follow. ‘May not both these
balls remain at absolute rest?’ Hume asks; ‘May not the first ball return in a straight line,
or leap off from the second in any line or direction?’.15 We believe that the motion of
the second ball must follow because we are accustomed to seeing certain events regularly
follow other events. We experience regular successions and believe that one thing is cause,
another effect. We infer this connection from experience, but we never actually experience
any connective tissue, so to speak. Neither reason nor experience justifies our positing of
such a connection.
Kant frames his position on causation with reference to this Humean account:
This complete solution of the Humean problem.. . restores to the
pure concepts of the understanding their a priori origin, and to the
universal laws of nature their validity as laws of the understanding,
but in such a way that it restricts their use to experience only, be-
cause their possibility is founded solely in the relation of the under-
standing to experience: not, however, in such a way that they are
derived from experience, but that experience is derived from them,
a completely reversed type of connection that never occurred to
Hume.16
The law of causality, along with other universal laws, is what enable us to experience a world
at all. While we cannot experience causation as such, things appear in experience as causes
and effects because causality is part of what goes intomaking experiences possible.The final
sentence is themost important and clearest: it is in experience that we encounter causes and
effects, but that does not mean that we derive causation from experience, asHume thought.
Experiences are as of causes and effects, not of things that we subsequently label ‘cause’ and
‘effect’. We cannot infer causation from the experience of ‘mere’ regular succession because
such a thing is never experienced. Where Hume sees regularities as contingent, Kant sees
them as necessary orderings under the principle of causation that enable experience to
occur. Which of these best reflects Nietzsche’s position? This is a difficult question as the
evidence seems to point both ways depending on where one looks. In what follows, I will
examine that evidence in an effort to secure a consistent position. I will claim that there is
such a position, but that it can be described as bothKantian andHumean.Nietzsche thinks
15David Hume, An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, ed. Tom L. Beauchamp (1756; Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 1999), 4.1.10/p.111.
16Emmanuel Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, ed. and trans. Gary Hatfield (1783; Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2004), §30/p.64.
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that in our evolutionary history, we have, in part because of custom, come to see succession
as causation; this is theHumean component.However, the story of the development of this
inference is not one of experienced succession that is gradually and increasingly mistaken
for causation. Rather, the development of the application of causation is the story of the
development of experience. Experience is conditional on the application of the principle
of causation, just as Kant claims.
There are passages in FSW that point strongly to a Humean interpretation of Nietz-
sche:
‘Cause and effect’. – In this mirror – and our intellect is a mirror –
something is taking place that exhibits regularity, a certain thing
always succeeds another certain thing – this we call, when we per-
ceive it and want to call it something, cause and effect – we fools!
As though we had here understood something or other, or could
understand it! For we have seen nothing but pictures of ‘causes and
effects’! And it is precisely this pictorialness that makes impossi-
ble an insight into a more essential connection than that of mere
succession. (D 121)
The order of events here seems clear. First, we experience a regular succession; then we
name this ‘cause and effect’. The final sentence of the passage is very close to Hume when
it claims that we lack into an essential connection between cause and effect. In a closely
related aphorism from GS, entitled Cause and effect, we find another seemingly Humean
claim:
The specifically qualitative aspect for example of every chemical
process, still appears to be a ‘miracle’, as does every locomotion;
no one has ‘explained’ the push. And how could we explain! We
are operating only with things that do not exist – with lines, sur-
faces, bodies, atoms, divisible times, divisible spaces. . . . An intel-
lect that saw cause and effect as a continuum, not, as we do, as
arbitrary division and dismemberment – that saw the stream of
the event – would reject the concept of cause and effect and deny
all determinedness. (GS 112)
Hume also claims that we have no insight into hidden chemical or physical processes. His
example is the body’s conversion of bread into energy: ‘neither sense nor reason can ever
inform us of those qualities, which fit [bread] for the nourishment and support of a human
body’.17 But notice Nietzsche’s alternative reason: the very things between which we seek
17Hume, Enquiry, 4.2.16/p.113.
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to posit a causal connection, for example bread and nutrition, are illusions. There are no
such entities; there is only a continuum rather than a discrete series of things. Not only is
this not invoked byHume, it clashes with his position. Although nothing about themotion
of the first billiard ball necessitates any specific motion in the second, the existence of the
two balls is not in question for Hume: ‘every effect is a distinct event from its cause’.18
For Nietzsche, the distinction between the two events in question is ‘arbitrary division
and dismemberment’ brought about by our imposing our picture of things. Alistair Moles
captures Nietzsche’s relation to Hume succinctly as follows:
The intellect categorizes the impressions received by the body –
which is to say, it proceeds by separating and isolating them from
the continuum. By the time we are aware of our experience, in
order to reflect on it, it has been interpreted as a series of atom-
istic events. As a consequence, Nietzsche’s position is very close to
Hume’s when it comes to evaluating our conscious awareness of the
continuum of forces.19
The categorisation hinted at here is actually the complex process that this chapter outlines,
including the application of causality that we will see momentarily. Moles’ final point is
what I have been putting forward, namely that Hume assumes atomismwhereas Nietzsche
rejects it.20 To even make sense of a succession in experience as Hume does is to already
have employed causal reasoning subconsciously. Moles goes on to claim that consciousness
is epiphenomenal in Nietzsche, and even though, as we will see, I do not agree with this,
the pre-conscious activity that is involved to produce the objects of consciousness is more
important to Nietzsche than conscious inferences. It is to this pre-conscious that activity,
in the form of the second kind of causality, that we now turn.
The second application of causation involves positing a cause for the sensations that
one receives.21 Causation between sensations and external objects is discussed in detail
in the context of dreams. In the aphorisms in question, dreams serve as more accessible
illustrations of the same processes governing waking life. In HH , this connection is weak:
dreams are only the blueprint for understanding waking life in earlier stages of mankind.
By D, waking life even today is essentially the same as dreaming life. The aphorisms in
question are HH 13 and D 119, but it is on the former that I will spend the most time.
18Hume, Enquiry, 4.1.11/p.111.
19Alistair Moles, Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Nature and Cosmology (New York: Peter Lang, 1990), 197.
20For an extended treatment of Nietzsche’s rejection of atomism see Keith Ansell Pearson, ‘Nietzsche’s Brave
New World of Force: Thoughts on Nietzsche’s 1873 “Time AtomTheory” Fragment & on the Influence
of Boscovich on Nietzsche,’ Pli 9 (2000): 6–35.
21I use the term ‘sensations’, but it should be noted that Nietzsche uses a range of terms to designate the
same thing, including ‘impressions’, ‘excitations’, and ‘nervous stimuli’.
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HH 13 describes the formation of dreams as follows. First, the brain receives a host of
sensations from the body.22 On receiving these sensations. . .
. . .there are a hundred occasions for the mind to be involved in
puzzlement and to look for grounds for this excitation: the dream
is the seeking and positing of the causes of this excitement of the
sensibilities, that is to say the supposed causes.
Nietzsche’s example is of having one’s feet bound and dreaming that they are encircled
by snakes. We should not read this as an experienced inference, but rather as one that
produces an experience. The puzzlement of the mind and its looking for grounds is a pre-
conscious activity of making sense of sensations by attributing them to an object.23 This
fits with how Nietzsche breaks down the process:
If, for example, you tie two straps about your feet you may well
dream that your feet are coiled round by snakes: this is first a
hypothesis, then a belief, with an accompanying pictorial repre-
sentation and the supposition: ‘these snakes must be the causa of
those sensations that I, the sleeper, feel’ – thus the sleeper’s mind
judges. The immediate past he has thus inferred becomes through
his aroused imagination the present to him.
The last sentence is crucial. The dreamer’s present experience is the result of the immedi-
ately preceding mental activity. Clearly, however, this is not something he is ‘consciously’
aware of, otherwise it could not be his present. ‘Becoming present’ should be read as be-
coming conscious.
One problem with this is that Nietzsche, referring to an example involving sound,
then tells us that the dreamer ‘believes he experiences the cause of the sound first, then
the sound itself ’. This suggests that the cause and the sound are experienced separately,
which is surely inaccurate. I do not experience the ringing of a bell before the sound of it
ringing. What would it even mean to experience an object before one has any sensations
that relate to it? The correct thing to say is surely that one experiences the object in or
through the sensations. One takes them to coexist precisely because the sensation is the
vehicle for experiencing the object; even the term ‘coexist’ is misleading in suggesting an
object side-by-side with sensations pertaining to that object, unless we are talking about
one of the many sensations pertaining to that object coexisting with other such sensations.
I think Nietzsche’s view is that the sensation comes first, followed by mental activity that
22That which receives and organises sensations is referred to interchangeably as ‘brain’, ‘mind’, ‘imagination’,
and ‘reason’.
23I am overlooking the fact that being asleep is not being conscious, but I take conscious here simply to refer
to the narrative of a dream that one might recall in a properly conscious state.
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assigns that sensation to an object, which it then takes to be the cause of the sensation.
But that does not mean that when the experience arises, it is of an object followed by and
causing sensation. I am proposing a three-part narrative: first, the sensation is received;
then it is assigned to an object; finally, an experience arises in which the sensation features
as a sensory mediation of the object to which it is assigned. In the final experience, there
is no separation between object and sensation.
This reading of Nietzsche points to a kind of drafting that goes on before the final
deliverance of content to conscious experience. In a very short window, the brain makes
sense of what it receives before yielding an experience. Nietzsche gives more detail of this
with another example. When we close our eyes we encounter many visual sensations, but
these arrange themselves into the shapes and figures, which it borrows from our daily
experiences. He again describes this as an inference to a cause, where these shapes and
colours are taken to be the cause of the sensations. In this case. . .
. . .the supposed cause [the object] is inferred from the effect [the
sensation] and introduced after the effect: and all with extraordi-
nary rapidity, so that, as with a conjourer, a confusion of judge-
ment can here arise and successive events appear as simultaneous
events or even with the order of their occurrence reversed.
Here, we need to be careful because although this looks like a repetition of the same point,
it is subtly different. First, there is the same inference from effect to cause, which is the
assignment of a sensation to an object. Second, there is the ability to re-order sensations
within a very short time frame depending on the inference that is made, i.e. on the final
decision about the nature of the object to which these sensations belong.24 Furthermore,
notice that he implies that this reversal is not the common case; he says ‘or even’, suggesting
a possibility. Earlier on, however, when he talked about the pre-conscious activity that took
there to be an object behind the sensation, of which the latter was the vehicle, he talked
about this as the structure of experience itself, not a mere possibility. The picture so far is
one onwhich sensations are received, assigned to an object, whichmight involve reordering
them within narrow limits, and an experience is delivered as of an object to which these
sensations pertain.
We are faced with the question of whether this interpretation can be pushed any further.
Does Nietzsche think that it is possible for us to experience sensations without positing a
cause for those sensations? Some passages suggest that he does. InHH 13 again, he writes
24I take this to be akin to Daniel Dennett’s multiple drafts model, on which experience involves a judgement
about the very recent past (measured in milliseconds). During that window, the judgement is open to
revision such that the order of parts can be modified, including being reversed.Where they differ, however,
is that onDennett’s view, there are multiple drafts in the sense that a judgement might constitute conscious
awareness very briefly before being redrafted. Nietzsche seems committed to their being only one final
version of the experience made conscious, with the drafts being strictly pre-conscious. See Daniel Dennett,
Consciousness Explained (New York: Back Bay Books, 1991).
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‘If we close our eyes, the brain produces a host of light-impressions and colours. . . Now,
however, reason (in alliance with the imagination) at once assembles these in themselves
formless colour-impressions into definite figures, landscapes, moving groups’. It would
seem that we can catch reason creating experience. We experience the unorganised sensa-
tions, the organisation process and the final result. However, there is reason to think that
this is not a case of experiencing the original layer of sensation. Within the above-quoted
passage, Nietzsche describes the arrangement of sensations as occurring ‘at once’, which
suggests at least the possibility that, although he implies that we are dealing with succes-
sive stages, he is actually referring to an indivisible act.There is more evidence for this if we
return to the passage that I quoted in discussing the first kind of causation, GS 112. There,
Nietzsche claims that in experience we ‘are operating only with things that do not exist
– with lines, surfaces, bodies, atoms, divisible times, divisible spaces’. The reason given
for the illusory status of causation here is precisely that experience is necessarily already
formed of ‘definite figures’. The problem is that we cannot experience that which precedes
this, an ability that is attributed only to a hypothetical alternate intellect. He also uses the
metaphor of the picture, exclaiming ‘How is explanation to be at all possible when we first
turn everything into a picture – our picture!’. Recall that the final stage of forming a dream
experience was the production of a belief with ‘with an accompanying pictorial representa-
tion’ (HH 13). As he claims in GS 112, we have not been able to look ‘behind the picture’.
Access to the unorganised sensations would surely be an example of such looking behind
the picture given that this picture is an organised one. Finally, in D 119, Nietzsche makes
the claim that ‘all our so-called consciousness is a more or less fantastical commentary on
an unknown, perhaps unknowable, but felt text’. Note that Nietzsche does not totally ex-
clude the possibility of ever knowing this text, but all that tells us is that he is not prepared
to extend his appraisal of human experience to the status of conditions for any possible
experience (he suspends judgement about this).
Nietzsche is committed to a view of experience which relies on taking there to be
causes for sensations, where those causes are objects in the broadest sense.25 This should
not be confused with a commitment to experience relying on either a relation to actual
objects out there in the world or a belief that what we are experiencing is really out there.
The first is ruled out because Nietzsche takes us to be responsible for the construction of
objects. The second is clearly false because the ‘definite figures’ that Nietzsche describes as
presenting themselves when we shut our eyes could not be mistaken for external objects.26
Nonetheless, whatever we believe about such objects, we represent them as being a certain
distance in front of us, with a certain size etc. The best way to read Nietzsche’s second
25This is Schopenhauer’s position. For a more detailed account of the connection between the two on this is-
sue see Maudemarie Clark,Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy, Modern European Philosophy (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1990), 80.
26A sense-data theorist might respond here that sensations are external to the subject, but I use external here
as meaning out there beyond the physical bounds of the individual.
27
application of causation is as a claim that experience is intentional, and that it relies on
positing objectivity as the form of experience. This is not a mistaken inference that we
might displace by updating our beliefs: it is encoded in the very structure of our experi-
ence. In TL, experience involves categorisation, which overlooks differences and focuses
on similarities, grouping disparate phenomena. Grouping occurs in the current case too,
but sensations are not declared simply to be of the same kind; they are instead declared to
pertain to the same thing.
There is a final piece to this puzzle that Nietzsche does not explicitly deal with, but
for which any theory of experience should account, namely what in modern philosophical
language is called ‘transparency’, which I touched upon in discussing value. To say that
experience is transparent is to say that when one tries to attend to features of one’s experi-
ence, one finds oneself only able to attend to features of the objects of one’s experience.27
So when I have an experience of a green leaf, and I try to attend to my experience green-
ness, I find myself only able to attend to the leaf itself, which I take to be green. I suggested
earlier that it is a mistake to talk about an experience of an object followed by an experi-
ence of the sensations that the object causes in us. This is a form of the transparency claim.
My brain receives, in addition to other sensations, a sensation of green and it postulates
a cause, namely a green leaf. This delivers an experience of a green leaf. But the sensory
processing of green is not available to me in consciousness, only the final experience as
of a green object. I can only attend to the green leaf, but not to a sensation of green.28
Experience, although formed by complex, disjointed processes, is well integrated when
it appears in consciousness. Moreover, it is integrated in virtue of it being an experience
of an integrated world. Transparency, although borrowed here from philosophy of mind,
finds precursors in Nietzsche’s own thought. Take the following aphorism from D:
The two directions. –Whenwe try to examine themirror in itself we
discover in the end nothing but things upon it. If we want to grasp
the things we finally get hold of nothing but the mirror. – This, in
the most general terms, is the history of knowledge. (D 243)
The first claim of this concise and elegant aphorism is a form of the transparency claim.The
mirror represents the intellect,29 which in this context means not thought in the abstract
sense, but rather that which performs the interpretive work required to form experiences.
When we try to attend to the mirror, we see ‘through’ it to objects. However, as the second
half of the aphorism makes clear, those objects that we discover are really the product of
27I take Poellner to be making something like the transparency claim about values when he writes ‘the most
basic first-order goods or values which co-determine even the value of the “feeling of power”, are given as
values in affective experiences that are aesthetic in the sense of being responses to objects (persons, actions)
for what they themselves phenomenally are’. See Poellner, ‘Aestheticist Ethics,’ 67.
28Even if one tries to attend to green by imagining a green blob in one’s visual field, one is still attending to
an object, namely a blob.
29See also D 121 for the intellect as a mirror.
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our interpretive activity, which in turn is the product of our drives: that is what Nietzsche
means when he says that we discover only ourselves.30
If this is right, then it is misleading to talk about experiencing sensations. We expe-
rience objects whose various features are manifest in our sensory modalities. When I see
and hear a gun firing, I have visual sensations that can be construed as a flash, along with
auditory sensations as of a bang. My experience of the gun firing brings together of these
sensations into a single experienced event. Even if I reflect on the sound of the gun sep-
arately from its visual appearance, I am still not attending to sensations in the sense of
something internal to me; rather I am attending to what I represent as features of the
world. Moreover, these features are themselves composed of multiple sensations. Nietz-
sche puts this point most clearly in an earlier notebook entry, where he writes ‘we produce
beings as the bearers of characteristics’ (NF 1872 19[236]).31
I have moved from talking about dreams to experience, the move Nietzsche makes in
both HH and D. However, I did so unannounced, whereas Nietzsche makes the connec-
tion explicitly. Moreover, he draws some comparisons:
Waking life does not have this freedom of interpretation possessed
by the life of dreams, it is less inventive and unbridled – but do I
have to add that when we are awake our drives likewise do nothing
but interpret nervous stimuli and, according to their requirements,
posit their ‘causes’? that there is no essential difference between
waking and dreaming? (D 119)
Nietzsche sees the same mechanism functioning in waking life as dreaming life, the dif-
ference being the freedom of interpretation. While he does not say why there is less in-
terpretive freedom, one possibility is that in dreams, the sensations that we weave into an
experience are sporadic. Our sensory faculties are dimmed significantly and information
comes through only occasionally compared with the constant bombardment that occurs in
waking life. The way Nietzsche talks about the arrival of an ‘excitation’ in the brain is that
it ‘works its way up’, suggesting that only a limited number make it all the way. We might
think of experience as resulting from a kind of joining up of these scattered points.This fits
Nietzsche’s description in GS 112, where he writes ‘a continuum faces us, from which we
isolate a few pieces, just as we always perceive a movement only as isolated points, i.e. do
not really see, but infer’.32 This is not just applicable to movement: we see an object that
persists over time by filling in the gaps in our sensory input. We might think of this as like
drawing a line to form a graph. In the dreaming case, there are a few scattered points and
30This ‘only’ will become relevant in the later discussion of idealism since it implies that there is no ‘given’
to be discovered in the world.
31Wir produziren als Träger der EigenschaftenWesen. . .
32This is one of those unfortunate times when Nietzsche suggests that we actually experience a continuum
(it ‘faces’ us), something that overall he does not endorse.
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there are many equally good ways to draw a line through those points. In the waking case,
the ‘resolution’ of sensation is much higher, so there are many more points. As a result,
there are far fewer sensible ways to draw a line that fits these points. I will revisit this point
at the end of this chapter when discussing the idea of modelling. First, there are additional
mechanisms of experience constitution that bear examination.
2.3 Transference
Nietzsche’s reflections on the constitution of experience do not start in FSW , but are
present in the early 1870s and before. In TL, Nietzsche gives the topic the kind of ex-
tended treatment that his subsequent aphoristic style makes difficult. The essay does ad-
dress causation, but its focus is a process that Nietzsche calls ‘transference’, which he claims
operates at the lowest levels of perceptual processing.This process is deeply connected with
metaphor, which in turn connects it with language.33 Nietzsche’s obsession with the role
of language in constituting experiences persists into FSW . We already saw this in the idea
that sensations form a text that is commented upon. The use of this metaphor has lead
Luca Lupo to claim that ‘consciousness and the unconscious are irreducible to one an-
other, but they are also united by the fact that both should be described as some sort of
“linguistic” activity’.34 In TL, sensations are subject to the process of transference repeat-
edly on their way into consciousness. The essay is as much about the composition of this
‘text’ as it is about its interpretation. Lupo’s choice to enclose the term ‘linguistic’ in scare
quotes shows that he has avoided falling into the trap of equating transference at lower
levels with language as we know it.
In this section I expand on the notion of transference, but also show that it is only part
of what we call ‘language’. Language as we know it, in addition to transference, pertains
to the other modes of constituting experience that feature in this chapter. Transference
can be broken down into two processes, one which is pervasive in nature and the other
which is the domain of language as we know it. The first involves grouping things and
responding to them consistently. The second goes further, positing an essence that groups
those members. We have already seen this second idea in the idea of causation between
world and mind. Both are present in TL and in FSW , and sometimes they run together
somewhat. However, it is useful to deal with them separately, which is what I shall do here,
starting with the first claim.
33Céline Denat has pointed out that much of Nietzsche’s view on metaphor and transference actually comes
from Aristotle. See Céline Denat, ‘“To Speak in Images”: The Status of Rhetoric and Metaphor in Nietz-
sche’s New Language,’ in As the Spider Spins: Essays on Nietzsche’s Critique and Use of Language, ed. João
Constâncio and Maria João Mayer Branco (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2012), 28ff.
34Luca Lupo, ‘Drives, Instincts, Language and Consciousness inDaybreak 119,’ in As the Spider Spins: Essays
on Nietzsche’s Critique and Use of Language, ed. João Constâncio andMaria JoãoMayer Branco (Berlin: De
Gruyter, 2012), 185.
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Transference hasmultiple names inNietzsche’s works and notebooks, amongwhich are
‘metaphor’ and ‘analogical inference’. The latter is defined in the notebooks as ‘treating as
equal something that one has recognised to be similar in one point’ (NF 1872 19[249]).35
This is repeated in TL as the claim that ‘Every concept comes into being through the equa-
tion of non-equal things’ (TL 1). Nietzsche’s example is the concept LEAF, which we form
by ignoring the differences between leaves, focusing only on what they share. That is, we
subsume a diverse range of particulars under a single concept. On the face of it, this hardly
seems an unreasonable way to proceed. If leaves really are all of a kind, then regardless of
their differences, it is surely justifiable to group them. Furthermore, Nietzsche cannot be
making the point that we literally do not experience the differences between leaves. That
would be an absurd position that would rule out having experiences of green leaves turn-
ing to brown leaves, or leaves of different shapes. A more subtle position to attribute to
him would be that in grouping things, we take some properties to be essential and oth-
ers incidental. So we might group leaves by identifying the property of being capable of
photosynthesis as essential to them, while their colour properties are merely incidental.
Nietzsche could then claim that the problem is not that we ignore the colour differences,
but that insofar as we apply the concept LEAF we give one kind of property priority in
grouping. The properties that we label ‘essential’ determine the lines with which we carve
up the world. These are arbitrary, since it is perfectly possible to focus on a different set of
properties as essential.36 That is, there is an enormous number of ways in which we could
divide up and categorise the world.
On this view, when I compare two leaves, I conclude that they are of the same kind.
But I can compare a leaf to other things that share properties with leaves. A solar panel, for
example, converts light into energy, but we are unlikely take the set of all leaves and solar
panels to be a natural kind. In a literary context, I might, for example, compare leaves
to politicians since both change colour depending on the season, where ‘colour’ might
signify a stance on something and ‘season’ to the proximity to an election. This works as
a literary metaphor only because politicians and leaves are not taken to belong to some
third natural kind delineated by the essential property of changing colour according to the
season. On the view I am attributingNietzsche, this is not because the property in question
is incidental rather than essential. The only difference is that one is conventionally used
to demarcate a kind of thing whereas the other is not. Nothing in experience commands
us to treat plants and humans as natural kinds but not ‘things that change colour with the
season’. If this is the right way to understand Nietzsche on this first kind of transference,
then it makes his view close to others who have written on metaphor. Best known among
these is probably Donald Davidson with his idea of living and dead metaphors.37 A living
35Metapher heißt etwas als gleich behandeln, was man in einem Punkte als ähnlich erkannt hat.
36This does not entail that any choice of properties could in practice give rise to a usable conceptual scheme.
37Donald Davidson, ‘What Metaphors Mean,’ Critical Inquiry 5, no. 1 (1978): 31–47.
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metaphor is one that is still novel. So I might describe the place where the river Nile meets
the sea as ‘an open wound fromwhich the lifeblood of Africa haemorrhages’.Themetaphor
of the wound is novel because of its scarcity. Were I to render this literally I might refer
to ‘the mouth of the Nile’. But surely ‘mouth’ is metaphorical here? It might be tempting
to think so, but in this case ‘mouth’ simply has more than one meaning. Since the phrase
‘mouth of the Nile’ no longer leads my to think further about the comparison between
an orifice for taking in food and the end point of a river. Such ‘dead’ metaphors abound
and many of us use them without ever reflecting on them. Even the topic of this thesis,
culture, is a dead metaphor. It originally concerned only the cultivation of the land, but
has since come to refer to certain human activities. This line of thinking fits very closely
with Nietzsche’s comments on truth in TL:
What then is truth? Amobile army ofmetaphors, metonymies, an-
thropomorphisms, in short, a sum of human relations which have
been poetically and rhetorically intensified, transferred, decorated
and which, after lengthy use, seem firm, canonical and binding to
a people: truths are illusions that are no longer remembered as be-
ing illusions, metaphors that have become worn and stripped of
their sensuous force, coins that have lost their design and are now
considered only as metal and no longer as coins. (TL 1)
This passage already strays into other processes that will feature subsequently, but the key
idea of moving from living to dead metaphors is plain to see.
One question this raises is whether Nietzsche thinks that things that are grouped really
share properties. If they do, then might it not be the case that the property of being a leaf,
for example, is shared among all leaves? Then it would presumably be justified to group
them accordingly. This is where the leaf example is a little misleading in that it suggests
that falsification only extends to grouping objects according to certain properties. When
we look deeper into the essay, this breaks down in two ways. First, transference at the
level of leaves is already a fairly advanced stage in the cognitive process. To even present
an object that could be categorised is already to have divided the field of sensations into
discrete groups. The lower-level processes are also of transference. Second, the properties
that we suppose things to have are projections based on sensations. To ascribe the property
of redness to an object is to move from an ‘internal’ sensation of red to the positing of an
‘external’ property. This is a version of the error identified in the previous section, where
sensations are taken to be caused by external objects. This thought is already present in
TL:
But to infer from the nerve stimulus the existence of a cause out-
side us is the result of a false and unjustified application of the
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principle of sufficient reason. If the only decisive factor in the gen-
esis of language had been truth and in the designation of things
certainty, how could we say that stone is hard, as if ‘hard’ were
known to us in any form other than that of a totally subjective
irritation? (TL 1)
The total picture so far is one on which our sense organs are stimulated, giving rise to
sensations in the most basic sense. These undergo processing that groups them into dis-
crete ‘packets’, possibly multiple times on their way to consciousness. By the final stage of
cognition, the sensations are taken to pertain to external objects. This is consistent with
the account given so far in this chapter. The discussion of live and dead metaphors above
is restricted to a level that is already constituted by lower level processes of transference.
However, given that the mechanism is the same, we can assume that those levels employ
only one among a number of ways that the grouping of sensations can occur. Unlike the
case of the leaves, where we experience the differences between them, it might also be the
case that the grouping of sensations at lower levels actually leads to a cropping process
where some sensations are excluded.38
The projection of sensations to produce properties that appear to inhere in the external
world is attributed to language. This is important for the sake of the current chapter. Only
human beings have language proper, even if some socially sophisticated animals have what
might be termed proto-language.39 It is possible, therefore, that only human beings take
their to be external objects with properties, rather than merely responding consistently to
sensory input. This is my view and I will argue for it at various stages of the thesis. For
now, it suffices to say that engaging in transference in the sense of treating as equal things
that are only similar is consistent with the idea that animals and even plants engage in
transference when they respond the same way to different stimuli. A plant always moves
towards a light source whether it is the sun or a bulb. In a very rudimentary sense, it is
engaging in transference. To call this linguistic, as Lupo does, is not to call it language,
but rather to identify it as transference, which is one of the foundations of language.
38This cannot be total, however, since, as I will argue at the end of the chapter, sensations can falsify our
experience.
39Nietzsche himself does not directly endorse this possibility. He sees language as a human affair (e.g.
HH 11). In 1868 he read the work of linguist and philologist FriedrichMaxMüller, who compares several
theories about the animal origins of language. Müller dismisses these, claiming that language did not de-
velop gradually, but it is not clear whether Nietzsche subscribed to this. Given his commitment to gradual
development generally, it is likely that he would have committed to at least some form of gradual linguis-
tic development from animal to human. The best candidate is probably some kind of gestural theory (see
HH 216). Furthermore, some of the Ancient philosophers with whom Nietzsche was very familiar – e.g.
Plutarch and Pliny the Elder – were prepared to grant animals simplified rationality, consciousness and
language. For a discussion ofMüller’s views see: Gregory Radick,TheSimianTongue:The LongDebate about
Animal Language (London: University of Chicago Press, 2007), ch. 1; On the animal communication in
Ancient philosophy see Thorsten Fögen, ‘Animal Communication,’ inThe Oxford Handbook of Animals in
Classical Thought and Life, ed. Gordon Lindsay Campbell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 216–
32.
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The externalisation of properties and the grouping of sensations are not exhaustive
of transference. In employing a concept, we also posit an essence behind that which we
group. In the case of the leaf, Nietzsche’s target is clearly a Platonic notion of forms. We
take there to be a ‘kind of prototype from which all leaves are woven’. Platonic forms are
a fairly easy target for Nietzsche, but he goes on to expound a more subtle position, this
time with the example of honesty:
We call a man honest. Why has he behaved so honestly today, we
ask. Our answer is usually: because of his honesty. Honesty! This
again means that the leaf is the cause of the leaves. We know noth-
ing at all about an essential quality called honesty, but we know
of many individualised and therefore unequal actions, which we
equate by omitting the inequalities between them and which we
now describe as honest actions; it is out of them that we finally for-
mulate a qualitas occulta [hidden property] called honesty. (TL 1)
This is to be distinguished from the aforementioned projection of properties. That
amounted to a category mistake: a ‘relational’ sensation is taken as an external prop-
erty. Here, there is the positing of something in addition to what is experienced. We
group actions and ascribe them to a single cause, honesty, which exists separate from the
actions themselves. At this point, Nietzsche is still operating at the level of objects in as-
suming that we experience certain actions that we can group, before creating honesty itself.
But this process, just like transference, works at a lower level. We tie together sensations
through transference and then posit a ‘qualitas occulta’, namely a mind-independent object,
that causes these sensations. Once again, this activity is pre-conscious. Nonetheless, it is
the same process and it is what leads to our experiencing a world of mind-independent
objects with inherent properties. TL shows that transference is closely linked with this
process of positing external objects.
This final part of the analysis ofTL carries over into FSW account of causation, but the
role of language, in particular transference, is also present in the latter. InWS 11, Nietzsche
writes ‘Through words and concepts we are still continually misled into imagining things
to be simpler than they are, separate from one another, indivisible, each existing in and for
itself ’. This arises from the fact that we think that through words and concepts ‘we grasp
the true in things’. Nietzsche is not careful to distinguish the two kinds of transference.
There is clearly a grouping going on here, but there is also the idea that in our taking
ourselves to access the truth of something, we distinguish it from other things. Here the
activities seem to operate together: grouping sensations by dividing the sensory field into
separate objects is part of our taking ourselves to access the true in things.WhenNietzsche
brings these together, I take it that he talks about words and concepts because he is not
applying his analysis to all transference. The mere grouping of sensations does not require
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words or even concepts; but taking there to be external objects that are distinct from other
external objects does.40 The projection of properties is tied to language again in HH 39,
where it is said to err when it ‘designates the stone itself as hard, the tree itself as green’.
The mistake is ‘taking for cause that which is effect’. In the context of the previous section
this makes sense: the effect refers to the object that is posited only after the sensations are
registered. That object, with the properties that correspond to the relevant sensations, is
then taken to be what caused those sensations, this entire process being pre-conscious.
The clearest example of transference in FSW is to be found in Nietzsche’s analysis of
compassion [Mitleid]. In D 133, he lists the subtly different states that make up what
we label ‘compassion’ and then declares ‘All of this, and other, much more subtle things in
addition, constitute “compassion”: how coarsely does language assault with its one word so
polyphonous a being!’.41 We must be careful about the position that we ascribe Nietzsche
here. He could be saying that ‘compassion’ is more complex than the word implies, but
in such a way that each instance of compassion shares essential properties; or he could be
saying that compassion groups things that are actually different in many ways. Nietzsche’s
analysis suggests a mixture of the two.What unites acts that we describe as compassionate
is that they involve helping others in a way that is not obviously self-interested. Nietzsche
sometimes cashes this out in terms of self-interest being unconscious (D 133). He is clear
that the suffering we feel when we supposedly feel compassion is ‘of very varying kinds’,
suggesting that we are not dealing with a single complex entity, but rather a range of
distinct entities grouped under one name. This is supported by the different examples of
selfish motivations that can be operating in an instance of pity.
We are clearly dealing with transference in terms of grouping here. But closer atten-
tion reveals that in fact both kinds are present. This arises in responding to the following
objection: could compassion not simply refer to those actions that involve helping others
with no conscious self-interest? In other words, there really is something common to all
instances of compassion that allows them to be grouped. This could be exhaustive of the
meaning of the word. In practice, however, this is not what the word means. Compassion
does not refer to actions at all, but to something underlying those actions that is responsible
for them, presumably a mental state. The grouping of actions goes hand-in-hand with the
40This will be covered in more depth in chapter 3.
41I have chosen to replace Hollingdale’s translation of Mitleid as ‘pity’ with the term ‘compassion’, which
a) conveys the literal translation of Mitleid as to suffer [leiden] with [mit]; and b) does not connote a
degradation of the receiver, even if this is something that Nietzsche does, at points, propose (e.g.WS 50).
There is a further reason behind this decision: compassion presents itself as benign and selfless, unlike pity.
Nietzsche thinks that modern morality prides itself on being selfless, and is therefore best characterised
as compassionate. But behind this is a desire to demean the other and raise one’s own status: that is, pity.
But since Nietzsche’s critique is of the fact that this aspect is covered over, it makes sense for him to adopt
something like compassion as that which he critiques. In short, he is critiquing compassion for not being
honest about the fact that it is pity. For a more detailed discussion of these two words in the context
of Nietzsche see David E. Cartwright, ‘Schopenhauer’s Compassion and Nietzsche’s Pity,’ Schopenhauer
Jahrbuch 69 (1988): 557ff.
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positing of this mental state: the actions are taken to be united by the property of resulting
from compassion; but it is also, reciprocally, the existence of the grouping that allows that
state to be inferred. Compassion in FSW is given an extended version of the treatment
of honesty in TL. In both cases, the error is moving from grouping things according to
one property to positing a range of shared properties and a shared essence. Compassion is
given pride of place in contemporary morality as though it were a distinct kind of moti-
vation for a distinct set of acts. Compassionate acts are simply a heterogeneous collection
of self-interested actions, which are not underwritten by a single mental state. The same
move made in TL from this case to a general claim about perception applies: objects as we
experience them arise as the result of postulating mind-independent entities that serve as
the unifying substrate to the diverse sensations that are grouped in their name.42
TL deals almost exclusively with transference in the two forms described. However,
there is a hint in the passage quoted at the beginning of this section that the grouping
of sensations and positing of objects enables further processes to occur, namely that the
results are ‘poetically and rhetorically intensified’. Nietzsche does not say muchmore about
what this involves in TL, but in FSW we have already seen that value comes to play a role.
But value is not the only example of this intensification. There are other processes that
do this work, which I will explore by looking at Nietzsche’s claim that the rise of culture
involves the colouration of the world.
2.4 Colour
A key middle-period passage that I have omitted from the discussion so far is HH 16. It
provides the following summary of the development of experience:
this painting – that which we humans call life and experience – has
gradually become, is indeed still fully in course of becoming. . . this
world has gradually become so marvellously variegated, frightful,
meaningful, soulful, it has acquired colour – but we have been the
colourists: it is the human intellect that has made appearance ap-
pear and transported its erroneous basic conceptions into things. . . .
That which we now call the world is the outcome of a host of er-
rors and fantasies which have gradually arisen and grown entwined
with one another in the course of the overall evolution of the or-
ganic being, and are now inherited by us as the accumulated trea-
42It should be noted that there is a distinct disanalogy between these cases and object perception, namely
that the inference from acts to mental states does not actually result in an experience as of another’s mental
state. This is an from an experienced act to a mental state that is not experienced. But it is analogous to the
pre-conscious inference involved in creating objects. Those objects are not simply believed to underwrite
sensations, but are experienced as hosting properties to which the sensations are taken to pertain.
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sure of the entire past – as treasure: for the value of our humanity
depends upon it.
There are several features of this passage that I want to explore, the first of which is the ref-
erence to meaning. While the other ways in which experience is constituted receive fairly
extensive and technical treatment, FSW lacks any substantive theory of meaning. While
Nietzsche talks about symbols and signification, discussion of the relation between sign
and signified is largely absent. Meaning does not require its own section in this chapter
simply because Nietzsche’s texts are too sparse to justify one. However, there is still some-
thing to be said for the notion of signification since it suggests a relationship that does not
easily reduce to transference, and which supplements the picture I have been painting of
experience.
In HH 215, Nietzsche theorises about the development of music, claiming that, over
many millennia, musical sounds were associated with the content of poetry. The result was
twofold: music came to evoke the content of poetry and, in turn, the feelings that poetry
itself evokes. Music gradually became ‘entirely enmeshed in feelings and concepts’. This
is characterised as the introduction of ‘significance’ into sounds. There are two ways to
understand the notion of significance in the case of music. Music is significant in that it
is important to us; it is also significant that it signifies or points beyond itself. We might
call this ‘symbolic’. So a piece of music might be said to symbolise the will, but might
also be said to be significant in virtue of the fact that the will, which it symbolises, is
itself a significant or important feature of the world. This analysis passes quite naturally to
meaning, where something can be said to have meaning in virtue of pointing to something
else, but also by being important to us. Let us focus on the symbolic aspect first. The
relation between a piece of music and that which it is taken to represent or symbolise is
not a necessarily a relation of transference. It is not a matter of shared properties that are
taken to be essential. That is not to say that transference cannot feature: a piece of music
might literally conjure up something in the world by recreating a property of it. So the
crash of cymbals and rumbling of timpani might represent a thunderstorm by emulating
its acoustic properties (mimesis). In language, the this example is be akin to onomatopoeia,
a limited case of language use just as this is a limited musical application. More often there
is just an association between music and the world that is formed by repetition until the
music comes to invoke that thing. This need not rely on any shared features. It is the
relation of music to the world through association that allows it to stir us so deeply. That is
to say, it is the first kind of significance, the symbolic kind, that lends music its significance
in the second sense.
Music gains its affective power through its symbolism, but this is of a highly abstract
and indirect kind. There are other instances and arenas of symbolism that are more con-
crete, as when for example Nietzsche uses the symbol of the bird to represent intellectual
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freedom. But this kind of symbolism involves transference and might better be described
as metaphor.The freedom of the bird to travel without the hindrances presented by various
geographical features, for example, mirrors the freedom of the free spirit to extend their
knowledge without the hindrance of guilt. The aptness of the symbol in this case is to be
found in something shared by it and that which it symbolises. One way we might want to
distinguish metaphor from symbolism is in the use of the two. The former is often used as
a way to try to make something more intelligible by likening it to something familiar; this
is appropriation of the unfamiliar is an important theme in the early notebooks. A symbol
on the other hand simply serves to invoke something that may or may not be familiar.
Using a symbol in a new context, modifying it, or combining it with other symbols can all
potentially affect how we view that which is symbolised. In other words, the symbol stands
in for the symbolised in an arena that permits artistry that cannot be directly practised on
the world. So for example, once the symbol of the bird is established for the free spirit,
an author can involve that bird in various scenarios that we now take to stand for poten-
tial scenarios that a free spirit might face. This is a speculative account of the difference
between symbolism and metaphor: Nietzsche does not engage with symbolism enough to
ground much more than this. Nonetheless, I think the emphasis on association between
symbol and symbolised as the grounds for conjuring up features of the latter is a good way
to make sense of what Nietzsche thinks has occurred with music.
This leads me on to another important feature of music, which is that it gains its power
not from an inference that wemake between themusic and that which it signifies, but from
mere association. There is no conscious mediation required once the association is strong:
we simply hear the music as significant. It moves us without our needing to entertain the
content that it was originally associated with. Our affective response to something can
be transmitted to something else. Nietzsche seems to think that this can occur not just
by associating symbols with things in the world, but also between symbols. Affectively
charged symbols can be combined and mixed just as colours can be mixed in painting.This
is what I take him to mean when writing ‘Odour of words. – Every word has its odour: there
exists a harmony and disharmony of odours and thus of words’ (WS 119). The choice of
odour here is instructive. Odours have the potential to be strongly affective while not being
easily reduced to propositional content. Nietzsche claims that increasing symbolism in art
goes with the decreased ability to appreciate simple aesthetic features and, crucially, that
this process is a matter of the world coming to have the ‘fragrant odour of “significance”’.
Odour here is an addition to the content that we can specify in the symbol, namely that
it points to this or that other part of the world. The odour that it acquires is an instant
affective response that we have. This separation of content has an interesting evolutionary
parallel. Smells like rotting flesh have an cause an incredibly strong and instant reaction in
us; the property of being disgusting is deeply embedded in them.This an evolved response,
since rotting flesh harbours disease; our disgust has to be strong enough that even when
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starving, we cannot overcome it, since to do so would be dangerous. Our representation
of the meat as disgusting requires none of this additional information. That is, it does not
provide us with reasons over and above the reason that the meat appears disgusting. I take
Nietzsche’s talk of odour to reflect this instant reaction that requires no reasoning. True,
we are often aware of what is symbolised in art, but the idea that words have an odour
does not require that we have insight into the associations that have led to this odour. In
other words, associations that are hidden from us account for the instant affective response
we have to words. When the artist employs symbolism, they have the power to invoke
parts of the world explicitly; but they also have the power to transfer some of the affective
response from one thing to another. This can be rendered as the claim that affectivity is
transitive. This claim – affect transitivity – will prove to be important to the project of
cultural incorporation in chapter 6.
We are now in a position to talk about the metaphor of colour, which Nietzsche em-
ploys throughout his work. I think colour, like odour, is deliberately chosen for its phenom-
enological character.While colour fits nicely with value, which is how some commentators
have interpreted it, I think we should avoid falling into the trap of thinking that the process
of colouration is just the addition of values to an existing world of objects.43 That is, it is not
that we once experienced objects without value and then gradually implanted values into
them. There are a couple of reasons for dismissing this reading. Nietzsche does not claim
in HH 16 that the action of the colourists is that of making them appear more valuable.
Rather, it is simply that of making appearances appear. That he also mentions conceptions
suggests that more is going on than mere value judgement. Later on, he describes our
study of this historical process as ‘a history of the genesis of thought’. If colour does stand
in for value, or an affective dimension in the experienced world, then the very least we
can say is that this arose as part of a larger process by which appearances came into being.
Appearances are ‘errors and fantasies which have gradually arisen and grown entwined
with one another’, which suggests that the colouration of the world is the result of such
entwinement. On my reading, the entwinement in question involves transference, causal
interrelation, and categorisation, but it also involves the association of things which allows
their affectivity to be transferred. Perhaps rather than focusing on whether colour is just
value, we should focus on the phenomenological aspects of it. That we are not aware of the
processes by which the world comes to be constructed means that, phenomenologically,
the world we encounter does not require us to infer value, significance or causation: it is
first presented as already containing all of these. Just as we need have no insight into the ra-
tionale behind our finding rotting meat disgusting, we require no insight into the processes
– historical and otherwise – that lead the world’s immanent experienced character.The var-
43As, for example, Clark does in Maudemarie Clark, ‘On Knowledge, Truth, and Value: Nietzsche’s Debt
to Schopenhauer and the Development of His Empiricism,’ in Willing and Nothingness: Schopenhauer as
Nietzsche’s Educator, ed. Christopher Janaway (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 55.
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ious kinds of interpretation come together in intentional acts that posit particular worlds:
these acts are what Nietzsche calls ‘perspectives’.
2.5 Perspective
Nietzsche’s perspectivism is one of the better known parts of his philosophy, and he has
much to say on the topic in his later works, which are the subject of the majority of the
prominent Nietzsche literature. In FSW , we see Nietzsche beginning to introduce the idea
of perspective into his more formal account of knowledge and experience. In the whole of
HH , excluding the prefaces, which were added years later, there is only a passing reference
to false perspective in painting. InD, there are four uses of the term, all of which encourage
experimenting with taking new perspectives. InGS, excluding the later book 5, perspective
features ten times and we find it directly implicated in the construction of the world, which
is no longer an unfurled painting but a poem (GS 301). In book 5 of GS alone we find a
further ten uses of perspective andNietzsche uses the term ‘perspectivism’ (GS 354). But as
Christoph Cox has pointed out, ‘we should read Nietzsche’s “perspective” language within
the broader bounds of a general theory of interpretation’; although direct discussion of the
former is rare, the latter is mentioned frequently.44
Despite the relative scarcity in FSW of the term ‘perspective’ and its variants, there is
clear evidence that the thought is already present. The clearest and oft-quoted published
expression of perspectivism is in GM . But the key ideas are present in notebooks from
1881, as the following comparison shows:
There is only a perspectival seeing, only a perspectival ‘knowing’;
the more affects we are able to put into words about a thing, the
more eyes, various eyes we are able to use for the same thing, the
more complete will be our ‘concept’ of the thing, our ‘objectivity’.
(GM 3.12)
Exercise: to see things as they are! Means: to see be able to see them
through a hundred eyes, through many people! It would be a false
path to emphasise the impersonal and to identify the sight out of
the eye of one’s neighbour with morality. Many neighbours and
through many eyes and through nothing but personal eyes – is
right. (NF 1881 11[65])45
44See Christoph Cox, Nietzsche: Naturalism and Interpretation (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1999), 114.
45Aufgabe: die Dinge sehen, wie sie sind! Mittel : Aus hundert Augen auf sie sehen können, aus vielen Perso-
nen! Es war ein falscher Weg, das Unpersönliche zu betonen und das Sehen aus dem Auge des Nächsten
als moralisch zu bezeichnen. VieleNächste und aus vielenAugen und aus lauter persönlichen Augen sehen
– ist das Rechte.
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Not only is perspectivism operational in FSW , it is a useful term because it allows us to
talk about all of the modes of experience construction at once. But it also reminds us that
although the construction of experience is a complex, dynamic affair, its product, namely
the world as we experience it, is integrated. I do not have to work hard to create the
world, I have to work hard to catch myself creating it. As Nietzsche says of our creativity
in experience, ‘we catch it for a moment we have forgotten it the next’ (GS 301). This
should not of course be taken to suggest that we can step out of that experience entirely
and witness its construction. With these considerations in mind, I will henceforth use the
term ‘perspective’ to refer to combinations of these interpretations.
Perspective so understood is not of a fixed width: one can hold a perspective for a
brief moment of relating to a small object, or a perspective on something very large can be
held in a culture for many centuries. Every instance of being conscious, i.e. every instance
of intentionality, involves both the intentional act and the corresponding intentional ob-
ject/world. By definition, every perspective is a perspective on something: perspectives are
intentional by nature. That does not mean that there need be a mind-independent world
for me to take a perspective on. Instead, it means that taking a perspective is at one an
interpretive act and the positing of an object on which it is a perspective.46 This helps
us understand the variable width of perspectives. I can take myself to be experiencing a
single flash of lightening, a storm or a decade of shifting weather patterns. All of these
are intentional objects, yet some are much more complex than others and contain smaller
experiences. Nonetheless, each involves a perspective.
Although perspectives can encompass smaller perspectives, Nietzsche does not think
that there can ever be a single perspective that encompasses all others or that any one per-
spective has a claim to being the true one. Furthermore, as we have seen, we can never
confirm that there is anything beyond the world of appearances that might vindicate a
particular perspective, if such a thing is even intelligible. For Nietzsche, knowledge of the
thing-in-itself would be knowledge free of a perspective, a view from nowhere, a contra-
diction in terms. This is the radical conclusion of perspectivism that makes it so central to
Nietzsche’s philosophy.
One instructive way to think about perspectives is as models. Modelling is the attempt
to provide a means of predicting a phenomenon to an acceptable degree of accuracy by
focusing on a few general features and ignoring the idiosyncrasies of each individual case.
Take the model of human behaviour that dominated economics in the latter half of the
twentieth century: the Rational Actor model (RA). RA assumes that individuals always
seek to advance their self-interest within the constraints of circumstance and available in-
formation, which allows it to predict behaviour to a certain extent. However, in the last
46Daigle also takes this line on interpretation, readingHH 16 as referring to a ‘dual act of perception/creation
of the phenomenon’. See Christine Daigle, ‘The Intentional Encounter with “theWorld”,’ chap. 2 inNietz-
sche and Phenomenology: Power, Life, Subjectivity, ed. Christine Daigle and Élodie Boublil (Bloomington:
India), 31.
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thirty years studies have thrown up data that RA cannot account for.Themost famous cen-
tres on something called the ‘ultimatum game’, in which individuals consistently choose
to punish others for being unfair even if it costs them to do so.47 RA has been undermined
because it dramatically fails to explain the results of this and other experiments. The ulti-
matum game established a clear, consistent deviation from RA; but models such as this are
also criticised on the basis that they falsify reality. That is, they are taken to do a disservice
to the variation between individuals. This is the root of the general objection to prejudice,
namely that one should refrain from generalisations of people based on a few shared fea-
tures because everyone is an individual. Prejudice in such case is functioning like a model.
But to level such a critique at any model is to ignore the nature and purpose of a model.
Excluding the particularities of individuals’ personalities and circumstances, while still be-
ing able to predict their behaviour to an acceptable degree, is the measure of success of a
model of human behaviour. Were a model to take into account every variation between
individuals it would not be a model.
The process involved in modelling is akin to the process of transference. We focus on a
few general features and overlook the idiosyncrasies. This is how objects as we know them
in experience are produced. So what of the status of those objects? Here the modelling
idea helps us. There is no such thing as a perfectly rational actor – a ‘homo economicus’.
It is a theoretical entity postulated as part of a model; that it is such an abstraction is pre-
cisely what makes it integral to the model. But what if experience is akin to modelling?
That is, what if the objects that we experience are like the theoretical entities posited by
models? The idea would be something like this: we receive a rich array of sensations in
various modalities. This is the equivalent of raw data. It is interpreted by postulating the
existence of objects that predict the future data, i.e. the stream of sensations. We expe-
rience these objects as mind-independent, but they are actually postulated by the mind
as theoretical entities.48 The economist would be rightly criticised for thinking that their
model involved the discovery of a new entity called homo economicus. Extending this to
science more generally complicates talk of discovering atoms or genes. But if experience
involves building models of an external world of objects based on sense-data, then it too
becomes problematic.
Discussing RA as simplifying individual behaviour is itself problematic on this view
because it assumes that we are able to experience the idiosyncrasies of individuals and, in
47This was first proposed in Werner Güth, Rolf Schmittberger, and Bernd Schwarze, ‘An Experimental
Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining,’ Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 3, no. 4 (1982): 367–
388, doi:10.1016/0167-2681(82)90011-7.
48This position has echoes within modern debates in epistemology. It is close to a view that John Camp-
bell considers and later rejects in his paper Berkeley’s Puzzle, although without the context of prediction.
Campbell writes: ‘The idea here is that experience is being appealed to only as providing the data which
the postulation of objects, with their functional characteristics, is designed to explain. Experience does not
provide us with any more direct conception of the object than that’. John Campbell, ‘Berkeley’s Puzzle,’ in
Conceivability and Possibility, ed. Tamar S. Gendler and John Hawthorne (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
2002), 142.
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light of those, accuse the model of ignoring them. But our experience of individuals is itself
a form of modelling. When we talk about a particular person, we are in fact overlooking
their different moods, behaviours, and disposition at different times, for example. We are
modelling their existence. The same is true for each characteristic that we might wish to
attribute them. Nietzsche’s view, then, should be expressed as the claim that ‘knowledge’ is
modelling all the way down. The hope that at some level, the objects we posit in this mod-
elling correspond to objects out there in the world is misguided. There is still the option
at this point to invoke something like structural realism in relation to models. So while
we might accept that there are, strictly speaking, no atoms, we could just claim that the
atom as a model tracks features of a mind-independent world; it gets some purchase on
the world as it exists beyond interpretation. For Nietzsche, this is simply an unjustified
assertion that cannot be verified. All we can say about a model is that it can make pre-
dictions, but to move from that to the claim that it makes those predictions in virtue of
connecting with a mind-independent world is a step beyond what we can know. That is
not to say that we need to commit Nietzsche to the outright denial of the possibility of
correspondence. He allows that it is possible, but you can never confirm that it is the case
or present evidence in favour of that, since he sees no reason that predictive power should
count as such evidence.49
While this appears to descend into complete relativism, we should avoid attributing
Nietzsche the view that all perspectives are equally valid. Poellner takes Nietzsche to claim
that ‘“there are only interpretations”, none of which can be said to be “objectively” better
or to be more “fitting” than any other, since it is not coherent to suppose that there is
anything for any interpretation to fit in the required way’.50 I take the point here to be
similar to mine, namely that the objects posited in experiential models cannot be taken to
fit a realm of mind-independent objects. However, this does not preclude the possibility
that some models might fit the data better. We know from the case of dreams that there
can be free interpretation when there is less ‘data’ being considered. The data constrain the
models that can be generated. In this case, there can be a more fitting interpretation in the
sense that the interpretation fits better with the data, not that its objects correspond to real
objects. However, it remains the case that there is no correct interpretation and the position
is compatible with there being many models that can lay claim to fitting the data. This is
the position that I think makes most sense out of Nietzsche on the one hand denying the
possibility of knowledge and on the other, dispensing with arbitrary interpretations.
Arbitrary interpretation is something that Nietzsche attacks explicitly, but more in
the context of literary interpretation than interpreting sensations. However, recall that for
Nietzsche ‘all our so-called consciousness is a more or less fantastic commentary on an
49In chapter 6, I will argue that as Nietzsche’s works progress, he comes more andmore to adopt a pragmatist
position where predictive power constitutes truth.
50Poellner, Nietzsche and Metaphysics, 282.
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unknown, perhaps unknowable, but felt text’ (D 119). The idea of a text is instructive
because it is not necessary to maintain that there is a correct interpretation of a text in
order to hold that there can be bad interpretations. For those that subscribe to the ‘new
criticism’ movement in literary studies, which is a great many of those engaged in it, the
interpretation of an artwork or a text is not an attempt to discern the author’s intention or
the meaning they sought to convey. Any such work is amenable to multiple interpretations.
Nonetheless, even these individuals are prepared to allow that some interpretations are bad.
They can point to the text and claim that the interpretation does not fit in crucial respects.
With Nietzsche’s texts, such a thing is always possible. Every book and article written on
Nietzsche seeks to build a model and does so by overlooking some features of the text in
order to concentrate on others. That we judge some to do this to an unacceptable extent
does not entail that we believe there to be a model that accesses the essence of the texts.
Indeed, the need to know exactly what Nietzsche meant is a manifestation of the need
to come into contact with things-in-themselves. The consequence of this is that we can
allow that some conscious experiences are bad interpretations without the need to talk
about there being a correct interpretation. A further important feature of this quotation is
that the text of sensations [Nervenreize] is itself unknown and merely felt. This impedes
the transfer of the idea of pointing to the text into the context of sensations. We cannot
point to the raw data to ‘correct’ an experiential interpretation because it is not possible to
experience that data. Even to say that the data consist of sensations is tomodel it.Whatever
it is that is originally put together tomake our experiences is not itself something that could
be experienced.
This whole way of talking raises an important question which, although I cannot dis-
cuss it at length, needs to be at least addressed: is Nietzsche an idealist (either transcenden-
tal or empirical)? Nietzsche’s texts are highly conflicted on this issue. At times he seems
to oppose the view of metaphysicians who claim that ‘the whole world is spun out of this
faculty of cognition’ (HH 2). In GS 372, he explicitly says that ‘we are not idealists’ but
rather ‘sensualists’, who look to the senses rather than to a world of ideas. Nietzsche allows
that an attempt to cling to a rigid set of ideas will still be liable to clash with the world
that empirical study can reveal.This is compatible with that empirical world being another
interpretive product. At best, this should be described as appearances clashing with certain
rigid ideas that have been distilled from those appearances and fixed.
The first above quotation suggests something stronger, namely that Nietzsche sub-
scribes to there being something that impinges on and constrains our experiences. The
danger here is of making Nietzsche into a transcendental idealist for whom there must be
a noumenal realm to ground experience. Of course, Nietzsche rejects this need, but it is
not as easy for him to do so as he suggests and there are times when he slips into that way
of thinking. For example, we have seen that he thinks of consciousness as a ‘commentary
on an unknown, perhaps unknowable, but felt text’ (D 119). Now, the ‘text’ in question
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presumably constrains interpretations otherwise it would be doing no work at all. But we
can not become aware of the text without commentating on it, therefore it is unknowable
in its original form.Wemight respond that we know about this ‘text’ as a result of scientific
understanding of the functioning of the human body. Nervous stimuli are simply part of
the natural world that we study in science. But even this scientific picture is an interpreta-
tion of an unknown text. This thought is expressed again when Nietzsche talks about us
turning ‘everything into a picture – our picture’ (GS 112). If indeed everything is merely
something turned into our picture, why even mention that which is turned into a picture?
Why not just say that we create pictures without committing to there being something
that is not our picture – and therefore inaccessible – that serves as the raw material to be
turned into our picture? If there is something that constrains our experience, but which
cannot itself be the subject of experiences, then Nietzsche is not that different from Kant.
One response to this would be to say that our experience involves organising sensations,
but that we still experience those sensations – albeit organised. That is to say, object of
experience function as vehicles for a given manifold of sensations to appear to us, where
those sensations are not simply the product of our minds, even if objects are. The difficulty
here is transparency: in experience, we can only attend to external properties inherent in
objects. But we know that Nietzsche thinks of this as an error of projecting something in-
ternal outwards; that is, of making something relational appear to be otherwise. We falsify
even our sensations.
An alternative constraint on perspectives is other perspectives. That is, we might
want to read Nietzsche as subscribing to a view on which perspectives are constrained
by the arrangement and content of existing perspectives. This is the strategy adopted by
Christoph Cox, who places Nietzsche alongside Nelson Goodman, W. V. Quine and
others whom he labels ‘ontological relativists’.51 Their view according to Cox is that there
are many adequate descriptions of the world – where adequacy is indexed to the aims and
purposes of a mode of enquiry – and, as such, there are many worlds. There is no world
to compare these two and decide which is ‘correct’, nor is it possible to reconcile all of
them to form a single description. But these descriptions are not arbitrary; but proposed
descriptions are constrained not by a world free of description, but by the existing de-
scriptions with which they have to cohere in some way. Thus constraints on descriptions
are internal to human life, but they are not internal to individuals, who are not free to
simply create new descriptions. Cox writes, referring to Goodman in a footnote, ‘what
reality there is and what constraints there are, Nietzsche argues, are provided solely by the
dominant, existing interpretations’.52
Although I agree with Cox that this constraint exists, it is hard to ignore what I high-
51Cox, Nietzsche, 155.
52Cox’s characterisation of the project of changing perspectives here is close to my own as outlined in this
thesis. See ibid., 160.
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lighted above, namely that Nietzsche continually refers to the unknown body that de-
termines our conscious experience, or that our translation of everything into our picture
supposes something to be translated. But I think one of the problems here lies with trying
to decide once and for all whether Nietzsche is an idealist or not; from Nietzsche’s per-
spective, this comes across as the attempt to answer the question once and for all whether
there is a world independent of the experience of the subject. Whether we adopt the view
that there is an unknown noumenal realm that constrains our experience or that perspec-
tives constrain one another is irrelevant to the question of constraint itself. Our experience
can be falsified by sensations that seem to undermine it; we can do science in such a way
that we can ‘uncover’ ‘facts’ that challenge existing perspectives. When we return to the
senses – or perhaps, as Husserl exclaimed, ‘back to the “things themselves”’53 – we might
just be returning to some deeper interpretation, still moving within idealism; or we might
be somehow butting up against an external world that we cannot directly experience. But
I take it that at this point, Nietzsche is simply not interested in the question. He is not
prepared to acknowledge that we require the noumenal to constrain our experiences any
more than he is willing to deny that it does so. But we could never know the nature of the
constraint or the nature of that which constrains, hence his indifference. What he attacks
Kant for is the requirement of a noumenal and then the use of that noumenal to ground
his project.
Having said that, Nietzsche is sometimes guilty of advancing positions that fall victim
to his attack on Kant. The field of sensations – the Nervenreize – that is supposedly fal-
sified to become conscious experience comes dangerously close to being an unknowable
thing-in-tself conditioning experience. These appeals to the idea of sensations are part of
Nietzsche’s choice to employ the work of neo-Kantians such as Lange to make his point
about the limitations of knowledge. Lange sought to show that an understanding of the
physiology of perception yielded Kantian conclusions. He pointed to the physiological
processes underlying perception to make the case that perception was irrevocably condi-
tioned by something comparable to Kant’s faculties. But something that science can reveal
to us in consciousness cannot then be declared to be beyond possible conscious experi-
ence. That is, we cannot say anything about the qualities of that subconscious content that
is processed to create experience except by first falsifying it so as to become aware of it.
Nietzsche should, then, simply remain agnostic regarding the existence of something, sen-
sation or otherwise, that is falsified to create experience, but which is never experienced.
His desire to vindicate his project by situating it in the natural sciences in this case over-
rides his caution with respect to talking about things-in-themselves. I will return to the
question of truth in chapter 4 when discussing incorporation. For now, the cultural dimen-
sion of Nietzsche’s project needs to be addressed and linked to the discussion of experience
53Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations, 2nd ed., ed. Dermot Moran (1900–1901; London: Routledge,
2001), 168.
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so far.
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Chapter 3
Culture in the Free Spirit Works
There are a handful of books and articles that place culture as a central theme in Nietzsche.
Many deal with his discussion in UM , or with culture as an overall theme across his work,
with only one notable book engaging exclusively with FSW .1 Of these texts, few take an
approach that seeks to separate and schematise Nietzsche’s various uses of ‘culture’. They
tend instead to talk about the kinds of culture in which Nietzsche is interested. We are
told that Nietzsche is in favour of a scientific culture, an artistic culture, some combination
of these. This is then supported with references to the kinds of behaviours and activities in
which members of such a culture engage. This is no doubt useful clarificatory work, but it
avoids the question of what ‘culture’ actually refers to. Vanessa Lemm, for example, in her
chapter on the distinction between culture and civilisation, goes to great lengths to detail
the different effects and tasks of culture, but does not actually venture a working definition.
At one point, she claims that ‘culture is the memory of animality and the affirming and
holding onto the human beings’ continuity with the animals’.2 How are we to make sense
of culture being a memory? Perhaps Lemm’s claim is that culture, whatever it is, serves to
remind us of our animality, but in that case, are we talking about culture as anthropological,
artistic, behavioural? This remains unclarified. Eric Blondel goes as far as to suggest that
culture ‘might well be nomore than a word, a pseudo-concept, referring only to the illusory
perception that man, an unconscious natural being, would have of the gap that in him and
around him separates nature from itself ’.3 This at least attempts to justify the failure to
give a coherent definition or even an outline of a definition, but it still leaves much to be
desired.
Jonathan Cohen, in response to the problem of finding a consistent theoretical defin-
ition, claims that in HH Nietzsche uses a ‘common-sense’ one. But this generates more
1See: Cohen, Science, Culture, and Free Spirits.
2Vanessa Lemm, Nietzsche’s Animal Philosophy: Culture, Politics, and the Animality of the Human Being (New
York: Fordham University Press, 2009), 17.
3Eric Blondel, Nietzsche, the Body and Culture: Philosophy as a Philological Genealogy (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1991), 44.
problems than it solves. ‘Culture’ can refer to acquired behaviours such as table manners;
but it is sometimes reserved for higher pursuits. Employing the latter, I can say that a
city ‘lacks culture’. On the former, this is clearly false: every city hosts acquired behaviours.
Which is the common-sense definition? Add to this the problem of whether the ‘common-
sense’ definition is ours or that of the 19th century. One can read Nietzsche without a
theory or definition of culture and still draw from him many interesting points. But this is
true of concepts such as drive, power, and free spirit. That a ‘common-sense’ understanding
allows us to form an interpretation, without theoretical work being undertaken we run the
risk of importing unannounced our own assumptions. Concepts like drive have received
extended theoretical treatment in the secondary literature and are better defined as a result.
Culture has received little such attention, despite being, in my view, one of FSW ’s central
concepts. In this chapter, I seek to do for culture, or at least start to do, what others have
done for key concepts in Nietzsche such as drive and power.
Elliot Jurist provides the most explicit schema, identifying three definitions: 1) habits
and practices, 2) self-fathoming, and 3) Bildung. I also take a tripartite approach. The
first category is what I will call the ‘anthropological definition’, which encompasses habits,
practices, mores, rituals and so on. This is in keeping with E.B. Tylor’s definition, which
Clifford Geertz has called the ‘classical definition’.4 Culture is ‘that complex whole which
includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits
acquired by man as a member of society’.5 In place of Jurist’s second definition, I talk
about communally mediated experience constitution. Finally, I replace Bildung with ‘self-
cultivation’. I deal with these in order, starting with anthropology
3.1 Anthropology
Nietzsche’s engagement with the question of culture changes from UM to FSW as part
of his wider endorsement of science. UM limits itself to a few millennia, but in HH ,
Nietzsche is clear that this really only scratches the surface of humanity. He claims early
that ‘everything essential in the development of mankind took place in primeval times, long
before the four thousand years we more or less know about; during these years mankind
may well not have altered very much’ (HH 2). Nietzsche’s interest is now in these early
conditions under which culture arose. This still has a practical dimension to it insofar as it
facilitates the management of culture:
if mankind is not to destroy itself through such conscious univer-
sal rule, it must first of all attain to a hitherto altogether unprece-
4Geertz,The Interpretation of Cultures, 47.
5Edward B. Tylor, Primitive Culture: Researches Into the Development of Mythology, Philosophy, Religion,
Art, and Custom, vol. 1 (London: John Murray, 1871), 1, http : / / books . google . co . uk / books ? id =
AucLAAAAIAAJ.
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dented knowledge of the preconditions of culturek as a scientific stan-
dard for ecumenical goals. Herein lies the tremendous task facing
the great spirits of the coming century.
The expansion of scope and formal acknowledgement that a deeper knowledge of human
history is necessary for cultural flourishing are accompanied by the use of ‘culture’ in an
anthropological sense, which was basically absent in UM . There, the opposite of culture
was barbarism; in FSW , barbarism is a stage of culture (D 113). Nietzsche is now using
it in the way that an anthropologist of the time would have, namely as referring to what
they might also have called ‘savagery’.
The anthropologists with whose work Nietzsche was familiar all subscribed to some-
thing like Tylor’s definition, and Nietzsche himself was familiar with it.6 Often applying
Darwinian principles, they sought to understand how and why customs came into exis-
tence. Much of what Nietzsche has to say on this topic is derivative of these thinkers. So
Nietzsche renders Bagehot’s claim that ‘a good rule is better than a bad one, but any rule is
better than none’ as ‘the mighty proposition with which civilisation begins: any custom is
better than no custom’ (D 16).7 Such examples are found throughoutFSW .8 ButNietzsche
does have some interesting things to say both about the functioning of custom and about
specific customs. But I see Nietzsche’s original contribution in his combining of the an-
thropological notions of customwith his commitments, as outlined in the previous chapter,
to the constitution of experience. That the entire experienced world might be profoundly
shaped by the application of inherited rules is a possibility that the above-mentioned an-
thropologists do not really investigate. They are more concerned with detailing habits and
behaviours, but, as we have seen, behaviour needs to be also understood with reference to
the experienced world in which it is situated. To understand the connection that Nietzsche
draws here, we need to know both his position on custom and its relation to the world of
appearances.
Nietzsche agrees with his anthropological contemporaries that custom arise in response
to survival pressure. In HH 224, he claims that the preservation of communities relies on
strong communal feeling. Elsewhere, he discusses the tendency for the needs of the com-
munity to be surreptitiously imposed on the individual (e.g. GS 21, 116). Strong customs
preserve communities, but there also arise various features of custom that lead it to be pre-
served within a community. Once a custom arises, it tends to become entrenched. One
such feature is that although customs often serve some function, their utility is hidden
6Nietzsche read Tylor’s Primitive Culture in translation in 1875. See http://www.thenietzschechannel.com/
global/library/t/tylor.htm, accessed: 13/06/2015.
7See: Walter Bagehot, Physics and Politics (1872; Kitchener, Ontario: Batoche Books, 2001), 18, accessed
March 5, 2013, http://www.efm.bris.ac.uk/het/bagehot/physics.pdf.
8On Nietzsche’s engagement with Bagehot and Lubbock respectively see: David S. Thatcher, ‘Nietzsche,
Bagehot and the Morality of Custom,’ Victorian Newsletter, no. 62 (1982): 7–32; David S.Thatcher, ‘Nietz-
sche’s Debt to Lubbock,’ Journal of the History of Ideas 44, no. 2 (1983): 293–309.
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from those who adopt them. This can be broken down into two parts: customs by defini-
tion preclude reason; and customs come to have a sanctity that creates fear over breaking
them and pleasure in following them, which further helps disguise their origins.
For Nietzsche, customs are mostly explained by their utility. His position on this is
even stronger than Darwin’s. The latter sees custom itself as having survival value, but
concedes that many customs arise that are not useful: ‘the strangest customs and supersti-
tions, in complete opposition to the true welfare and happiness of mankind, have become
all-powerful throughout the world’.9 Nietzsche sees the survival value even in these:
Among barbarous peoples there exists a species of customs whose
purpose appears to be custom in general: minute and fundamen-
tally superfluous stipulations. . . which, however, keep continually
in the consciousness the constant proximity of custom, the perpet-
ual compulsion to practise customs: so as to strengthen the mighty
proposition with which civilisation begins: any custom is better
than no custom. (D 16)
Custom is distinct from other utility-maximising behaviour by the fact that its utility does
not figure in the motivations of those who adopt it. Nietzsche is unequivocal about this:
‘What is tradition? A higher authority which one obeys, not because it commands what
is useful to us, but because it commands’ (D 9).10 Although this appears to involve acting
for reasons, I take Nietzsche to be making quite the opposite point, namely that doing
something simply because one is commanded to do so is precisely not to actually act for
reasons, even if one can form grammatical constructions that make tradition look like a
reason (‘because tradition commands’). Reflection and deliberation are usurped by blind
obedience. That customs are followed without the individual needing to engage in reason-
ing helps secure their longevity, since it is reasoning that has the capacity to undermine
them. Acting for concrete reasons makes one amenable to being persuaded by competing
reasons; one can have one’s reasons challenged. But simply obeying custom is, if strongly
inculcated, recalcitrant to reasons against one acting in certain ways. In this respect, custom
is comparable to faith.
Sometimes custom does seem to involve some form of reasoning. InD, it is followed to
avoids the retribution of vengeful gods or ancestral spirits. In primitive tribes, people tend
to believe that ‘punishment for breaches of custom will fall before all on the community’
(D 9). But although involving a reason, this is really an instance of reason being immured.
The real reasons for customs having come to be are obscured and never debated. Even the
apparent reasoning here is better characterised as an atmosphere of fear. Breaking custom
9Charles Darwin, The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex (London: John Murray, 1871; Chich-
ester: Princeton University Press, 1981), 99.
10Nietzsche uses ‘custom’ and ‘tradition’ almost interchangeably.
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acquires a kind of affectivity of foreboding; ‘atmosphere’ is the appropriate term, with
Nietzsche talking about gloomy skies, clouds and storms. In truth, this is not exclusive
to primitive tribes. Everyone I would wager has experienced the awkwardness or anger
that accompanies even minor infractions of taboos. A politically insensitive comment at
a liberal dinner party or an accidental swearword in a formal setting: the metaphor of an
atmosphere captures well the phenomenology of such cases. This fear is coupled with a
tendency to treat customs as sacred, which helps further suppress dissent over them or
investigation into their origins. Nietzsche writes ‘Every tradition now continually grows
more venerable the farther away its origin lies and the more this origin is forgotten. . .’
(HH 96). Finally, there is a degree of pleasure to be had in obeying customs: ‘One does
what is habitual better andmore easily and thus prefers to do it’ (HH 97).The combination
serves of fear, sanctity and pleasure serves to keep the majority of humankind firmly within
the narrow customs in which they are raised.
Nietzsche’s discussion of custom deals with the same anthropological material as Dar-
win’s and Bagehot’s. Customs are basically learnt rules of behaviour. Their content is easily
specified and understood by those who do not adhere to them.Without having been raised
in a tribe I can easily follow their custom of avoiding a certain plant that is deemed holy
or remember to take my shoes of when entering the house. What I cannot do easily is see
through the eyes of someone raised with those customs. Knowing how people behave and
seeing the world in the way that leads them to do so are different things, just as knowing
the grammatical rules of a foreign language and speaking it fluently are not the same. The
aforementioned anthropologists do not deal with phenomenology, but Nietzsche has a
great deal to say about the appearance of the world and its ground in the contingencies of
human cognition. To what extent is this cognition culturally specific? Could it be that our
understanding of a culture is not exhausted by descriptions of its prescribed behaviours,
but includes the world that is presented in experience to those whose lives unfold within
it? In what follows, I will show how Nietzsche’s anthropology is taken in this direction.
Our starting point is the notion of inherited evaluation. In chapter 2, evaluation was
said to be a feature of all life, which is always drawn and repelled by its environment in
accordance with its needs. The terms that Nietzsche uses for this are ‘aversion’ [Abnei-
gung] and ‘partiality’ or ‘inclination’ [Zuneigung or Neigung]. The degree to which these
are hard-wired in organisms differs depending on their place in the tree of life. Apes can
learn these, whereas bacteria cannot. For humans, aversions and inclinations are inherited
from the social environment at every stage of life, beginning in infanthood: ‘children ob-
serve in adults inclinations for and aversions to certain actions and, as born apes, imitate
these inclinations and aversions’ (D 34). Behavioural imitation leads to an imitation of the
feeling behind that behaviour. In the next aphorism, this point is pursued: ‘feelings are
nothing final or original: behind feelings there stand judgements and evaluations which
we inherit in the form of feelings (inclinations, aversions)’ (also D 111). The feelings we
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have are often the product of associations that we are only vaguely aware of. They act as a
kind of enforcer of the customs with which we grow up; this applies particularly with the
feeling of pleasure. Custom is ‘the union of the pleasant and the useful, and in addition it
demands no cogitation’ (HH 97). We have already seen that the constitution of experience
is the result of the activity of inclinations and aversions, as well as feelings, all of which
determine the appearance of the external world. As their product, our external world can
be said to be acquired.
This acquisition is not restricted to childhood:
. . .Why are inclination and aversion so contagious that it is hard
to live in the proximity of a person of strong feelings without be-
ing filled like a barrel with his For and Against?. . . our transition,
from indifference to inclination or aversion is in no way conscious;
we gradually accustom ourself to the sensibility of our environ-
ment, and because sympathetic agreement and accommodation is
so pleasant we soon bear all the marks and party colours of this
environment. (HH 371)
We live ‘in a fog of impersonal, semi-personal opinions, and arbitrary, as it were poetical
evaluations’ and ‘This fog of habits and opinions lives and grows almost independently of
the people it envelops’ (D 105).The idea of poetical evaluations recalls the processes in TL,
where the world that we took to be real was partly constituted through processes of poetic
and rhetorical intensification and decoration. Such processes are, we now see, guided by the
individual’s social environment. RecallingTL also reminds us of an activity that is governed
by acquired rules and which plays an important role in experience constitution: language
use. In TL, language – more accurately, transference – is the model for understanding all
experience constitution. Although culture is not really dealt with in the essay, the idea of
convention is. Nietzsche talks about. . .
. . .the obligation to be truthful, i.e. to use the customarymetaphors
or, to put it in moral terms, the obligation to lie in accordance with
a firm convention, to lie in droves in a style binding for all. Of
course man forgets that this is his predicament and therefore he
lies, in the manner described, unconsciously and according to the
habit of hundreds of years – and arrives at a sense of truth precisely
by means of this unconsciousness, this oblivion. (TL 1)
Although linguistic processes have their origin in deep history, the development of spe-
cific of experienced worlds is here measured in centuries. In D, language is involved in
experience constitution again, where evaluations are ‘only images and fantasies’ that result
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from the employment of ‘a kind of acquired language for designating certain nervous stim-
uli’ (D 119). This is identified as the language that comments on the ‘text’ of sensations.
Consciousness arises through the use of language, which in turn is embedded in the in-
herited rules of particular cultures. That is not to say there are not shared features of all
languages. But even so, without the presence of the community and its enforcing of norms,
individuals do not acquire language of any kind, as testified to by cases of feral children.
If language is fundamental to the constitution of experience, then it should place a limit
on experience. At times, Nietzsche commits to the view that thought at least is constrained
by language:
Words present in us. – We always express our thoughts with the
words that lie to hand. Or, to express my whole suspicion: we have
at any moment only the thought for which we have to hand the
words. (D 257; see also D 115)
Recalling the idea of existing within a fog, Nietzsche writes in 1880 ‘we arrive at thoughts
via the words that swim around us’ (NF 1880 2[31]).11 There is evidence elsewhere that
Nietzsche uses thought in a fairly broad sense. In HH 16, he outlines the historical devel-
opment appearances that accompanied human evolution. While this passage clearly deals
with conscious experience, Nietzsche describes it as ‘a history of the genesis of thought’.
This is further supported by HH 11, where the ‘significance of language for the evolution
of culture’ is in its creating ‘a world beside the other world’. Nietzsche pursues the familiar
idea that language involves taking there to be essences independent of the individual to
which words are adequate. He also identifies logic as the source of the presupposition ‘that
there are identical things, that the same thing is identical at different points of time’.
In the next section, I will explore in more depth the connection between language and
consciousness. First, it is worth mentioning another link between culture and conscious-
ness. Chapter 2 saw dreaming as a blueprint for all conscious experience. In HH 12 –
Dream and culturek – Nietzsche claims that our dreams are constituted in the same way
that primitive cultures constitute all experience. The cultural significance of dreams seems
to lie in the fact that they are a window into the formative years of culture. Later, inD 119,
culture and dreaming are associated again, except this time waking life, even in modern
culture, is not exempt from the interpretive practices of dreaming: ‘when we compare very
different stages of culturek we even find that freedom of waking interpretation in the one
is in no way inferior to the freedom exercised in the other while dreaming. . .’. The compar-
ison of cultures is here a matter of comparing the interpretive practices that they employ
in the creation of experiences. All cultures interpret, but some are able to reign in their
tendency to wild interpretation. This foreshadows Nietzsche’s realisation in GS that no
stage of culture is free from illusion, a realisation the groundwork for which is already
11Durch die Worte, die uns umschweben, kommen wir auf Gedanken.
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present in HH . Dreams and language are culturally significant because culture is a matter
of experience constitution.
I have covered two of the definitions of culture that I presented at the beginning of the
chapter. Culture in the anthropological sense refers to a body of acquired rules. Acquiring
these rules gives rise to our experience of a world of meaningful, value-laden objects. To
know that a tribe views a flood as the will of a deity is not the same as experiencing that
flood as an act of will. To be able to describe the uses of a word is not the same as hearing
the word as meaningful. Anthropology deals in description, but for a project of incorpo-
ration we need to engage in the phenomenology of culture, which means engaging with
the meaningful, valuable objects as presented experience. Why this is will become clearer
in chapter 4. Before then, I will to further cement the connection between language, com-
munity and consciousness by looking at a late addition to GS, namely aphorism 354.
3.2 Consciousness and Language in GS 354
His clearest thought on that topic comes in GS 354, which is part of book 5 and, there-
fore, a later piece of work. This aphorism has received a great deal of attention from those
working on Nietzsche, in part because it is one of his clearest expressions of his position
on consciousness. In GS 354, consciousness is said to be linguistic and, as such, to be
an expression of a community or ‘herd’ perspective. These three themes – consciousness,
language, communal perspective – are all central to FSW , which is why I take this later
aphorism to be important. My discussion focuses on a prominent 2005 paper by Paul Kat-
safanas12 and a forthcoming one by Mattia Riccardi13 that responds to it. I will present a
third reading that contains elements of both of these accounts, but emphasises conscious-
ness’ experiential world-directedness.
Katsafanas claims that for Nietzsche the conceptual articulation of a mental state is
necessary and sufficient for it to be conscious.Mental states can be unconscious, but in such
cases they are articulated non-conceptually. Words and concepts are connected insofar as
language is necessary for conceptualisation, although we may possess more concepts than
we have words for. Katsafanas denies that mere discriminatory abilities are sufficient to
ascribe concepts to something, claiming that animals and newborn babies can discriminate
between things, even though they lack the relevant concepts:
a newborn baby can look at a white cat, and her perception will
represent the white cat. The newborn lacks the concepts CAT and
12Katsafanas, ‘Nietzsche’s Theory of Mind.’
13Riccardi, ‘Nietzsche on the Superficiality of Consciousness,’ I would like to thank Mattia Riccardi for
generously sending me the final draft of his forthcoming paper and for allowing me to quote from it. Page
numbers refer to this raft, a version of which is available at http : / /www.mattiariccardi .net /Uploads/
Riccardi_Superficiality_penultimate_draft.pdf. For the full paper see.
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WHITE, so the content of her perception cannot be conceptually
articulated; the constituents of her perception’s content cannot be
concepts.14
Concepts involve a type-token relation.The newborn baby does not recognise the object as
an instance of the type cat, even though she can distinguish it from, say, a black dog that is
sitting next to it. She can represent the white cat, but she cannot represent it as a white cat.
Katsafanas goes on the detail two further distinctive features of conceptualisation proper:
[the human being] can relate the concept FOOD to other con-
cepts, for her concept FOOD is part of a whole system of concepts
which stand in various relations to one another. Second, these con-
cepts can be employed in non-perceptual contexts.
Conceptualisation distinguishes conscious from unconscious mental states. This is partly
motivated by the fact that, for Nietzsche, the ego is a myth. There is no ‘inner eye’ that is
aware of mental states in virtue of which they can be said to be conscious; there is no Carte-
sian theatre. Katsafanas seeks to preserve the conscious/unconscious distinction without
relying on this illusory faculty. I have agreed throughout this thesis that consciousness
should be taken seriously in Nietzsche, denying its epiphenomenal nature. Katsafanas also
holds this position, which is why he seeks to prevent consciousness from being undermined
by the undermining of a certain understanding of the ego.
Mattia Riccardi’s alternative view claims that mental states are conscious in virtue of
their being the subject of a higher order thought. For example, the mental state ‘desiring
p’ is conscious if and only if accompanied by a higher order thought to the effect ‘I de-
sire p’, or ‘I am in a state of desiring p’. This shifts the emphasis away from consciousness
as a matter of conceptualisation towards consciousness as self-consciousness. Riccardi re-
jects Katsafanas’ claim that conceptualisation and consciousness are coextensive, claiming
that, for Nietzsche, there can be unconscious conceptualisation. This erodes an important
foundation for Katsafanas’ overall interpretation of GS 354.
Riccardi’s argument is based on only a partial reading of Katsafanas. Referring to Kat-
safanas, Riccardi writes:
the kind of conceptualisation responsible for falsification at the
perceptual level is generalisation. What seems problematic, how-
ever, is the further assumption according to which such a general-
isation requires a mental state to be conscious and consequently –
given Nietzsche’s view – language-dependent.15
14Katsafanas, ‘Nietzsche’s Theory of Mind,’ 4.
15Riccardi, ‘Nietzsche on the Superficiality of Consciousness,’ 11.
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We can indeed imagine generalisation occurring that does not require this assignment to a
type and which is therefore not conceptual by Katsafanas’ lights. Riccardi invokes the idea
of a sensory template, which is another way of reading Nietzsche’s phrase ‘pictoral signs’
(BGE 268), as a way of thinking about the generalisation that occurs below the level of
consciousness:
perceptual concepts are something like ‘sensory templates’ that we
form when we first come across some object O and then reactivate
on successive encounters with objects of the same kind.16
Riccardi then asks whether this would count as an instance of recognising O as belonging
to some type, which he answers in the affirmative, referring to one of Nietzsche’s source for
GS 354, Otto Liebmann. Liebmann was part of the ‘back to Kant’ movement in Germany,
something in which Nietzsche was heavily invested. He indeed thinks that animals and
newborns classify objects in the way Katsafanas requires. But Riccardi does not provide
any references to Nietzsche actually endorsing this claim. That Nietzsche was invested in
Liebmann’s overall project is scant evidence for his endorsement of specific and technical
claims, just as his investment in Darwin’s overall project of naturalising human origins
need not commit him to specific claims in Darwin’s work. But even if Nietzsche held
the view that sensory templates or pictoral signs count as classificatory, this would not
suffice to render them conceptual on Katsafanas’ view. For Katsafanas, concepts relate to
one another, forming a conceptual system. This is a necessary feature of conceptualisation,
meaning that sensory templates, or pictoral signs, should not be called conceptual unless
they enter into such relations. Riccardi does not consider this feature of conceptualisation
before he concludes ‘generalisation is a kind of falsification-involving conceptual capacity
which falls the wrong side of the divide Nietzsche draws at the beginning of GS 354,
namely on the side also populated by animals’.17 Katsafanas can simply deny that this is a
conceptual capacity because generalisations do not relate to one other as concepts do.
There is yet more to this disagreement, since for Katsafanas, the distinction between
classification and discrimination is connected with the systematic nature of concepts. He
tells us that classifcation ‘might seem like a mere discriminatory ability, but it is not, for
the following reasons: concepts are systematically related to other concepts, and concepts
can be employed in non-perceptual contexts’.18 Without a conceptual system there cannot
be any kind of classification. Therefore Liebmann’s view cannot actually be ascribed to
Nietzsche. Why do concepts need to be structured to count as classifications? Katsafanas
does not address this question, so I would like to suggest one reason that we might occupy
such a position. When we classify an individual as being of the type CAT, we also classify
16Riccardi, ‘Nietzsche on the Superficiality of Consciousness,’ 12.
17Ibid., 13.
18Katsafanas, ‘Nietzsche’s Theory of Mind,’ 8–9.
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it as being of the type ANIMAL. To possess the concept CAT, one must also possess
the concept ANIMAL, along with a host of other concepts. It is intuitive to think that
someone who does not think that cats are animals simply does not possess the relevant
concept CAT. ANIMAL is a type to which cats belong. Concepts are structured such that
the more determinate concepts rest on the less determinate. The newborn might well be
able to distinguish animals from, say stones. Shemight also be able to distinguish cats from
dogs. But she does not take cats to be animals. She simply lacks the relevant conceptual
scheme that would allow for this. If we pursue this conceptual scheme from the more to
the less determinate where would we end up? Is there a type to which everything else
belongs? A possible candidate for such a type would be OBJECT in its broadest sense.
Calling this a concept is odd, however, since it is not immediately obvious what kind of
discrimination it allows. Does it make sense to have a category that contains everything?
Should such a thing be called a category? But there is a candidate for another category at
this level, namely SUBJECT. To see how this might work, we need to return to Riccardi
briefly.
Katsafanas, as has beenmentioned, recognisesNietzsche’s dissolution of the ego and he
seeks to preserve the distinction between conscious and unconsciousmental states.He does
this by characterising them without reference to the ego, citing instead their conceptual
nature. Riccardi takes the opposite approach. For him, consciousness is only present in
virtue of the ego or, more accurately, a higher order thought that involves the positing
of an ego. This is the falsification for which language is responsible in GS 354. Riccardi
writes:
we are led to believe that there is an ‘I’ which acts as the bearer
of the relevant mental attitudes. In Nietzsche’s eyes, this is due
to the syntactical structure of our conscious thought. However, he
argues, on this point language simple misleads us.19
This positing of an ego arises from the need to communicate mental states, which involves
forming higher order thoughts about those states; this in turn requires creating an ego to
which they can be ascribed. Riccardi takes consciousness to be self-consciousness both be-
cause it involves higher order thoughts about mental states and because in forming those
thoughts, the self as we know it is effectively created. Nietzsche’s association between con-
sciousness and the creation of the ego goes far back into FSW , and the evidence that this
self-consciousness is present in GS 354 is convincing: ‘[man] had to express his neediness
and be able to make himself understood – and to do so, he first needed “consciousness”,
i.e. to even “know”what distressed him, to “know” howhe felt, to “know”what he thought’.
Consciousness here is synonymous with knowledge of mental states, which is exactly what
Riccardi claims. Moreover, it is difficult to make sense of this passage if there is nothing
19Riccardi, ‘Nietzsche on the Superficiality of Consciousness,’ 14.
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surveying mental states. Even if that ego which forms higher order thoughts is an illusion
as the result of language, it nonetheless seems that forming said illusion is necessary for
the development of consciousness. However, I want to put pressure on Riccardi’s focus
on self-consciousness by suggesting a reading that incorporates both a conceptual scheme
with intentionality as its foundation and the notion of a unified ego.The claim will be that
it is only in positing an ego that we also posit a world of objects. This single act that creates
the intentional structure of conscious experience.
On Riccardi’s reading, only higher order thoughts about mental states are linguistic.
Some words clearly pick out mental states and we can imagine someone wanting to com-
municate those states. Being in a state of compassion is something that one might wish to
communicate. One might form the higher order thought ‘I feel compassion for this per-
son’ and communicate that thought. As we know fromD 133, the word ‘compassion’ does
not actually refer to any unified thing, but rather falsifies a vast array of discrete, selfish
calculations. To the extent that ‘compassion’ has any meaning, it has to falsify. Although
D 133 makes no mention of communication, language is already involved in the falsifi-
cation of mental states. Notice, however, that ‘compassion’ makes no secret of referring
to a mental state. We do not take compassion to be out there in the world except in the
form of a mental state. This is part of our theory of mind, which Riccardi claims to be the
socially acquired error that features in consciousness. Contrast this with the word ‘tree’,
which refers to a different kind of entity. When we use the word ‘tree’, we do not make
explicit reference to a mental state. When we run Nietzsche’s evolution of language story
for this case, we see a similar difference. I might say to you ‘I feel compassion for you’, in
which case I am communicating a mental state; equally, I might say ‘there is a tree behind
that ridge’. The latter case makes no reference to my mental state. It is not reducible ‘I
believe there is a tree behind that ridge’. Were that the case, we could not make sense of
the fact that ‘there is a tree behind that ridge’ can be false, while ‘I believe there is a tree
behind that ridge’ can be true. To put the point simply, we use language to talk about men-
tal states and to talk about objects in the world. If higher order thoughts are exclusively
about mental states and they are the only domain of language, this object talk needs to be
accounted for.
One response open to Riccardi is to say that mental states make reference to objects.
To have higher order thoughts about those mental states allows language to refer to objects.
For example, the mental state of seeing a tree might be rendered conscious by being the
subject of a higher order thought that uses the word ‘I’ as well as the word ‘tree’. When
I say ‘I see a tree’, I falsely take there to be an ego, a mental state of seeing and a tree.
When unconscious mental states are feature in higher order thoughts, every element in
them becomes linguistic and therefore falsified in line with ‘socially mediated propositional
articulation’, as Riccardi calls it.20 In this example, the subject is the ‘I’, the mental state
20Riccardi, ‘Nietzsche on the Superficiality of Consciousness,’ 2.
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is ‘seeing’, and the object is ‘tree’. Riccardi accounts for the first as we have seen, but he
also accounts for the second, claiming that there is a generalisation involved in picking
out a mental state. It is a generalisation that is socially mediated: ‘Nietzsche seems to hold
that we interpret our own mental states in light of a socially developed “theory of mind”:
we attribute to ourselves the same types of mental states we also attribute to others’.21
Seeing, believing, pitying, or fearing that p are all socially constructed names for mental
attitudes to p. It is these attitudes that constitute the type of mental state one is in, and
these that come from a socially developed theory of mind. However, this leaves out p itself.
That is to say, it supposes only that the type of mental state is falsified, when in fact, the
content is also falsified. When I say ‘I see a tree’, I am positing an ego, attributing it the
mental attitude of seeing, and taking there to be an entity called a ‘tree’. Riccardi thus
faces a dilemma. He could claim that the type of mental state one is in is determined by
its content, i.e. the object that it takes. That way, the entire mental state would be falsified
linguistically. But then there will have to be a different type of mental state for every single
possible object of experience. Or he could claim that the content of the mental state is
not subject to falsification, only its type is. But then he needs to deny that words like ‘tree’
falsify in a way that is socially mediated. But surely anything linguistic is socially mediated
on his reading. This dilemma is not a difficult one to escape from: Riccardi simply needs
to modify his account so that the content of mental states as well as their type are part
of the falsification involved in consciousness. However, in this case, what was a theory of
mind is now a theory both of mind and of world.
Riccardi’s position is not as much contradictory as it is incomplete. He places too much
emphasis on the subject side of the subject/object divide. I take there to be a symmetry
between the positing of an ego and the positing of objects: between a theory of mind and a
theory of world, so to speak. Evidence of this symmetry can be traced right back to before
FSW . Compare, for example, Riccardi’s characterisation of ego constitution with a much
earlier note from 1872. Riccardi writes ‘we are led to believe that there is an “I” which acts
as the bearer of the relevant mental attitudes’;22 Nietzsche writes ‘we produce beings as
the bearers of characteristics’ (NF 1872 19[236]).23 In this note, Nietzsche discusses both
the falsification of the subject and of objects, in this case trees. He is keen to emphasis the
dual nature of this fantasy. In FSW , the errors of language are clearly object directed (e.g.
HH 39, D 133).
One of Riccardi’s moves is to point to the indexical structure of higher order thoughts.
The thought ‘I desire that p’ is only possible with reference to an ‘I’. But this grammar also
21Riccardi, ‘Nietzsche on the Superficiality of Consciousness,’ 9.
22Ibid., 14.
23See also NF 1885 2[87]: ‘the “thing” in which we believe was only invented as the foundation for various
predicates’ (das „Ding“ an das wir glauben, ist nur als Ferment zu verschiedenen Prädikaten hinzuerfun-
den).
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relies on objects in the majority of cases.24 Moreover, the object of the sentence is only
the object as compared with the subject. To exclaim ‘tree’ need not involve picking out an
object nor to pick out a subject. This returns us to the problem of how OBJECT might be
said to be a classification. If objects only exist as objects in virtue of being distinguished
from subjects, then to conceive of an object already presupposes that I conceive of myself.
That is, we must take there to be a self in order to take there to be an other. Consciousness
arises in this moment of diremption. This is similar to Hegel’s claim that ‘Consciousness
simultaneously distinguishes itself from something, and at the same time relates itself to
it’.25 Seen like this, it becomes clear why talk of ‘sensory templates’ as involving object
recognition is misleading. A finger print recognition system can respond to a template,
but the finger print is not thereby an object for it. It only becomes an object for it when
it has the capacity to distinguish itself from the object. It is only with some form of self-
consciousness that object consciousness arises.26
The reading I have given, like Katsafanas’, connects consciousness with conceptualisa-
tion. What is the nature of this connection? This breaks down into two questions. Does
Nietzsche think that whatever is conscious is necessarily conceptual? Does he think that
whatever is unconscious is non-conceptual?The fact that consciousness is a linguistic affair
suggests that he indeed thinks that consciousness is inherently conceptual. Consciousness
takes place in language, although I take it that Nietzsche here thinks of language as in-
cluding concepts for which there are not single words. But can consciousness include non-
conceptual content? Certain common examples of non-conceptual perceptual content in
contemporary philosophy of mind are ruled out. Three examples stand out:
Contradictory States of Affairs We experience illusions that require entertaining contra-
dictions, for example Escher paintings. Conceptual content cannot be contra-
dictory in this way.
Nature is Analogue Nature does not divide neatly in the ‘digital’ way that concepts do; it
is rather an ‘analogue’ affair.
Fineness of Grain Experience is more fine-grained than conceptual frameworks could
ever allow for.
These examples are all ones that Nietzsche is likely to reject given his comments on con-
sciousness. He claims that in becoming conscious we impose the laws of logic on our expe-
24I say in the majority of cases because a complete sentence should technically contain a subject, verb and
object, there are exceptions that do not strictly contain an object, for example ‘I see clearly’, ‘I dine out
regularly’, ‘I cry’. Notice, however, that such sentences are useless for communicating almost anything of
the kind that Nietzsche has in mind in the aphorism.
25G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V. Miller (1807; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979),
§82.
26Poellner makes a similar point when writing on Nietzsche: ‘Even if we assume, then, that a subject might
find itself in this way entirely passively enjoying experiences as of spatial particulars, this would not yet
allow for a distinction between a self and real objects’. Poellner, ‘Perspectival Truth,’ 104.
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rience, suggesting that he thinks of genuinely contradictory experience as precluded from
consciousness (so much the worse for consciousness, perhaps); how he would respond to
examples such as Escher paintings is unknown. He also claims that we divide up a contin-
uum when we consciously experience; this favours the view that he thinks of experience
as digital and not analogue. Conscious experience, he would claim, is conditional on this
division, so he likely to deny the fluidity of conscious experience. Finally, the idea that
the world is more fine-grained than concepts allow for is precisely Nietzsche’s problem
with consciousness. It simplifies by employing broad brush strokes. This would surely not
be a problem if conscious experience really were fine-grained; Nietzsche I take it thinks
that in becoming conscious, fineness of grain is sacrificed to some extent presumably, in
part, because concepts are employed. These are only preliminary considerations. I suspect
a full answer to the question of non-conceptual content in Nietzsche would run out of
textual support very quickly. Nietzsche did not have the conceptual framework or perhaps
inclination to answer such questions in depth. It is not vital to my argument that we take
a position either way, but, for the sake of clarity, an attempt at answering the question of
concepts and consciousness is warranted.
This brings us to the second question: does unconscious mean non-conceptual? We
know that concepts proper only arise with consciousness. However, this does not entail
that concepts are only employed in consciousness. It is compatible with the idea that con-
cepts arising in the development of consciousness might come to be employed outside of
that context. In other words, it might be that the subconscious representations of con-
scious beings differ from those of beings who were never conscious. Whether Nietzsche
holds this position is difficult to answer from his texts alone. He clearly thinks that human
beings have become homogenised to a large extent as a result of being part of communi-
ties held together by herd perspectives. Incorporation, after all, is not merely an aim of
his philosophy; that which he struggles against has also been incorporated at some point.
This is often cashed out as a matter of inculcating shared conceptual frameworks. One
way to understand this is to say that what occurs below consciousness is not conceptual in
the sense of genuinely picking out objects qua objects. It might simply involve consistent
response to stimuli. But the pattern of this response might be deeply embedded in the
conceptual scheme that is employed at a conscious level. That way, the homogenisation of
consciousness can make the whole individual homogeneous to a certain extent, without
the need to talk of the unconscious as genuinely engaging with objects as a true subject
engages with its world.
The interpretation that I have presented runs into a problem towards the end of the
aphorism, where Nietzsche writes ‘it is not the opposition between subject and object
which concerns me here; I leave that distinction to those epistemologists who have got
tangled up in the snares of grammar’. Does this not undermine all of my talk of subjects
and objects? On closer reading, I think this actually vindicates rather than condemns my
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interpretation.The second half of the sentence gives us the first clue. Nietzsche claims that
he wants to avoid entering into the discursive framework of those ensnared in grammar,
but this does not mean that he does not want to talk about the framework itself.27 Indeed,
that is precisely what he does talk about. He is best read as saying that once we reflect
on the snares of grammar, we realise that the distinction between subject and object is
misleading. This seems to threaten an interpretation that rests on that distinction. But
there is another way to read the claim. Suppose that Nietzsche’s target view, which he
attributes to ‘folk metaphysics’, is that there exist external objects on which we can all take
a perspective. There is a shared world of objects and there are subjects whose experience
allows them access to those objects. If so, then GS 354 could be read as a discussion of
how subjects fail to come into contact with objects. If, however, he simply does not think
there are any objects without subjects – that the only objects that it even makes sense
to talk about are intentional objects – then questions about what objects are really like
independent from subjects would be irrelevant and misguided. That he goes straight on
to also distance himself from talk of things-in-themselves suggests that this is indeed the
line of thought he is taking.
The interpretation that I have been giving brings together Katsafanas and Riccardi.
It relies on conceptualisation proper being restricted to consciousness. To classify objects
already means to employ a conceptual structure, which in turn relies on the kinds of con-
nections between concepts that can only be achieved by higher cognition and language. In
this, I agree with Katsafanas. However, employing a conceptual structure in this manner
already supposes that one distinguishes oneself from the world of which one is conscious.
It already relies on taking there to be a subject and an object, which relies on the positing
of a unified ego. This allows the individual to take themselves to be the bearer of men-
tal states, but it also allows them to posit external objects that can act as the bearers of
characteristics. This is to be contrasted with simply responding consistently to roughly the
same sensory input on different occasions. Because of this symmetry, the constructed ego,
although a myth, cannot be discounted from the story of consciousness any more than the
objects of consciousness can be discounted because they are falsifications.28 Both myths
arise together, they are bound together and they are codified in a grammar that, as far as
Nietzsche or we are aware, is universal to human language communities. As such, self-
consciousness is required for consciousness, just as Riccardi claimed, but consciousness is
not exhausted by a higher order thought account.
The work of interpreting GS 354, even though it comes much later in Nietzsche’s
thought, pays off in the connection between perspectivism, experience constitution and
herd mentality. As Nietzsche renders it:
27Of course, he has to enter to into it insofar as he uses language. But he does so cautiously and aware of
not falling for its traps.
28In BGE 54, Nietzsche makes clear that the ego is not transcendental, but is rather the product of the the
thinking process. But by ‘product’ here, I take him to mean that it is bound up with the process of thinking.
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due to the nature of consciousness – to the ‘genius of the species’
governing it – our thoughts themselves are continually as it were
outvoted and translated back into the herd perspective. . . . every-
thing which enters consciousness thereby becomes shallow, thin,
relatively stupid, general, a sign, a herd-mark; that all becoming
conscious involves a vast and thorough corruption, falsification,
superficialization, and generalization.
Nietzsche seems to be committed to the view that grammar is universal in humans.29 How-
ever, that does not make it any less a matter of culture. On Nietzsche’s account, without
learning a language, human infants would not develop consciousness or self-awareness
that comes with employing it. Similarly, they would not develop object awareness proper.
However, the general structure of true languages permits a vast range of variation, both
grammatically and in vocabulary. When Nietzsche talks about the herd perspective, we are
inclined to think that he is referring to the universal grammar that gives rise to conscious-
ness.30 But there are clearly many herds with many perspectives. The herd perspective in
this case also applies to the specifics of the herd in which an individual is raised.
We are in a position to pass a verdict on the topic of culture as experience constitution.
As early as TL, we see it being linked with customs whose age is measured in centuries.
This allows for a great deal of cultural variation. In FSW , we see the interpretation involved
in dreaming rendered as a process of experience constitution; this is linked to culture. In
D, this process is also said to govern our waking lives and the cultural link is iterated. Fur-
thermore, inD, it is the status of consciousness that is at stake. Consciousness is described
in terms of an ‘acquired language’ that allows for the interpretation of nervous stimuli.
Consciousness here is object-directed, as we see in Nietzsche’s main example, which is
of interpreting another’s laughter. It is cultural, linguistic and a matter of experience con-
stitution. The acquisition of language we can assume operates in a similar way to that of
values: infants imitate adults and even adults constantly and unconsciously take on features
of their social surroundings. They live ‘in a fog’ of values, words, judgements and so on; in
short, a culture. When we arrive at GS 354, this experience constitution is tied to becom-
ing conscious, which is in turn connected with occupying the perspective or perspectives
of those that surround one. At the deepest level, one’s consciousness is not the personal,
private and immediately knowable entity that many philosophers have thought it to be: it
is defined through and through by the culture in which one finds oneself. It is, paradoxi-
cally, the least individual part of oneself. Culture, then, is not merely ‘that complex whole
29This should not be confused with a Chomskian notion of universal grammar, which holds certain rules
to be innate to humans. Nietzsche’s view is compatible with grammar being learned, and therefore not
strictly universal, since an infant might fail to acquire these rules; the rules are universal in the sense that
they are common to all language communities, which is, de facto, all known human communities.
30This should not be confused with the kind of innate grammar proposed by Chomsky. See Noam Chomsky,
Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1965).
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which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and
habits acquired by man as a member of society’: it is the external world that we experience
as a result of such things. It is the root of experience as such, the origin of all appear-
ances. This insight has far-reaching implications for the communal aspects of Nietzsche’s
project of culture; these are the topic of chapter 6. But it also effects culture in the sense of
self-cultivation. It suggests that consciousness should be an important rather than fringe
consideration in self-cultivation. That is what the rest of this chapter focuses on.
3.3 Cultivation
Human evolution for Nietzsche has involved the homogenisation of the human animal.
This has taken various forms and operated at different depths of the psyche.Many powerful
drives have been tamed that in animals express freely.31 The difference between present
and past is that we are now in a position to take control of this and ‘to watch over the
destiny of culturek with a sharp eye in future’. When culture ‘led an unconscious animal-
and plant-life’ (HH 24), continual checks had to develop to keep it on track. Conscious
culture can recognise the necessity of managing the drives and no longer requires coercing.
I take Nietzsche here to mean consciousness in the sense of reflection on oneself rather
than simply undergoing conscious experience. Although this taming process is used in the
context of customs, we know that the deeper level of rule-following had to develop under
the same conditions.
This acknowledgement that Nietzsche sees culture both as regulating drives and as
allowing consciousness to arise means that we are in a position to view conscious self-
cultivation either as continuing the work of regulating drives, continuing the work of ex-
perience constitution, or both. I favour the final option.32 Nietzsche has both in mind, but
consciousness has been overlooked in favour of focusing on drives. In what follows, I first
put pressure on self-cultivation being cashed out in purely drive terminology, before pro-
viding an alternative. I explore the drive cultivation model through the lens of the analogy
of the garden.
3.3.1 The Garden Analogy for Drives
Self-cultivation is the subject of various analogies in FSW , but the most prominent is that
which compares the self to a garden.33 In addition to direct comparisons between garden
31Here Nietzsche follows Bagehot’s use of the concept of taming as applied to human cutural development.
See Bagehot, Physics and Politics, 32.
32Ansell Pearson links these, claiming that culture has given us the regularity to become great, but also
claiming that we are not to throw away consciousness in this endeavour. Instead, we need to employ
concepts in new ways. See Keith Ansell Pearson, ‘Incorporation and Individuation: On Nietzsche’s Use of
Phenomenology for Life,’ Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 38, no. 1 (2007): 75–79.
33This occurs in D 174, 382, 560 and .
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and self, FSW is littered with gardening metaphors. Culture is associate with trellis, soil,
fungus, plant, shoot, weed, vineyard, fruitful field.34 There are two main contributions of
this analogy. By comparing them to drives, it gives us a way to think about themanagement
of the latter. It also provides a way of thinking about the self as a complex that we can
modify to produce an aesthetically valuable whole. In what follows I put pressure on two
assumptions that underlie this analogy.The first is that self-cultivation primarily addresses
drives directly; the second is that the self can be appreciated by the individual in the same
manner as a garden, thus allowing them to assess its aesthetic properties in an equivalent
fashion. Although the garden analogy itself is not extensively studied in the secondary
literature, these two assumptions are pervasive. Before looking at the garden analogy, I
briefly examine the notion of direct drive cultivation.
Nietzsche details the techniques involved in drive cultivation in D 109, where he lists
six ways to ‘combat the vehemance of a drive’. Aphorisms such as this lend support to
the idea that self-cultivation deals directly with drives. But if this directness is taken to
be an introspective affair, then this account immediately runs into difficulties. As early as
TL, Nietzsche demonstrates deep scepticism about our access to our complex underlying
psyche. He claims that man lives ‘as if he were hanging in his dreams from the back of a
tiger’ (TL 1). Our conscious lives are supported by many subtle processes unknown to us.
This is partly the result of the inherent simplification involved in trying to reflect on our
inner lives. D 115 states the problem as follows:
Anger, hatred, love, pity, desire, knowledge, joy, pain – all are
names for extreme states: the milder, middle degrees, not to speak
of the lower degrees which are continually in play, elude us, and
yet it is they which weave the web of our character and our destiny.
There are two problems here for a theory of direct drive cultivation. First, focus on that
which we can name introspectively is destined to be shallow and to ignore that which
weaves ‘the web of our character’. Second, the states listed here are not obviously drives
even if, for example pain and knowledge, involve drives. Since these are names for extreme
states, we might still maintain that only in naming them do different types of state arise;
in reality, there are just different configurations of drives. Even so, in cultivating ourselves
directly, we would have to expose the drives that underpin each state, which relies precisely
on the access to the unconscious that we are denied. The material that we work with in
introspective attempts to self-cultivate is almost cartoonish in its simplicity.
That only simple states are introspectively accessible has led commentators to illustrate
drive theory and its associated model of self-cultivation by focusing on relatively unam-
biguous cases such as hunger and thirst. There is value in starting with clear-cut examples,
but if we commit to drives as operating at all levels, we are still faced with the considerable
34See, in order,WS 275, HH 45, D 382, D 435, D 560, GS 289, GS 87,WS 275.
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challenge of applying the lessons from things like hunger to the rest of the psyche. With
hunger, we have a clear ‘drive’ towards food in the sense that we feel drawn to it. We also
experience a lack that an object promises to fill. Our having the drive disposes us to seek
out food. But can all of these features be transposed to cases of memory, representation, or
emotion? I do not deny that they can, but Nietzsche’s texts under-determine such a project.
Still, hunger does serve as amodel for some important drives.The feeling of being drawn to
something that can fill a void in us is common to many scenarios amenable to explanation
in drive terms.These are important in self-cultivation, but far from exhaust the weaving of
our character. The garden model, which deals with such drives, is at worst limited rather
than useless. The task now is to see to what in it, and its underlying assumptions, is usable.
One strength of the analogy is that plants are a goodmetaphor for certain drives. Plants
grow continuously unless hampered by the environment or the gardener. Some plants are
vigorous growers which need to be constantly kept in check to prevent them taking over.
Others are nearly impossible to eradicate. For those in whom the hunger drive causes
weight problems, for example, these could be useful parallels. It may help someonemanage
their hunger by recognising it as a blind force with a life of its own, which does not need
to be eradicated, but merely controlled before it gets out of hand. The plant metaphor can
be stretched to help us understand cultivation of multiple drives. If I want to control a
particularly fast-growing plant I might prune it, which is the equivalent of exercising self-
control over one’s hunger drive. Or I might restrict its nutrients, which in the hunger case
might amount to avoiding situations or experiences that stir the drive. I could introduce
competition, encouraging the growth of plants/drives that compete with the one I seek to
suppress. If I nurture a drive to fitness by various means, it might come to out-compete
my hunger drive, allowing me to lose weight. The idea of a weed is also useful. A weed is
any plant that is not desired in an area, but it is normally used to refer to particular native
species of plant that grow vigorously where they are not wanted. Nietzsche uses this as a
metaphor for unwanted drives that must be continually dealt with (e.g. D 435). Drives,
like weeds, grow on their own unless we take action to control them. A final strength of
the garden analogy is that it supposes working with what is present rather than creation
from nothing. Clearly, we cannot create a self from scratch, but rather when we seek to
cultivate ourselves, we already are a collection of drives in a certain arrangement. I take the
these three points – plant/drive similarity, weeds and cultivation as working with what is
there – to be the main strengths of the garden analogy.
The problems start with the move from this to the idea of drives as a complex whole
that we are able to observe and assess aesthetically. Even a small garden presents a complex
scene, with many colours, textures and structural properties. But we know that such com-
plexity is precluded from our introspective access to drives. We appreciate the garden as an
aesthetic whole because we are able to represent many plants side-by-side, their relations
to one another, their competition, their colours and so on. At any given time, how many
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drives can I represent simultaneously? The hunger-vs-fitness example that I gave involves
two, and perhaps a few more could be added to this. But simplified to the level that intro-
spection demands makes of the drive structure something that resembles no garden that
one is likely to encounter. Even supposing that the garden actually reflects the complexity
and structure of the subconscious, since this is not available in introspection, it is not clear
how a conscious project of self-cultivation goes about ‘doing the gardening’.
There are responses available to this. It could be argued that I do not actually take in
the whole garden at once. I might have to walk through it to reveal different parts; even
within one part, my eye must take in pieces one at a time that contribute to the whole.
Could the same not be true of our experience of the self, where drives present themselves
in experience in such a way that I can synthesise them into a comparable experience? I
think the distance between the two phenomena is still too great. Even small parts of the
garden are far more complex than the drives presented in reflection. Regarding the other
claim, in the perceptual case we can at least get a grip on how the rapidly experienced parts
come to form a whole represented as present before us in its rich detail. In the drive case,
there is no such rapidity nor is there the breadth of content. Another response would be
to say that introspection is not the right way to understand this analogy. It is compatible
with our learning about drives by other means and gradually piecing together a complex
picture that is analogous to the garden. But here we have the problem of in what mode of
representation this piecing together takes place. Does it amount to having a picture in our
minds of a garden-like arrangement of drives with all the complexity of an actual garden
which we can then appreciate as an aesthetic whole? Such a thing is difficult to imagine,
to say the least.
The garden analogy helps us visualise what would otherwise remain abstract. It also has
the potential to alert us to features of drives that we might not have considered. On the
basis of one set of shared structural properties between gardens and drives, we might come
to see other shared properties, illuminating something about drives that was previously
obscure. In the case of cultivating specific drives that we can access introspectively, these
benefits are welcome. However, in trying to understand the self as a whole composed of
multiple drives that is capable of being treated as a work of art, the ability for the garden
analogy to help us visualise the otherwise abstract is a double-edged sword. It leads us
into thinking that because we understand how a garden could be an aesthetic whole, we
therefore understand how drives could be such. The analogy is so useful in helping to
visualise drives that it becomes an explanatory crutch. When we want to talk about drives
as aesthetic wholes, we find ourselves falling back on the analogy. In short, the effectiveness
of the analogy is also its danger: it makes us think we have a clear picture of drive cultivation
until we come to actually shape our drive structure. Ironically, this is because the two things
being linked are not actually that similar. Drives are similar enough to plants that we can
move easily beyond this aspect of the analogy. But with the aesthetic comparison, there
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is too great a leap from the analogy to the actual content. This leap can make us feel that
we have progressed a great deal towards understanding the issue, but it really just leaves
us stranded. The analogy trades on the fact that the drive-as-plant part of it is sound; this
side of the analogy helps further support the side that is unsound.
Although this analysis has focused on a single analogy, it applies to all self-cultivation
as a matter of modifying a drive structure like a work of art. How we actually envision
that structure in its complexity and ascribe it aesthetic properties is the challenge faced
by such accounts. I do not have space to examine whether a symphony or a novel might
serve as better analogies for the self that is cultivated. These at least rely on a temporally
extended appreciation of structure that is more akin to the self. The problem here is likely
to be one of mapping the content of these onto drives, something that the garden analogy
manages well. Perhaps there is a way that these can all be brought together in a mutually
strengthening way, but if so, it would be the subject of another entire thesis. Rather than
take this approach, I propose that aesthetic appreciation of a complex whole in all its
detail is not the best way to understand self-cultivation. We should allow for there to be
a structure of those simpler drives to which introspection gives us access; but the majority
of our complex selves should be dealt with indirectly, namely by addressing that which it
gives rise to in experience. Furthermore, although activity directed towards this complex
self can be said to fit into an overall project, it should not be a project that is comparable to
finding a place for each small piece in an artistic whole. Most of what I have described will
feature in the next chapter.The rest of the current one will address the indirect engagement
with our complex selves.
3.3.2 Externalisation
If drives are responsible for the constitution of our experience, then the world that we
encounter in experience presents us in some sense with ourselves.D 48 captures this point:
‘“Know yourself ” is the whole of science. – Only when he has attained a final knowledge of all
things will man have come to know himself. For things are only the boundaries of man’.
Elsewhere, Nietzsche makes a great deal of attending to the experienced world. I take
it that although this is a way to understand the world of appearances, it is also a way to
understand oneself as the creator of that world. But charting the ‘boundaries of man’ takes
in the entire experienced world and is therefore vast. Furthermore, if experience and the
processes that constitute it are hidden or transparent to that which is experienced, it is
hard to know where to start with self-cultivation. We need a middle ground, which this
section provides.
This middle ground is art in its various forms, but because Nietzsche talks about it most
often I will focus on writing. The world is an externalisation of the self, but so to is a novel
or a painting. Nietzsche often talks about books as containing their author. InHH 208, the
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‘author has drawn the happiest lot who as an old man can say that all of life-engendering,
strengthening, elevating, enlightening thought and feeling that was in him lives on in his
writings. . .’. In the preface to the second volume of HH , he writes ‘My writings speak
only of my overcomings: “I” am in them, together with everything that was inimical to
me, ego ipsissimus [my very own self ], indeed, if a yet prouder expression be permitted,
ego ipsissimum [my innermost self ]’ (HH II P:1). These sentiments are consistent with the
way Nietzsche later treats his books as records of himself. But they are not literally diaries.
Rather, it is in observing the content that he (his drives) produced that Nietzsche is able
to reflect on himself.
We know that consciousness is a commentary on a ‘text’. Nietzsche’s commitment
to the linguistic foundations of our experienced world means that the text serves as a
microcosm of the larger world. This has led some commentators to liken his genealogy to
the practice of philology.35Theproduction of a text for Nietzsche is experience constitution
on a smaller scale. It serves as a record of the perspectives that one takes at a given time.
But it also has the capacity to distil, exaggerate and concentrate those perspectives, making
themmore readily accessible. Imagine a writer who has racial prejudices, but is unaware of
that fact. He reads his own novel and realise that characters of a particular race are typecast.
They are never heroes but are regularly villains.They are symbolised with traditionally dirty
animals, whereas other races are symbolised as noble animals. This writer discovers many
such patterns within his novels. When writing, he simply used what felt right at the time,
what he felt the book needed. Only in reflecting on the work does a pattern emerge. He
concludes that he harbours racial prejudice that govern his writing, but also presumably
the way he perceives the world. Finally, he reflects on his behaviour and realises that he
treats members of this race differently. Now, however, he has an insight into why: his
behaviour takes its cue from the world as presented to him in experience already altered
by his prejudice. This is an example of what I take Nietzsche to mean by ego ipsissimum –
‘my innermost self ’.
This practice of externalising the self shows itself in various guises in twentieth-century
psychoanalytic practice. One that Nietzsche clearly prefigures is dream interpretation: ‘In-
terpreting by dreams. –That which we sometimes do not know or feel precisely while awake
– whether we have a good or a bad conscience towards a particular person – the dream in-
forms us of without any ambiguity’ (AOM 76). This lack of ambiguity arises from three
things. First, our ‘civilised’ nature or our conception of ourself as such is no longer block-
ing out these baser drives. Second, the dream contains events that are drastically reduced
in complexity compared with waking experiences. Finally, dreams have fewer sensations
to organise, meaning that their narrative freedom is much greater than that of waking life.
These features allow the psyche to produce a world in which its commitments are exag-
gerated and presented for reflection. Alongside dreams, there are more obvious kinds of
35Blondel, Nietzsche, the Body and Culture, See the subtitle of Blondel’s book:
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externalisation in psychoanalysis, including, but not limited to, free association, stream-
of-consciousness writing and the Rawshark test. In all of these, externalisation serves to
exaggerate existing perspectives.
The problem with introspecting on drives was that it painted in broad brush strokes.
The external world and works of art produced in it have the potential for a much higher
resolution.Whereas our author might reflect on a feeling he has in the presence of another
race, when he externalises his prejudice in the form of writing, he can then study the
subtle associations that demarcate it. Given that drives are what determine the way we
constitute experience, it makes sense that the best way to come to know them is to attend
to their presented content rather than simply reflecting on them as independent entities.
It could be objected that this analysis is compatible with the garden model insofar as it
seems to involve collating information about the number and nature of our drives, which
then puts us in a position to cultivate drives in an aesthetic whole. In the case of the
racial prejudice, this makes sense because the example involves a forensic procedure that
reverse-engineers the constitution of experience. But to limit ourselves to cases in which
such a process is possible is only necessary if we take self-cultivation to require direct
reorganisation of our drive structure. If, instead, we bracket the underlying drives and
focus on the associations as they appear externally, then we are able to deal with the most
subtle details. Observing associations made within a text we produce is already observing
ourselves; we do not necessarily need to reverse-engineer this in order to arrive at the self.
Those invested in the model of self-cultivation as reorganisation of the drive structure
in line with an artistic plan might protest that we do not learn anything about ourselves
other than that we associate certain things. We still do not know why we do so. When
we shift the emphasis away from drives to perspectives, this becomes less of a concern.
Seeing how we construct the world by making various associations, employing concepts
in certain ways and so on is to understand our perspectives. There is the further question
of what drive or drives underlie a perspective, and in many cases discovering this will be
important, but it is not necessary for us to recognise and break with a perspective that is
dogmatic in us. Even in the racial prejudice case, we need not understand why we have
that prejudice or what drives go into it in order to break it. Such information might be
valuable, but we can act on ourselves without it in many cases.
This leads to the active element in self-cultivation. Having presented ourselves with
our own perspectives, we are able to do two things. First, we can consciously break with
a particular perspective. Imagine that our racist author now deliberately sets out to cast
the discriminated-against race in the role of the hero. Through the act of writing and the
reflection on the product of that writing, he may come to change the way he sees that race.
That is, he will have broken his perspective somewhat and replaced it with another one.
For an example closer to home, we could imagine a philosopher who uses ‘she’ in all of
his examples in the hope of overcoming his own perspective on philosophy and philoso-
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phers. Indeed, I take it that the trend in academic writing to default to female pronouns
in examples is built on the assumption that new associations can be forged unconsciously,
leading to an alternative perspective and, in the long run, more equality in academia. This
brings us to the second point, namely that we can not only break perspectives by forming
new ones, but can also create new behaviours in ourselves by forming new perspectives.
If our author assumes that his racial prejudice leads him unknowingly to treat one race
unfavourably, he can engage in this reforging of a perspective to lead to new behaviour.
In the next two chapters, I expand on this, outlining a form self-cultivation that relies
not on placing every drive or feature of the self into an artistic plan, but on the ongoing ac-
tivity of breaking down perspectives. But as we will see, this leaves room for self-cultivation
in the sense of arranging one’s drives. The difference is that this arrangement need only
focus on a small set of fairly simple drives. It is the correct arrangement of these that leads
to the activity of undermining the much more complex web of associations that make up
our character. Thus the project reaches into our complex selves, but not in a way that re-
quires that we find a position in a complex whole for each of these parts. Rather than
think of this in terms of a painting whose many dots and lines are the minute features of
our drives structure, and which we can step back and admire, I instead use the notion of
incorporation to map out an ongoing activity that deals with each small part of the self in
turn. But dealing with the self in this context is going to amount in many cases to dealing
with the world of appearances that we are presented with. This world is our externalised
self. In the final chapter, we will see that although personal in some ways, this world, just
like the individual, is also communally constructed. This will prove the key to cultural
incorporation.
Appendix: True Culture, Low Culture, High Culture
Having outlined culture as it functions in both UM and FSW , we are in a position to
more fully address an important difference between the two periods. In UM , culture is
something to be attained by a human community; in FSW , culture is universal, but admits
of higher and lower varieties. One reason for this universalisation of culture in FSW is that
Nietzsche weaves an anthropological strand into his use of the concept. Since anthropology
views culture as a matter of acquired customs, it would be remarkable indeed if Nietzsche
were to deny culture of most communities, as he does in UM . Every human community
plays host to inherited customs of some form. So it could simply be that FSW represents
a simple modification to the UM definition of culture such that anthropology is included.
Higher culture would then simply correspond to the possession of culture in UM ; lower
culture would be the lack of culture in UM . Closer examination of Nietzsche’s use of the
terms, however, reveals this mapping of concepts to be far from clean, as the rest of this
section will seek to illustrate.
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In UM , lack of culture amounts to a lack of unity. Nietzsche calls this lack ‘barbarism’,
and it is characterised by a diversity of cultural material that is not bound together in the
relevant way. It must be pointed out, however, that all communities, even in UM , exhibit
unity to some degree. To even criticise modern attempts at culture requires that there be
something binding those attempts together. German pseudo-culture, for example, might
not qualify as culture for Nietzsche, but it still shares a common language, concepts and
beliefs. So when we talk about a lack of unity, what is really meant is a failure to reach a
certain minimum threshold of unity. By contrast, culture in FSW is used to refer even to
that which fails to meet the UM threshold. The contrast between this minimal threshold
view of culture and that of FSW can be made clearer by analogy with the concept of
intelligence. We sometimes describe people as intelligent when their cognitive abilities
exceed a certain threshold. But unintelligent people can still do basicmaths, solve problems
etc. That is to say, intelligence in this sense refers to a certain level of cognitive ability of
the relevant kind; but unintelligent people still display the relevant cognitive ability to
some extent. Similarly, Nietzsche in UM talks about a culture, or a cultured individual,
when a certain level of unity is attained. He does not thereby commit to the view that
barbarism is entirely lacking in unity. Now, we might well talk about intelligence in a
different way. For example, wemight say that relative to animals, all humans are intelligent.
That is to say, intelligence might be understood to refer to the mere possession of certain
cognitive abilities. So the attempt to create artificial intelligence will still be successful if
it fails to create an Einstein; it will be sufficient for it to create an intelligence that, as a
human being, would be described as unintelligent. An artificial intelligence that can match
Einstein would be very intelligent, or have a ‘higher’ intelligence. This understanding of
intelligence as a universal feature of human beings mirrors the way that Nietzsche uses the
concept of culture in FSW . He no longer denies culture of human communities, but he
does distinguish higher and lower culture.
If this were the sum of the difference between the two periods, then translation of
Nietzsche’s cultural talk would be simple.The higher-lower dichotomy in FSW would cor-
respond directly with the absence-presence one inUM . In other words, every time we read
‘higher culture’ in FSW we could think ‘presence of culture’ from UM . We have touched
upon the fact that anthropology’s introduction into FSW makes this problematic, but even
without this addition, there are complications to this direct mapping. The difficulty of
transposing the concept from one period to another results from a difference in what Nietz-
sche considers constitutive of cultural progress. In a nutshell, UM emphasises unity; FSW
emphasises diversity. InUM , possession of culture requires that diversity be carefully man-
aged or, failing that, excluded. Culture breaks down when it is overwhelmed. By contrast,
in FSW , lower culture is characterised by strong adherence to customs, whereas higher
culture is broadly characterised by a freedom from narrow constraints and an embrace of
diversity.UM already hints at something like this: Nietzsche talks about the need to break
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from custom and become genuine individuals. Indeed, this is important to him. However,
he is torn between that individualism and a stronger collectivism that is concerned with
culture as a collective unity of style. It is only in FSW that this is resolved somewhat by a
clear emphasis on the individual (though, as we will see, there is also a collective dimension
to FSW ).
The difference between higher and lower culture in FSW cannot be exhausted by a
discussion of the relative weightings of unity and diversity, even though, through that lens,
many of the aphorisms mentioning the divide come into sharper focus. Several aphorisms
on higher culture in FSW are not obviously concerned with diversity. Nonetheless, we will
see in chapter 5, for example, that discussions of the virtues present in higher individuals
in fact bear on the issue of unity and diversity. This pattern will be repeated throughout
this thesis: the more the underlying theory of FSW is fleshed out, the more that diverse
aphorisms on higher culture begin to come together.
In this chapter, culture has been divided into three kinds, where each is connected with
the others. Nietzsche’s discussions of higher culture fall into these categories. Often, the
description of higher culture pertains to individual cultivation, as in the following:
He who has furnished his instrument with only two strings – like
the scholars, who apart from the drive to knowledge have only an
acquired religious drive – cannot understand those men who are
able to play onmore strings than two. It lies in the nature of higher,
many-stringed culture that it should always be falsely interpreted
by the lower (HH 281)
Here we see the idea of diversity within the individual, a notion whose place in this thesis
will become clear over the next two chapters. Sometimes, higher culture seems to refer
simply to the fact that an individual has cultivated themselves more than others, as when
Nietzsche talks of the Epicurean who ‘employs his higher culture to make himself inde-
pendent of dominating opinions’ (HH 275). At other times, higher culture refers to a
community rather than an individual, as when Nietzsche talks about the ‘higher cultures
such as those of Peru and Mexico’ (D 204). This suggests an anthropological understand-
ing of higher and lower. Finally, higher culture is connected with the way we construct
the world – specifically, the degree of freedom in our interpretations – in HH 13.
While the theory presented in this thesis is capable of bringing together a number
of key aphorisms on higher culture, it has its limitations. There is not enough space to
demonstrate for each aphorism how the theory helps to interpret it. There is also a limit
to the degree to which all such aphorisms can be made systematic. After all, FSW is a
contradictory and ever-shifting collection of thoughts. As I alluded to in my introduction,
systematising such a body of work is only ever a case of providing one way to carve things
up. Furthermore, much of the time, Nietzsche reads like any other cultural critic who
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treats the notion of higher culture as self-evident. He does not base every aphorism on
his own theory, but sometimes merely comments from a particular perspective. So there
will always be aphorisms that seem to support just taking higher and lower culture at
face value. This thesis does not preclude doing so, it merely provides an option for more
consistent theoretical engagement.We can produce claims to the effect that higher culture
is scientific, or that it values unpretentious truths, or that it involves giving style to one’s
character. But to simply collate these features would not be to provide the substantive
theory that defines the current project. To try to collate all of higher culture’s features,
and provide the theory, and tie them together all in the space of this thesis would do a
disservice to all at once.
Two questions, then, have been answered in this appendix: How can Nietzsche talk
about a lack of culture in UM if every community exhibits key features of culture? and
To what extent do the categories of higher and lower culture fit with the discussion of
culture inUM?The answer to the second inevitably looks forward to the rest of this thesis.
The emphasis on diversity, the interaction of different senses of culture (individual, an-
thropological, interpretive), the idea of liberation from custom – all will be addressed in
more detail as we proceed such that, hopefully, by the end, the reader will have available
to them a theory of cultural flourishing wherein the terms higher and lower have a basis
in Nietzsche’s wider theory.
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Chapter 4
Incorporation
Most readers of Nietzsche focus on the bodily aspects of incorporation, which makes sense
given that theGerman –Einverleibung – literally translates as ‘bringing into the body’.The
body includes the drives that are said to make up the psyche. So we see plenty of discus-
sion of incorporation in drive terms. I agree that there is a sense of incorporation that
has to do with drives, but I also take there to be other ways of understanding the term
that have more to do with conscious experience. That this experience is grounded in drives
means, of course, that incorporation at any level is in some sense drive-involving. But it
is nonetheless useful to draw a distinction, just as it was in the previous chapter between
direct and indirect drive cultivation. To start the chapter, I examine John Richardson’s
account of incorporation, which addresses drives and the incorporation of truth. Richard-
son’s contribution is valuable, but I think he is drawn too far into a project of naturalising
Nietzsche that assumes that the language of conscious experience must be replaced by that
which pertains to unconscious processes. I see my account in this chapter as extending, not
replacing, the way he thinks about incorporation.
4.1 Drive Incorporation
4.1.1 Richardson on Drives
For Richardson, ‘a Nietzschean drive is a disposition that was selected for a certain result;
this result is its individuating goal, which explains its presence and its character’.1 Human
beings as we find them today are the result of a breeding process, namely evolution by nat-
ural selection.This has bequeathed us with the drives that compose us.Through genealogy
we gain an insight into the evolutionary history of our drives, as well as into the more local
history of those of our drives that have been shaped in our lifetime. This is the insight that
is to be incorporated. Incorporation is a matter of forming ‘dispositions that oppose drives
1John Richardson, Nietzsche’s New Darwinism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 39.
and habits where and insofar as they express sources we choose against’.2 Richardson goes
on to claim that this is a matter of building into our lives the habit of honesty, which con-
tinually exposes the origins of our values. This in turn relinquishes some of their hold on
us. Only in this state of relative independence can we create and employ our own values.
This involves a kind of self-selection wherein we adopt the role previously only played by
forces outside of us.
I agree strongly with some of Richardson’s points. He claims that the aphorisms serve
as small instances of diagnosis, that honesty needs to become habitual, and that we con-
tinually break with small errors in order to be free. As we will see through the remainder
of this thesis, these points will be reflected in my account. However, there are some claims
that clash with thesis and there are some that are difficult to give determinate content. It
is to these that I now turn.
The first point of disagreement comes with the role of consciousness. Richardson
claims that the incorporation of dispositions, for example to honesty, must go beyond
consciousness. Talking of the insight provided by genealogy, Richardson writes:
Although these truths about values do detach from the values, they
do so only in theory, i.e., only in consciousness and language. As we’ve
seen, Nietzsche takes this to be a superficial and secondary kind
of valuing. What we need to do, to be free, is to bring this insight
down into our drives and habits, to give it substance there. It’s only
by its presence there that this insight gives rise to new dispositions,
with new goals and values.3
The first sentence is misleading about the status of consciousness in Nietzsche. Here,
Richardson equates consciousness and language with theory. Presumably what he means
is something like the following. We have some insight into the origin of a value, for exam-
ple that valuing sex is the result of the evolution of sexually reproducing organisms. This is
theoretical insofar as it is stated in the form of a proposition that makes reference to other
propositions that come together to make a theory.These are all formulated in language and
I am conscious of them insofar as I entertain a thought with the relevant proposition as its
content. In that sense, consciousness certainly is theoretical and incorporating the insight
in question has to involve a lot more than simply assenting to the proposition. However,
consciousness is not a merely theoretical realm: it is an experiential one. For example, I
can consciously entertain the belief that there is a war in the Middle East, but I can also
consciously experience that war. These are different, but both are conscious. Richardson
persists with his narrower understanding of consciousness when he claims that Nietzsche
‘thinks of values as creatures not of consciousness but of our drives and habits, which are
2Richardson, Nietzsche’s New Darwinism, 102.
3Ibid., 101.
77
more obviously difficult to “select” than our opinions’.4 This implies a division between
values and opinions that makes the first unconscious and the second conscious. But what
does the claim that values are not conscious amount to? Does it mean that we cannot be
conscious of our values? This is feasible – albeit still far-fetched – if the claim is that con-
sciousness is only ever a matter of judging that we have a certain value. It could then be
claimed that the judgement is conscious, but not the value. However, I think we should
resist this. Consciousness is not mere judgement, it also experience. As we have seen, it is
the experience of things as valuable.
This is the sense in which value shows up in consciousness, namely as inhering in inten-
tional objects. When Nietzsche talks about our colouring of the world as partly involving
taking things to be valuable, he is clearly referring to our conscious experience of a world of
appearances that contains values. If we take consciousness to be restricted to judgements
about this world that have a propositional form, then we might conclude that opinions are
the proper domain of consciousness. When we allow that consciousness is also experien-
tial, then it is not clear how values are not ‘creatures of consciousness’ given that they show
up in that experience. One line of response that Richardson could take here is to say that
what remains unconscious is the activity of drives that produces the experience in question.
An opinion is something like a judgement whose content is accessible to consciousness in
propositional form, whereas the content of a judgement of value only shows up as a prop-
erty of objects: we do not have access to its content in propositional form. Even if this is
right – and I think there is something to say for drawing a distinction here – it does not
make values themselves any less part of conscious experience.5
The two sides of this divide do exist: there are propositional judgements and there
is unconscious activity in the brain that affects our behaviour without the mediation of
consciousness.The mistake is in taking these two be the only two states one can be in.This
overlooks the possibility that our conscious experience can be modified by incorporating
propositional claims.That is to say, there is a way of thinking about incorporation that does
not require the crude division between consciously entertaining a thought and turning that
thought into an unconscious disposition. Incorporation can occur within consciousness.
Katsafanas, whose views grounded chapter 2, sees his position as a development of John
Richardson’s dispositional account, but one that allows conscious evaluation to play a role.
My view is very close to his:
Thus, the link between drives and values is this: drives generate
affectively charged, selective responses to the world, which incline
the agent to experience situations in evaluative terms.We can sum-
marize this point by saying that drives are dispositions that gener-
4Richardson, Nietzsche’s New Darwinism, 101.
5]That is not to say that all values need be conscious.
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ate evaluative orientations.6
This provides the blueprint for the model of incorporation that I wish to present. I do
not agree with Richardson that incorporation should be thought of exclusively in terms of
turning insights into unconscious dispositions. Instead, incorporation should be seen in
three ways. Firstly, it can involve training oneself to have certain dispositions that one no
longer need think about. That is, I do not deny that in some cases, Richardson is correct.
This is what I refer to as the incorporation of drives. Secondly, incorporation is a matter
of changing the way that one consciously experiences the world. One might consciously
entertain judgements about what is valuable, which would be the kind of consciousness
that Richardson has in mind. But such judgements can come to change the intentional
objects of one’s conscious experience. This should be thought of in terms of perspectives.
One can recognise the objects that a perspective posits and finds to be of value, but one
can go further and actually see from this perspective. This is a conscious form incorpora-
tion that is far from shallow, as implied by Richardson’s comments. This is what I call the
incorporation of perspectives. Finally, I take Nietzsche to be concerned with the incorpo-
ration of truth, where the truth is not simply that our drives are the product of selection,
but is rather the claim that all experience is a falsification that posits being where there
is none. While incorporating this truth does involve thoroughgoing honesty, there is a
kind of embodiment implied by this honesty that Richardson touches upon but does not
explore to its full potential. I take this up in the penultimate section of this chapter, which
deals with the incorporation of truth. Before moving on to consciousness and cultivation,
I want to present Nietzsche’s contribution to our understanding of drive cultivation as I
understand it.
4.1.2 Nietzsche’s Contribution
There are some drives or dispositions that Nietzsche sees as important for his project.These
he encourages the reader to incorporate by making behaviour habitual. Honesty with one-
self, for instance, is something that Nietzsche want us to get into a habit of doing. Al-
though such dispositions might affect the world that we experience, this need not be the
case. They might simply involve behaviour modification. In this section, I will look more
closely at this kind of incorporation through habituation. I will argue that although present
in Nietzsche, most of what he says about it is fairly pedestrian when viewed in the context
of those ethicists that went before him. I will consider in turn various ways that his theory
might be said to be original, before concluding that although pedestrian, this aspect of
drive incorporation is interesting insofar as it serves a further project. It is in that further
project that Nietzsche is both original and interesting.
6Katsafanas, ‘Nietzsche’s Philosophical Psychology,’ 745.
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The idea of forming habits that allow one to quieten drives, instincts, or passions is
ancient. Epictetus in the Discourses portrays the formation of habits in a very similar way
to Nietzsche in D 109.7 How does Nietzsche stand out against this backdrop? As I see it,
answers to this fall into five broad categories, expressed in the following claims:
1. Nietzsche has a relatively sophisticated psychological theory based on the
drive concept, whereas the Ancients simply assume the reader understands
the meaning of common psychological terms.
2. Nietzsche’s views were informed by scientific insights not available previously.
3. The methods Nietzsche adopts for incorporating drives are novel.
4. The drives that Nietzsche encourages us to incorporate are different from those
of his predecessors.
5. The incorporation of drives fits into a philosophical framework that is radically
different from that of his predecessors.
In the remainder of this section, I will address these in turn.
As we have seen, Nietzsche has a theory of drives that includes fairly radical claims, for
instance the claim that the individual is nothing more than the sum of their drives. This is
not a claim that occurred to the Ancients, for most of whom reason was an independent
faculty capable of managing the drives. Other than this, Nietzsche’s talk of incorporating
certain drives, at least inFSW , is compatible with the concept of drive used by theAncients.
This refers to things like hunger, thirst, bravery and so on, which can be thought of as
dispositions or as motivating feelings. It if often these that Nietzsche has in mind. For
example, the drive to truth is, for Nietzsche, comparable to hunger in certain ways: it
seeks satisfaction through the acquisition and consumption of something called ‘truth’.
When understood in this way, drives and habits go together well. Making a behaviour
habitual is a matter of creating in oneself a disposition to act in a certain way or to feel
drawn to a particular object. Taken in this sense, the division between the Ancients and
Nietzsche regarding the status of reason is not particularly salient. Even if enforcing habits
on ourselves is just the result of a drive, it looks a lot like the imposition of habits by reason.
In both cases, we simply behave a certain way, as a rule, until eventually we behave this way
7Epictetus stresses the need to repeat behaviours until they follow naturally, and to abstain from those that
one wishes to eliminate long-term. Habit for Epictetus functions in a similar way to drive in D 109. For
instance, he talks about not ‘feeding the habit’ thus allowing it to ‘weaken’. Thomas Brobjer has noted that
there is no evidence that Nietzsche read the Discourses, but he did read and approve of Marcus Aurelius,
who takes up the relevant themes from Epictetus. See Epictetus, Discourses and Selected Writings, ed. and
trans. Robert F. Dobbin (London: Penguin, 2008), II-18; andThomas H. Brobjer, ‘Nietzsche’s Reading of
Epictetus,’ Nietzsche-Studien 32, no. 1 (2003): 430.
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automatically. We have thereby incorporated a habit or disposition. Nietzsche’s theoretical
account of drives adds little to this picture.8
I am not claiming that the incorporation of habits and dispositions is not important
to N: on the contrary, he wants to help us rediscover the practices of Ancient ethicists
for whom care of the self was paramount. I am claiming that incorporation as a theory
in Nietzsche is not best explored in the context of habits of this kind. These can be incor-
porated in the sense that we can change the way we tend to behave in certain situations,
making that behaviour automatic to some extent, but this is something that on its own is
not enough. This leaves us with the final two ways in which Nietzsche stands out from the
Ancients, which is that he endorses different drives and that these fit into a larger philo-
sophical project that is genuinely original. The former of these claims, at least with respect
to FSW , is only partially true. While there are some original drives favoured by Nietzsche,
the key ones – intellectual honesty, scepticism, magnanimity, courage and others – are all
borrowed from Greek philosophy. What makes Nietzsche original and interesting is not
his re-description of these and the methods for their incorporation in modern, scientific
terms, but rather the place that they have in his greater theory, which actually is deeply
informed by his time and its discoveries. One such discovery with which we are already
familiar is that the world we experience is the product of our faculties and has therefore
developed along with them; it is the story of the development of conscious experience of
an external world. This insight, which combines Kant, Hume, Hegel, Darwin and others
has been the backbone of this thesis so far. I have called it experience constitution and I
am arguing that it is the key to understanding FSW . By focusing only on dispositions and
dismissing consciousness, it is easy to overlook this aspect of Nietzsche.
We can think of this as a matter of disposition versus interpretation. Richardson is
interested primarily in the former. He effectively dismisses the latter in a footnote, writing
‘drives “interpret” others just by their plastic tendencies to incorporate them; I think we
can read “interpret” in this thin sense in, e.g., WP643 [1886]’.9 This goes along with a
minimal reading of the term ‘perspective’:
a perspective is constituted merely by virtue of a responsive or ‘plas-
tic’ system having been selected to bring about some outcome.The
amoeba’s adapted pursuit itself amounts to a ‘viewpoint’ on the
world. And we must think of the ‘posit’ in valuing in a similarly
minimal sense: the amoeba ‘posits’ the value of feeding, in and by
the way its perceptive and motive systems have been selected to
bring about feeding.
8Richardson does attempt to import evolutionary theory into self-selection, but ultimately this proves to be
limited both by the disanalogies between natural and artificial selection, and by the the fact that the specific
application of evolutionary concepts (‘population’, ‘stochastic’, ‘aggregation’, ‘statistical’) is left unexplored.
See Richardson, Nietzsche’s New Darwinism, 83.
9Ibid., 57n123.
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Richardson’s commitment to the irrelevance of consciousness allows him to move freely
from perspectives as described above and those found in human existence. A perspective
just is a disposition and human life mostly unfolds unconsciously much as it does for an
amoeba. This view leaves the status of our experience of values ambiguous. We are not
simply amoebae with epiphenomenal consciousness bolted on.10 Unlike amoebae, we ex-
perience a world that is meaningful and valuable. To reduce perspectives to mere uncon-
scious dispositions is to overlook Nietzsche’s constant references to the appearance of the
world to those with various perspectives. Gemes is more cautious in relating the notion
interpretation to that of disposition. He discusses humans, animals and plants. His animal
example is a hyena interpreting a wild boar as food and attacking it:
Note the hyena does not interpret the boar as food by explicitly
making the judgment that it is food, rather it interprets it by inter-
acting with it in a certain way, e.g. attacking it.11
In the animal case, to interpret is simply to react in a certain way. This is contrasted with
explicit judgement, which is presumably supposed to occur during episodes of conscious-
ness. Gemes is not here committing to a dismissal of consciousness, but he is subscribing
to a fairly strong dichotomy of conscious and unconscious. That which is conscious is
explicit judgement, perhaps thought with propositional content, whereas that which is un-
conscious, as in the animal case, is dispositional. But there is a way of preserving some
degree of interpretation as we ordinarily understand it, even in the animal case, namely by
using the notion of a representation. Representations can occur even beyond the realm of
living things: thermometers represent temperature, maps represent landscapes, and so on.
These things represent their objects insofar as they share structural properties with them
and they reliably co-vary with them. In the case of a thermometer, the height of the mer-
cury is proportional to the ambient temperature, and when the temperature changes, the
thermometer consistently tracks that change. In this basic sense, a plant can be said to rep-
resent its environment.There are certain cells within the plant that reliably co-vary with the
position of the sun. As organic life becomes more complex, developing a central nervous
system, so does representation. When we arrive at the level of humans, representations
are highly complex, interacting in various ways. Many representationalists in philosophy
of mind would, at this point, claim that mental phenomena – consciousness, experience,
belief – can be exhaustively captured by a sufficiently developed representational theory.
The notion of representation provides a way of talking about interpretations, and there-
fore perspectives, that a) avoids making them supernatural; and b) allows them to explain
10Katsafanas presents a number of convincing reasons that Nietzsche should not be read as endorsing epiphe-
nomenalism about consciousness. One such reason is that Nietzsche sees consciousness as a danger, which
is mysterious if it has no effect. See Katsafanas, ‘Nietzsche’s Theory of Mind,’ 1.
11KenGemes, ‘Life’s Perspectives,’ inTheOxfordHandbook of Nietzsche, ed. John Richardson and KenGemes
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 564.
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behaviour rather than merely describing it. That a plant represents the position of the sun
amounts to the claim that some part of it consistently co-varies with the position of the
sun; this leads it to change position.12 The hyena, by contrast, has more sophisticated rep-
resentations that guide adaptive behaviours. The hyena has something like a map of the
environment available to it. Human beings represent their environment, but they also rep-
resent themselves as distinct from it as I described in section chapter 3; furthermore, they
apply concepts in the way outlined by Katsafanas (see chapter 3). It is at this point that
humans can be said to experience a mind-independent world as mind-independent. They
take their mental map to be a map, rather than it simply feeding into behaviour.
I read Nietzsche as holding the view that consciousness arises gradually as the emer-
gence of a certain representational structure. Gemes, by contrast, applies his analysis to
human perspectives as follows:
The Christian interprets the world as being of little value not by
making the explicit judgment ‘the world is of little value’ – indeed
many Christians would think it sacrilege to make such a judgment
since the world is God’s creation. Rather they interpret it as being
of little value through their interactions with the world.13
Here we find what I suspect is the motivation for Gemes’ account: we are faced with a
choice between explicit judgement and mere disposition. With such a decision, it makes
sense to deny the important role of conscious experience (rather than merely thought).
With the notion of representation, we need not be committed to such strong divisions.
We can talk about, for example, implicit rather than explicit judgement; in representa-
tional terms, this might just be a matter of how we represent the world in experience,
rather than specifically thinking about it. Implicit and explicit judgements come apart
quite naturally. For example, a recovering alcoholic looking at a pint of beer might well
explicitly judge it to be of significant disvalue to them, but they might nonetheless experi-
ence it as being alluring. Similarly, the Christian might make the claim that the world is
highly valuable as God’s creation, but nonetheless represent it as containing a great deal of
disvalue in experience. They might be disgusted by human sexual behaviour and feel un-
comfortable when confronted with it, yet when asked claim that reproduction is the sacred
duty of human beings and that the whole process is a miraculous testament to the divine.
Many such cases of self-deception can be imagined wherein an individual is dishonest with
themselves about their experience of the world. If explicit judgement is something like the
formation of propositions that an individual is inclined to express when prompted, then it
can come apart from the judgements of experience. Indeed, this is surely what Nietzsche
12I confess that this is more difficult to make sense of if the co-variance of cells just is the physical change
that alters the plant’s position.
13Gemes, ‘Life’s Perspectives,’ 565.
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has in mind in GM P:1 when he writes ‘As far as the rest of life is concerned, the so-called
“experiences”, – who of us ever has enough seriousness for them? or enough time?’. I take
it Nietzsche is referring to conscious experiences here – what, after all, could Nietzsche
mean here if not conscious reflection?
In both the human and the animal cases, representation provides grades between dis-
position and explicit judgement. The hyena does not explicitly judge the boar to be food –
indeed, given that explicit judgement in the Christian case seems to amount to a conscious
thought, it is not clear whether hyenas can even make explicit judgements. However, the
hyena can be said to represent the boar as food, which is to say interpret it as food, i.e. take
a perspective on it as food. It is this perspective that leads it to attack the boar. As I have
suggested, the human case should be viewed as a case of representation. Conscious expe-
rience is a form of representation, but it is more complex than animal representation. It
includes the representation of a subject as distinct from an object. It is this new level of
complexity in representation that means that humans come to experience a world of exter-
nal objects as external objects. In each case – plant, animal, human – we find perspectives
insofar as we find representations of the environment. However, those perspectives differ
with the differing complexity of the representational apparatus involved. There is no need
to reduce the human level to the plant level when talking about perspectives any more
than there is when talking about representations. That is not to say that all human per-
spectives are conscious experiences any more than it is to say so of representations. There
are many processes that never arrive in consciousness that can be said to represent. Our
bodies make constant adjustments to the environment that we are never aware of. More-
over, there is clear interaction between subconscious representations and conscious ones
and it is perfectly natural to claim, as Nietzsche does, that the unconscious can influence
the conscious.14 When discussing perspectives, then, I am committing to a view on which
the term can apply to levels below that of consciousness – indeed to any sphere of reality
in which representation is involved. But I am restricting my discussion of perspectives to
those conscious interpretations that involve a certain sophisticated representational struc-
ture. This does not preclude the idea that incorporation involves every level of the human
animal, conscious or otherwise. But it is consciousness, I would argue, that has been some-
what overlooked in discussions of both perspectivism and incorporation.
My reasons for taking seriously perspectives in the conscious sense is that for all of his
attempts to ‘translate man back into nature’ (BGE 230), Nietzsche clearly thinks that with
14Representations interact in complex ways that give rise to consciousness in humans, but that does not
require that they be of a different kind in lower organisms. We can talk about interpretation in the rich
sense of phenomenology without being committed to the view that that rich phenomenology must be
applicable at all levels. I take Katsfanas to make a similar point when he writes: ‘we can deny that drives,
considered in isolation, can reason, evaluate, and interpret, whilemaintaining that embodied drives – drives
considered as part of a whole organism – can reason, evaluate, and interpret’. I would adapt this to the
claim that we can think of drives in isolation as akin to drives within an organism in which there is not a
well-ordered complex drive structure. See Katsafanas, ‘Nietzsche’s Philosophical Psychology,’ 744.
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the rise of human beings, something new has come into being and, moreover, presented
us with a problem. He blames this on language, which he also sees as responsible for con-
sciousness. Language has its origins in those animals most closely related to humans, but it
is not present until humans, even though Nietzsche traces some its key components right
back to plants. Once language has come to shape us, the task of translating us back into na-
ture cannot be one of straightforwardly reducing our perspectives to those in other species,
however much Nietzsche sometimes tries to do so in his most vehement struggles with
anti-naturalists. Consciousness may only be a surface as far as Nietzsche is concerned, but
it is nonetheless the surface that hosts the orchestration of cultivation and incorporation,
even if both aim ultimately to force something below that surface. Moreover, if Katsafanas
is right that drives influence us by changing the conscious world that we navigate in daily
life, then it makes sense to claim that the range of choice we feel belongs to consciousness
decision making is illusory; but even so, it is within this illusory field that the project to
continually overcome such limitations is planned and carried out. Directing ourselves to-
wards the experienced world can be a means to incorporation; demonstrating this is the
task of the rest of the chapter.
4.2 Perspectival Incorporation
There is a difference between being recounted an event and experiencing it. Similarly,
there is a difference between knowing that someone is in pain and being in pain oneself.
Again, there is a difference between knowing the meaning of a sentence and hearing it as
meaningful. These differences, although obvious, are key to understanding what it means
to incorporate a perspective. I take the incorporation of a perspective to consist in allow-
ing one’s experience to be shaped in ways relevant to that perspective. So to incorporate
the perspective of a palaeolithic person might be to experience the howling of the wind
as the angry voice of an ancestral spirit rather than as the mere rapid movement of air.
This should be distinguished from simply believing that certain palaeolithic peoples took
the wind to be the voice of ancestral spirits. It is in this difference between having beliefs
about others’ perspectives and occupying them.
This presents a number of problems that will be dealt with in the remainder of this
chapter. The main two are as follows: first, it is clearly a difficult if not impossible task
to completely satisfy the conditions for incorporating a perspective. The problem of other
minds is insurmountable, seemingly making it impossible to know how anyone else expe-
riences the world. Even if this were possible, coming to experience the world as someone
else does surely means taking on their past experiences, their particular physical make up
and so on. This in turn relies on suppressing the same parts of myself. Surely a modern
individual can never know what it is like to have grown up in a community ignorant of
some of the most basic facts about the world around them and who believed in things far
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removed from that which we now hold onto? This is indeed a challenge, but I hope to
show that it is not as insurmountable as it appears. Second, there is the problem of incor-
porating multiple perspectives. How are we to incorporate multiple perspectives if each
contradicts the others? What does it even mean to experience through many eyes at once?
This problem will be dealt with in the next section.
It is all to easy to dismiss certain projects in Nietzsche’s work because their full realisa-
tion seems nonsensical. Complete freedom from custom, for instance, is hardly intelligible,
yet being free for Nietzsche has to do with breaking with customs. Rather than dismiss
this as an unrealistic definition, we should bear in mind that such things admit of degrees.
One can aim to be perfectly consistent in one’s treatment of others even in the knowledge
that such perfection is probably impossible to achieve. Nonetheless, the closer one gets to
perfection in such a case, the better. Similarly, freedom need not be an all-or-nothing af-
fair; realising this makes it much less problematic for Nietzsche to define freedom in ways
that make its full realisation impossible. In the same vein, the problem outlined above re-
garding perspectival incorporation is less severe than it appears. While one cannot hope
to completely enter another’s perspective, the potential for overlap is great. One can ap-
proximate another’s perspective in important ways even if the nuances remain ungraspable.
The remainder of this section relates to methods by which one comes to experience at least
partially through an alternative perspective. They break down into three basic methods:
behaviour modification, imaginative exercise, and art.
We saw earlier thatNietzsche wants us ‘to live in drives and activities so as to create eyes
for ourselves’ (NF 1881 11[141]).15 If drives are dispositions, then it stands to reason that
what is involved here is a change of behaviour that leads one to see the world differently.
There a few ways that this might work. One might behave in such a way as to expose
oneself to facets of things that one would not otherwise encounter. For instance, changing
one’s routine to include an early morning walk in a city before it fills with people might
expose one to a beauty that one previously denied of that place. Over a long period, one’s
entire outlook on the city might change as a result, including one’s perspective on it at
other times of the day. Such a change of routine might have other effects; it might mean
that one is tired at different times of the day. Tiredness can cause irritability, which in
turn can colour our experiences. Something that we would welcome when fully awake
might be too much when we are not. This is a change in the value properties of the world.
Changes of routine and other such things may seem trivial, but they are just the kind of
thing that Nietzsche calls us to focus on in FSW . We have historically overlooked the
degree to which such things determine the world we experience. At the more extreme
end of such experimentation, we can imagine someone depriving themselves of water for
days, thus stoking their drive for water. To such a person, a single glass of water suddenly
appears very different than it did when he was able to simply run the tap and drink. Such
15leben in Trieben und Beschäftigungen, um damit sich Augen zu machen. . .
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an example fits with the formulation of living in drives so as to create new eyes.
As well as these changes in routine, one can change the way that one comports oneself.
As this becomes habitual, it can change one’s perspective. Recall our racist author who
discovers a prejudice in himself. He reflects on his behaviour and realises that he is unfair
to this group because he perceives them to be less valuable than other groups in some regard.
He might then decide to experiment with this by treating that group equally if not better,
regardless of whether he actually sees them as such. As he makes this behaviour habitual,
it is perfectly conceivable that he comes to see that group as having equal value to others.
This would be an example of a disposition becoming incorporated such that it modifies
one’s perspective. Our author might be disposed to treat this group equally without having
the corresponding perspectival shift, but over time, this situation can change. I take this
kind of experimentation with one’s behaviour and perspectives to be part of Nietzsche’s
vision for experimentation as the key to cultural progress.
Behavioural changes can also be used to incorporate perspectives from ways of living
distant in either space or time. Say I want to see the world through the eyes of an agricul-
tural worker from centuries ago. One way I might to this would be to spend an extended
period engaged in farm work using only tools from that time. Contrast this with someone
who has studied the relevant period. They might know much more about the daily life of
such an agricultural worker, but this knowledge is somewhat ‘dry’. Within the discussion
of perspectives this makes sense: the scholar has not had their experience altered by the in-
formation. This recalls Nietzsche’s own claim about TSZ, namely that readers can only be
said to have begun understanding it who have been wounded by it in some way (GM P:8).
This emphasis on the need to have one’s experience changed by a truth claim rather than
simply assent to it as a proposition.
The changes in behaviour that I have detailed are experiments in living whose goal is to
alter one’s perspective, even if only for the duration of the experiment. There are limits to
this. I might spend time living as someone from the past might have done, but ultimately
I cannot make myself forget entirely about the existence of modernity. I know my tools
are made of atoms, that they belong to a bygone era, that they have been superseded.
My experiment is, at best, a simulacrum. This method is further limited by the material
conditions that a modern individual is capable of recreating. While tilling a field with
hand tools is a realistic project, sailing to an undiscovered country on a fully rigged sailing
ship or partaking in the Greek polis is not. Behavioural modification alone needs to be
supplemented with other tools.
One such tool is the human imagination.The imagination can take us into worlds that
would are otherwise closed to us. I can, for instance, imagine what it might be like to
partake in a Greek polis. Naturally, this is limited since it rests on certain cognitive abili-
ties that are difficult to employ. It relies on suspending disbelief, putting aside my current
knowledge, prejudices and so on. Nonetheless, this is an important tool in incorporating
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perspectives. Its limitations are mitigated to some extent by a couple of things. First, the
imagination can be trained.We can practice suspending disbelief and we can dedicate time
to imaginative exercises. As with the experiments detailed above, this is the kind of intel-
lectual work that has been historically overlooked. Second, imagination need not be used
in isolation: it can be used in combination with experiments in living. The practice of sus-
pending disbelief when combined with a radical lifestyle change might help an individual
enter into a perspective. Similarly, the ability to fill in the gaps with imagination is an im-
portant tool in such experiments. Our experimenter who seeks to take on the perspective
of a pre-industrial agricultural worker might be well aware that just behind the hill next to
his field is a modern industrial estate, but when he looks at the hill he might exercise his
imagination in an attempt to elide that fact. Such practice, which is almost self-deception,
might again be limited, but there is nothing to say that a culture in which such practice is
formally recognised and cultivated would not achieve much greater successes than we can.
The suspension of disbelief, which is important in imaginative practice, is also central
to an area of culture which Nietzsche sees as both useful and threatening: art. Art in its
various forms occupied Nietzsche for much of his life and his relationship to it was tumul-
tuous. I do not mean to provide a theory of art in Nietzsche nor do I claim that its sole
purpose is to aid incorporation, however I think incorporation is something for which art
is highly suited. The visual arts present a perspective on something. Paintings, even fairly
abstract ones, literally take a perspective on something by showing it from a particular an-
gle. But they also have the capacity to present the evaluative and symbolic components of
a perspective. This is precisely the reason that we do not judge paintings for their photo-
realism. Were we to do so, Picasso would fall well short of the scores hobbyists painting
the countryside in watercolours. Picasso’s genius is not in reproducing the scene exactly,
but in capturing, exaggerating and thereby revealing to us something about the scene that
we might otherwise miss. Yet while there is something universal in that which Picasso
shows us, for it is this universality that explains his success, we nonetheless take this to be
his vision. His paintings are a window into the way that he sees the world. In other words,
they present a perspective in all the rich sense of that word that was detailed in chapter 2
of this thesis.
The perspectival power of art lies in its ability to change the way we see the world by
presenting it as filtered through someone else’s experience. An otherwise familiar object
now appears alien or vice versa. In analysing a painting, we can draw conclusions as to the
values of those who made it. This goes back to the very inception of art. Some of the oldest
art is agreed to be ancient carved figurines of women that date back up to forty thousand
years. These figures have enlarged breasts and are more body fat than would have been
likely at the time they were made, and the common interpretation of this is that they are
fertility symbols. Here we see the values of the artist made manifest in their artwork at the
expense of realism. Although a crude example, this serves to illustrate the claim that I am
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making.
In chapter 3 I claimed that self-cultivation is best achieved through art, where writing
can reveal one’s own drives to oneself. Now we see that art can also be used to reveal to us
perspectives other than our own. Just as we are able to cultivate ourselves through it, the
artist whose work is public is able not only to show their perspective, but to depict alter-
native perspectives to their own, to experiment by rewiring the various mechanisms that
produce perspectives and record the results in their art. The author can create new connec-
tions by employing metaphors; the painter can do the same by combining conventional
symbols in new ways. What has this to do with incorporation? Appreciating work of art
or reading a novel does not necessarily effect a permanent shift in one’s view of the world.
But even if only temporarily, a work of art can place one into a perspective that is different
from one’s own and which thereby challenges the latter’s authority. In my view, it is this
challenge that holds the key to understanding incorporation for Nietzsche. To understand
how this is so, we need to examine the central target of incorporation in Nietzsche: truth.
Before looking at that, however, I want to provide some textual evidence to support what
I have been saying. This evidence will serve not only to support the idea of perspectival
incorporation, but also give us a hint as to how it relates to truth.
HH , Nietzsche’s most ‘positive’ work, at times encourages a calm detachment from the
fervour of modern culture. He describes the age as overheating and in need of ice packs
restore a degree of moderation. The nineteenth century was a time of great intellectual
upheaval and the advances of science were clashing with religion, leading not only to hy-
perbole on both sides, but also to a new wave of thinkers who sought moral lessons in
scientific insights and were not afraid to employ rhetoric to this end. In this context, the
idea of deliberately incorporatingmany perspectives in the ways described seems like some-
thing that Nietzsche would not encourage. Would this not involve falling into the many
illusions that Nietzsche accuses art of perpetuating? Would it not create in the individual
a chaos of conflicting values rather than a moderate, controlled and, above all, personal
set? Were Nietzsche to consistently reject art in favour of science, it would make sense to
read him as agreeing with these worries. However, even in the midst of HH , in which
art receives its harshest treatment, we find abundant evidence for a calculated engagement
rather than straightforward rejection of artistic practices. This is most explicit in HH 251,
entitled Future of science:
higher culturek must give to man a double-brain, as it were two
brain-ventricles, one for the perceptions of science, the other for
those of non-science: lying beside one another, not confused to-
gether, separable, capable of being shut off; this is a demand of
health. In one domain lies the power-source, in the other the reg-
ulator: it must be heated with illusions, onesidednesses, passions,
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the evil and perilous consequences of overheatingmust be obviated
with the aid of the knowledge furnished by science. . . .
Nietzsche is very clear that science must be prevented from cleansing human life of all
illusory practices. Rather, these are to be kept for their usefulness. In this case, that useful-
ness consists in their ability to make knowledge-seeking pleasurable. There is no mention
of perspectives here, but when we try to think through precisely what it might entail, the
idea of perspectives is useful. By providing us with alternative ways of viewing the world,
art has the potential to make things that we would otherwise find mundane into objects of
mystery, of potential discovery and so on. A scientific picture alone is not enough to con-
tinually draw us back to explore it; it needs some poetry to it. This might well be contested
by those for whom the discoveries of science possess a grandeur and majesty to match any-
thing provided by religion. But precisely these feelings have their root in those illusions of
transcendence that ground religion. Is the beauty and mystery of a supernova a ‘scientific
property’ that it has? Should a strict scientist not dismiss such properties as projections
and therefore illusions?
This use of illusory practices as inspiration for continued scientific enquiry is not, on
its own, the same as the perspectival incorporation discussed above. The engagement with
different perspectives through art is merely fuel for the scientific fire. However, elsewhere
we find evidence that this idea of the double-brain is extended in more relevant ways. We
can think of this in terms of two moments, one of allowing oneself to be carried away by
illusions and another of returning to a strict scientific mindset that keeps a watchful eye
on the self. This idea finds expression inWS 306:
Losing oneself. – Once one has found oneself one must understand
how from time to time to lose oneself – and then how to find
oneself again: supposing, that is, that one is a thinker. For to the
thinker it is disadvantageous to be tied to one person all the time.
This makes sense when understood as expressing the view that to seek knowledge one
must use various means to occupy the perspectives of others. Losing oneself here, I think,
means suspending one’s own judgement of the world so as to take on someone else’s.
There is another implication in losing oneself, namely that during the process one is not
reflecting and analysing the situation. When we talk about losing oneself in the moment,
it is with reference to this suspension of scrutiny. If Nietzsche advocates this, then he strays
from the careful watchfulness over the self which characterises Stoic readings of FSW . A
few aphorisms earlier, it is clear that this is precisely what Nietzsche has in mind:
For as long as one is experiencing something one must give oneself
up to the experience and close one’s eyes: that is to say, not be an
observer of it while still in the midst of it. For that would disturb
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the absorption of the experience: instead of a piece of wisdom one
would acquire from it indigestion. (WS 297)
The irony here is that in order to better enter into a perspective, one needs to close one’s
eyes. I take ‘eyes’ to stand for observation; while one clearly observes the world in a visual
experience, one need not attempt to reflect on one’s experience in the sense of forming
propositional thoughts about it. One needs to suppress the tendency to explicitly make
judgements. Losing oneself in the experience means temporarily shutting off the scientific
brain so that one can enter into and experience through an alternative perspective.
The counterpart of losing oneself is finding oneself. Both moments are present in
WS 306. That one must have an ability in order to find oneself suggests that it is possi-
ble to lose oneself permanently, or at least for extended, unplanned periods. What does
this ‘finding’ look like? The first thing to say is that the self referred to here is he who is
in a position to employ his scientific brain. To be in command of oneself involves being
able to observe and judge the world and one’s relation to it. We should bear in mind that
the individual who has cultivated this double brain will also have cultivated various drives
associated with the search for knowledge: intellectual honesty, scepticism, care for details.
The return to the self is partly a rediscovering of these drives, which required temporary
suspension in the moment of absorption by a perspective. This suggests a way to under-
stand the inability to find oneself. If one is so drawn in by a particular perspective as to take
it not to be just a perspective, but a window into the true nature of things, then one might
see no more need for that scientific brain. This would effectively mean succumbing to the
metaphysical need, a danger which plagues even the freest spirit. The following passage
on the free spirit expresses this danger:
[The free spirit] feels a profound stab in the heart and sighs for the
man who will lead him back to his lost love, whether she be called
religion or metaphysics. It is in such moments that his intellectual
probity is put to the test. (HH 153)
What makes metaphysics so appealing is the same thing that marks it out as opposed to
perspectivism. A metaphysical viewpoint makes the claim to be an eternal, universal view
of reality. On the one hand, this makes metaphysics abhorrent to the scientifically minded
individual who recognises that reality is becoming; on the other, the sheer explanatory
power, albeit illusory, of such systems of explanation is very tempting. It is this promise
to explain that tempts the scientist, not just the promise of a world laden with eternal
significance. In WS 31, Nietzsche describes the thinker as a wanderer in the desert. He
draws a parallel between mirages and philosophical systems that promise comprehensive
explanation. To some natures, these simply make themmore determined to pursue science;
however, ‘there are other natures, to be sure, which stand still, as if bewildered by the fair
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illusion: the desert swallows them up and they are dead to science’. Although not explicitly
about perspectivism, what emerges from this is the idea of losing oneself permanently by
being stuck in a perspective. This amounts to taking that perspective to be not ‘only’ a
perspective, but a universal truth. The wanderer repeats this cycle of losing himself and
finding himself again. He experiences the world in a new way, unreflectively entering a
perspective; he then withdraws from it, reflecting on the experience having come through
it. In other words, he continually moves between perspectives, not allowing himself to
settle with any single perspective as an unquestioned universal. This is what allows him to
chart the many possible worlds that a human being can occupy. In book 5 of GS, we see
this portrayed as a noble and important enterprise:
Anyone whose soul thirsts to experience the whole range of previ-
ous values and aspirations, to sail around all the coasts of this ‘in-
land sea’ (Mittelmeer) of ideals, anyone who wants to know from
the adventures of his own experience how it feels to be the discov-
erer or conqueror of an ideal, or to be an artist, a saint, a lawmaker,
a sage, a pious man, a soothsayer, an old-style divine loner – any
such person needs one thing above all – the great health, a health
that one doesn’t only have, but also acquires continually and must
acquire because one gives it up again and again, and must give it
up! (GS 382)
What was alluded to before is now made explicit. The goal of the great individual is to
experience a range of values, but also an understanding of ‘how it feels’ to occupy a per-
spective. This involves giving up a perspective to take on a new one. Continual giving up
and acquiring are here components of what Nietzsche calls ‘the great health’, the subject
of chapter 5.
What we have so far in this thesis is a way to understand the construction of a world
of appearances, which takes place within an intentional structure captured in the notion
of a perspective. Additionally, we know how these perspectives come to be and and how
they survive in culture. We also know how it is possible to incorporate various perspectives
in the sense of coming to experience the world as those perspectives take it to be, rather
than simply assenting to propositional claims that those perspectives make. Finally, we
have seen that rather than incorporating a perspective permanently, the great individual
incorporates a perspective only temporarily before expelling it in order to take on another.
But what has any of this got to dowith the incorporation of truth? If individual perspectives
cannot be true, how can incorporating them be a matter of incorporating of truth? And
even if they could be true, why give up a true perspective to incorporate another one?
In what sense is that incorporating truth? To answer these questions, we need to look
more closely at the incorporation of truth, which, it turns out, will not be a matter of
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incorporating a single perspective, but will instead be a distinct kind of incorporation, but
one which relies on everything said so far.
4.3 Incorporation of Truth
The most pressing question when considering the incorporation of truth is: what is the
truth to be incorporated? Nietzsche seems to rule out the possibility of truth, or at least
our access to it, on many occasions. In order to make sense of the incorporation of truth,
we need to knowwhat we are incorporating.GS 110 identifies incorporation as central: ‘To
what extent can truth stand to be incorporated? – that is the question; that is the experiment’
[my emphasis]. Helpfully, this question is posed in the context of a discussion of the errors
against which we can make sense of truth. These are familiar from chapter 2: ‘that there
are enduring things; that there are identical things; that there are things, kinds of material,
bodies; that a thing is what it appears to be; that our will is free; that what is good for me
is also good in and for itself ’. All but one are the falsifications inherent to the construction
of a world of intentional objects that is undertaken within a perspective or perspectives.16
The truth must therefore be that there are no such entities.
This is often cashed out as the claim that the world is flux or becoming. If this is taken
to pertain to the nature of a world underlying appearances, then it is strong even if derived
negatively, namely from the falsity of those appearances. There is no justification to move
from the view that all perspectives so far encountered falsify in a certain way to the view
that there is a world free of perspectives with a certain character.There is no obvious reason
that there could not be a world with which some of our perspectives line up. Even to deny
that requires that one compare perspectives to such a world and find them wanting. This
leads Nietzsche to adopt what we might call indifferentism with respect to the noumenal
world (see HH 9). But perhaps this demand that we need to compare a perspective to the
‘real’ world to judge their veracity is too strict. Every perspective presents an intentional
object or set of objects as mind-independent. In doing so, it takes the world of appearance
to be something they are not. Entailed in this is an idea of a world that persists through
various perspectives being taken on it. This need not entail a belief about the status of
objects; rather, the structure of experience is such that objects are presented as enduring
independently of any perspective taken on them.
Human history contains a vast array of perspectives interacting and changing. Each
perspective when originally occupied illegitimately purported to be a window on a mind-
independent world. From this, we arrive at flux in a different sense. The world of appear-
ances is constituted by ever-changing perspectives, therefore it too is in a state of flux.
16Free will is a whole other issue in Nietzsche that would take up far to much space here to deal with
adequately. For treatments of the topic, see: Ken Gemes and Simon May, eds., Nietzsche on Freedom and
Autonomy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
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Perspectives are not what they purport to be, namely windows into a mind-independent,
stable world; and the world that perspectives present is not what it seems to be, namely
mind-independent and stable. Perspectives and the world of appearances are interlocked
in a constant and reciprocal state of change. I take this to be the truth that Nietzsche seeks
to incorporate. It is a matter of coming to terms with the world of appearances within
which we find ourselves.
The incorporation of truth has now been formulated as the incorporation of perspec-
tivism. We might think then that to incorporate perspectivism we need simply extend the
project of incorporating perspectives phenomenologically. That is to see, we might come
to see the world as perspectival. Or we might come to experience perspectives as them-
selves intentional objects present in our experience. But there are good reasons to think
that this is doomed to failure. The first is that perspectivism denies that there are any sta-
ble objects, but to incorporate a perspective requires that one at least temporarily posit the
stable objects pertaining to a perspective. The second is that perspectives are transparent.
As such, they cannot feature as objects of experience. Let us look at these more closely.
Perspectivism involves a commitment to the nature of the world of appearances,
namely that it is constituted in multiple ways simultaneously, that it varies between per-
sons and cultures, and that it presents as properties that are relational as independently
inhering in external objects. To incorporate perspectivism in an experiential sense, one
would have to experience objects in multiple ways at once, as relative to individuals and
cultures – indeed, as possessing relative properties at all. But this is contradicts the nature
of experience. Perspectivism takes there to be many eyes that each correspond to a world;
to incorporate it experientially would be to see through many eyes at once, which is
non-sensical as the idea that one might see without eyes: that one might be able to occupy
a view from nowhere. That does not preclude the possibility that one might experience
through one perspective followed by another. In this case, however, one is still, at any one
time, experientially committed to a single, unified world.
We might think that perspectivism simply involves coming to experience perspectives
as intentional objects that we can identify separately from those objects that they them-
selves posit. However, this angle fails because perspectives are transparent, a notion that
we met in chapter 2. When we try to attend to a perspective, we only find ourselves able
to attend to the objects of that perspective. We need another way to understand incor-
poration if we are to get a grip on the incorporation of truth. It has been suggested that
truth can be replaced here with truthfulness or honesty, as we saw Richardson do earlier.
To incorporate it truth would then amount to incorporating these virtues. While I believe
this to be an important part of the story, on its own, it is difficult to square with the texts.
Nietzsche talks as though he had a particular truth in mind, just as he talks about particular
errors. The virtue of honesty only makes sense in the context of some truth that one either
faces or ignores. If it does not require this, but is simply a set of behavioural dispositions
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that we call honest, then why talk about truth at all? My suggestion is going to be that
honesty or truthfulness serves as a means to incorporating truth in a way distinct from
those already mentioned. For reasons that will become apparent at the time, I will discuss
these virtues in the next chapter. I will now outline this third kind of incorporation that is
neither merely dispositional nor a matter of coming to experience a particular world.
At the end of the previous section we saw that the great individual does not stick to one
perspective but instead continually moves between perspectives. Each perspective asserts
itself as the truth, which may include but does not require a belief; it is a matter of the way
the external world is presented. I take this to be Rex and Welshon’s point in Nietzsche’s
Perspectivism:
objects are convenient fictions, constructed in some manner to sat-
isfy the interests of some particular perspective. Objects are in this
way are perspectival just as he claims truth is perspectival. . . . lan-
guage misleads people into accepting object realism.17
The authors distinguish objecthood from truth, suggesting that they also distinguish expe-
rience from belief.18 Where I differ from the authors is in their claim that objects are ‘bun-
dled together via perspectives taken on properties’. Perspectives are intentional in virtue
of being perspectives on objects, not properties. Moreover, properties, if they are posited
as being external to us, are already a falsifying projection of relations. Nonetheless, what
the authors capture, and what I am also pushing for is that a change in perspective means
a change in the presented world.
This can occur at a fairly superficial level, as when I overcomemy fear of spiders. In this
case, spiders go from having the property of being scary to having that of being cute. From
this one learns that the properties in question are not inherent to spiders, even though they
present themselves in experience as such. This example deals with a perspective that at an
individual level might be very powerful, but which at the level of culture is not entrenched.
It is safe to assume that every human community contains members who differ in such
matters and whose differences are acknowledged without difficulty by that community.
However, when it comes to other value properties – usually of the moral variety – this is
not the case. Good and evil are examples of values that are usually entrenched in commu-
nities. The transition from seeing murder or rape as evil or wrong to seeing it as good is
unlikely, at least in most known societies, to be simply waved away. This is because the
property of being evil or wrong taken to inhere in the act itself. We can imagine an individ-
ual entertaining the perspective that murder is good, even if only as a thought experiment,
17Steven D. Hales and Rex Welshon, Nietzsche’s Perspectivism, International Nietzsche Studies (Chicago:
University of Illinois Press, 2000), 55.
18That does not mean, however, that the acceptance of object realism cannot not involve a belief as well as
an experiential commitment. Indeed, it likely does most of the time.
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before concluding that this property is relative to the perspective one occupies. Great in-
dividuals are able to change their perspectives in deeper ways than others; this is ongoing
and does not take as sacred any particular perspective.
At this point, it could simply be responded that changing one’s perspective is compati-
ble with there being a true world. Just because someone sees the world one way today and
another tomorrow tells us nothing about the nature of the world, which might well remain
consistent through this change. Indeed, this is the common-sense view: we assume that
when someone overcomes their fear of spiders, abandons their religion, or subscribes to a
new philosophy that the world remained the same and only they changed. The substance
of this response could hardly be denied, but it misses its mark somewhat. Changing the
world of appearances for oneself is not meant to provide evidence for the truth of per-
spectivism. It is way for those already convinced by perspectivism as a result of additional
considerations to live perspectivally, so to speak. These individuals are not seeking confir-
mation that there is no underlying world to which some perspective might be adequate.
One can never confirm a negative. They are engaged in an ongoing scepticism; insofar
as the constituents of a perspective can be undermined they undermine it, moving to a
different perspective.19
One could also respond that of course we experience from a certain perspective, but
that does not preclude us from having knowledge of a mind-independent world. It just
means we occupy a perspective on that world, just as seeing something from the side is not
seeing it entirely, but is still seeing it. But Nietzsche thinks that we construct representa-
tions out of sensations. In such a case, we have no way to verify that our representation
is as of a mind-independent object. The most we can say is that some representations tie
the sensations together more effectively or they allow us to predict future sensations more
accurately (this will be addressed again at the end of chapter 6). But even if we allow that
some perspectives allow us to access a mind-independent world rather than constituting it
for us – something that Nietzsche denies – the degree of independence that perspectives
attribute that world would be too much. In the case of value, for example, we would still
have the problem that the value properties we accept as relative, such as something being
disgusting, present themselves as independent. We surely would not want to say that any-
thing really is inherently disgusting even if it presents itself as such. Perspectives push for
dogmatic acceptance; Nietzsche thinks that in any such case, they can be undermined and
incorporating truth amounts to engaging in this undermining at the level of experience.
This deep anti-dogmatism is at the root of another important concept in FSW : justice.
Alongside the use of this term to refer to our dealing with conflict and criminality, there
is a sense of justice as connected with our epistemic engagement with the world. In the
19Nietzsche might even be attributed a kind of disjunctivist position here. He does not rule out a priori that
some of themany perspectives that we can occupy could count as knowledge in the sense of correspondence.
But he would say that we have no way to know when we are in possession of knowledge.
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preface to HH , Nietzsche tells us that life is ‘conditioned by the sense of perspective and
its injustice’ (HH P:6). Specifically, this injustice consists in the fact that perspectives are
formed within the narrow constraints of a particular form of life, which takes itself as the
‘goal and measure of things’. I take Nietzsche to be claiming that a form of life presents
its narrow perspective as that which really picks out the way the world is. The injustice,
then, is precisely that which the project of incorporating truth as I have described it seeks to
overcome.This thought is not confined to the anachronistic prefaces. InHH 32, Nietzsche
claims that life is unavoidably unjust because we cannot live without valuing. The specific
injustice here lies in the fact that we can never have a complete picture of that which
we judge because not only are things more complex than we can hope to grasp, but we
as knowers are subject to constant vacillations in drives. The injustice here is not simply
that we have an incomplete picture, it is that we move from that picture to a definitive
judgement of a thing. This maps well onto perspectivism: each perspective involves taking
only a few parts from an incredibly rich field of sensations, forming a model and, finally,
asserting that model as pertaining definitively to mind-independent objects. The assertion
amounts to the becoming conscious of the appearance; that is, becoming conscious of
an object requires that it ‘assert’ itself as mind-independent, out there in the world. The
injustice is in positing the existence of mind-independent objects with a certain character,
when really there are only appearances whose character is mind-dependent and fluctuating.
The idea of justice as anti-dogmatism surfaces elsewhere, as in HH 636, where the just
person opposes all convictions, andGS 3, where the noble individual is unjust because they
take their perspective to be uniquely correct. InGS 289, a ‘new justice’ is called for wherein
individuals are permitted their own philosophy rather than being constantly pressured to
adhere to social norms. Here, justice consists in the diversity rather than hegemony of
perspectives.
Justice is connected closely with this project of continued change in the penultimate
aphorism of HH , 637. First, N tells us that ‘Opinions grow out of passions; inertia of the
spirit lets them stiffen into convictions. – He, however, whose spirit is free and restlessly alive
can prevent this stiffening through continual change’. Here we see a process akin to that
of values asserting themselves as dogmatic perspectives on the world. The countermeasure
is a restlessness and an abundance of life that refuses to allow the free spirit to settle on any
one perspective. Nietzsche then goes on to present a dichotomy that maps the moments
of losing and finding oneself onto the notion of justice. The two moments are rendered
here as ‘fire’ and ‘spirit’:
But let us, who are compound creatures, now heated up by fire,
now cooled down by the spirit, kneel down before justice as the
only goddess we recognize over us. The fire in us usually makes us
unjust and, from the viewpoint of that goddess, impure; in this
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condition we may never grasp her hand, never will the smile of
her pleasure light upon us. We revere her as the veiled Isis of our
lives; abashed, we offer up to her our pain as penance and sacrifice
whenever the fire seeks to burn and consume us. It is the spirit that
rescues us, so that we are not wholly reduced to ashes; it tears us
away from the sacrificial altar of justice or encloses us in a coat
of asbestos. Redeemed from the fire, driven now by the spirit, we
advance from opinion to opinion, through one party after another,
as noble traitors to all things that can in any way be betrayed – and
yet we feel no sense of guilt.
First, the free spirit evinces a clear commitment to justice. Then there is the claim that the
fire in us makes us unjust. Now, however, there is an inversion in the relation to justice.
The fire is that which draws us towards justice, not injustice. So on the one hand, the fire
in us leads us to be unjust; on the other, it is that which tethers us to justice in such a way
as to hinder us in pursuing truth. Similarly, the spirit is that which tears us away from the
altar of justice.
Although N is not yet talking in terms of perspectives, the project of incorporating
truth can shed some light on this apparent confusion. Two aphorisms earlier, we find indi-
viduals who take themselves to be seekers of knowledge, but who are in fact only interested
in igniting and maintaining ‘the fire of convictions’ (HH 635). Those who foster convic-
tions think they do justice to the world because, as far as they are concerned, there is a real
world out there and as knowledge seekers we are duty bound to align our perspective with
it. However, if perspectivism holds, then this way of treating the world is unjust because
it treats intentional objects as something other than the fluctuating, mind-dependent enti-
ties that they are. So the fire that burns to keep individuals before the altar of justice is the
very same thing that leads them to be unjust. That is, their strong desire for knowledge,
because it does not realise itself within the framework of perspectivism, ends up preventing
them from incorporating truth. The free spirit, by contrast, is seen as an unjust traitor by
those who take their perspective to be the truth and they seek to make him feel guilty for
abandoning it. However, his cultivation of the scientific spirit prevents him succumbing
to this. The free spirit has a more complex relation to justice. On the one hand, he is freed
to a certain extent from the demand to adhere to that perspective which does justice to
the world (to kneel at the altar); on the other, his activity of moving through perspectives
actually does more justice to the nature of the world of appearances. Nietzsche’s ‘new jus-
tice’ does not seek to reduce all perspectives to one, but treats them as perspectives qua
perspective. Even so, the free spirit, as long as he lives in perspectives – i.e. lives at all – he
is still, to some extent, unjust.
The difference between the free spirit and those whom Nietzsche is attacking in this
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passage is not that one lives in illusion and the other not; nor is it that one is just and
the other unjust.20 Both are unjust insofar as they live within perspectives. This difference
is made clearer in GS 57, where Nietzsche attacks those he calls ‘realists’. Realists take
themselves to be ‘incapable of drukenness’: they take their perspectives not to be the result
of their passions and related interpretations, but windows into reality. Nietzsche responds:
There is no ‘reality’ for us – and not for you either, you sober ones
– we are not nearly as strange to one another as you think, and per-
haps our good will to transcend drunkenness is just as respectable
as your belief that you are altogether incapable of drunkenness.
‘Our’ will to transcend drunkenness cannot be a will to access a noumenal realm, since we
know that is out of the question. I suggest that that transcendence should be understood
as realised through the project of incorporating truth as I have outlined it. It is not a matter
of standing outside of perspectives, but of immersing oneself in as many perspectives as
possible.This does not do justice to a world beyond appearances by finding that perspective
which is adequate to it; instead, it remains within the world of appearances and does justice
to it as appearance. This is a justice that must, at the same time, play cautiously with its
opposite, namely the claim that each perspective presents to be justified in presenting the
objects that it does as mind-independent things-in-themselves. The individual who takes
on this project puts himself at risk because he undermines the stability of the world around
him, as well as that of his own character, which is inextricably entwined with that world.21
This thesis has so far concerned itself with Nietzsche’s theoretical descriptions of the
origins and structure of experience. But Nietzsche’s project is as much a normative as it is
descriptive. Gemes recognises this in his analysis of perspectivism.22 He dismisses seman-
tic and epistemic readings of perspectivism in favour of one that has a ‘psychobiological’
descriptive component and a normative component that revolves around health. One of
Gemes’ main reasons for rejecting semantic perspectivism is that it refutes itself. Gemes
20Maudemarie Clark and David Dudrick incorrectly claim that in HH , Nietzsche’s free spirits are able to
transcend valuation. They claim talk about HH 34 as ‘his presentation of the “better man” as one who ab-
stains from evaluation’. But this conclusion does not follow from the passage.Their quotation of it contains
the claim that the for the attribution of responsibility, not with value.The aphorism opens expressly talking
aboutmoral ‘oughts’no longer being employed, with pleasure and pain being all that remains. I am claiming
that pleasure and pain are precisely evaluative in that they draw us to or repel us from aspects of our experi-
enced world, which manifests as experiencing things as having value properties. Nietzsche goes on to claim
only that the free spirit is free from ‘the traditional evaluations of things’, but not evaluation as such.There-
fore the free spirit is still unjust insofar as he writes his own values into the world.See Maudemarie Clark
and David Dudrick, ‘Nietzsche and Moral Objectivity: The Development of Nietzsche’s Metaethics,’ in
Nietzsche and Morality, ed. Brian Leiter and Neil Sinhababu (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007),
200.
21Denat has proposed something similar, albeit in the context of language. She sees the need for us to
embrace the fluid nature of language rather than deny it. Like my project, hers focuses not on transcending
language, but on embraces certain features already within it. See Denat, ‘“To Speak in Images”:The Status
of Rhetoric and Metaphor in Nietzsche’s New Language,’ 36.
22Gemes, ‘Life’s Perspectives,’ 563.
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follows the principle of charity in interpretation: one ought ‘not to ascribe incoherent views
to interpretees’.23 He also claims that there are few mentions of perspectivism in the pub-
lished texts. Given that, we ought not to use the texts to justify overruling the principle of
charity and attributing Nietzsche an incoherent view. However, this is slightly misleading
in that it overlooks the fact that the underlying commitments on which perspectivism is
grounded are not in short supply in the texts.24 His not using the term perspectivism in
every case does not justify our dismissing such passages. As I hope to have shown in chap-
ter 2, the theory of experience constitution that Nietzsche proposes points in the direction
of the self-undermining view that we cannot legitimately make any true claims about a
mind-independent world; this is sometimes rendered as the claim that there are no facts,
only interpretations.
What Gemes wants is a theory perspectivism that does not fall victim to what he
calls ‘facile refutations’; that is, it is not easily shown to be self-undermining. This is what
a psycho-biological account is supposed to provide. But does it? The basic claim is that
organisms are composed of drives which struggle with one another to interpret the world,
where interpretation just amounts to responding in a certain.We are a totality of drives and
nothingmore. But how can such a strong claim not have implications for either knowledge
or truth? Any claim we might make about the nature of the world is presumably just a
particular disposition in us that is dominant at the given time, including our tendency to
express the claim that we are composed of drives that interpret by reacting in certain ways.
That there are no facts, only interpretations is a claim that arises from the same view of the
individual, namely as a collection of drives each of which presents the world in accordance
with its end. For every dominant drive, there is a corresponding perspective and therefore
a corresponding presented world. That world is just a function of the drive’s interpretation.
That Gemes reduces interpretation to mere behaviour makes this even more problematic.
It is not clear that behaviourism, where this line of thinking ends up, can give any viable
account of knowledge.
The normative components ofGemes’ view centres on health and perspectivism’s ability
to engender it. He quotes a passage fromGM 3.12 which deals with perspectivism, writing
the following about it:
Where this passage is, in the traditional matter, interpreted as a
discourse on the nature of knowledge and objectivity or as a thesis
about truth or justification, its function in GM is totally obscure.
Why after having in section 11 finally identified the priest as prime
mover behind the ascetic ideal, the focal point of the third essay of
23Gemes, ‘Life’s Perspectives,’ 556.
24Christoph Cox has made the point that Nietzsche uses ‘interpretation’and ‘perspective’in a very similar, if
not identical mannner. Once we see that, then given the ubiquity of discussion of interpretation, perspec-
tivism is no longer a fringe theory. See Cox, Nietzsche, 111ff.
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GM , does Nietzsche turn to epistemological/semantical concerns,
after which, in the remainder of the essay, he concentrates on the
effects of the priest as a failed physician who only serves to make
the sick sicker? I suggest that it is really functioning here to surrep-
titiously give Nietzsche’s countermodel of and injunction towards
genuine health.25
Gemes’ claim is that the GM passage should be understood as an injunction to health and
I agree with him. But that does not mean that it does not take the form of an epistemo-
logical/semantical claim or claims. There is no mention in the GM passage of anything
resembling Gemes’ psychophysical account. The following passage from the same section
looks a lot more like the conscious, experiential project of incorporation that I have been
describing:
Finally, as knowers, let us not be ungrateful towards such resolute
reversals of familiar perspectives and valuations with which the
mind has raged against itself for far too long, apparently to wicked
and useless effect: to see differently, and to want to see differently
to that degree, is no small discipline. . . (GM 3.12)
The emphasis here is not on merely coming to respond differently to the world, but on see-
ing differently. Reading the rest of the passage, it is hard not to take it to be making either
epistemological or semantic claims. I propose that a more natural way to think about the
descriptive/prescriptive divide is as follows. Nietzsche’s perspectivism is epistemological
in that way I have described in this thesis; moreover it falls victim to self-refutation when
pushed; however, Nietzsche is not ultimately concerned with its validity, but rather its abil-
ity to engender health. I still think that Nietzsche believes in his theory and perhaps fails
to notice that it undermines itself. But assuming he is aware of it, perhaps he views self-
undermining as an occupational hazard for sceptics, since almost any reason given in favour
of scepticism is vulnerable to it. It could also be the case that the self-undermining nature
of perspectivism, while not necessarily being deliberate as some commentators have sug-
gested,26 is nonetheless instrumental to health in virtue of the fact that one cannot simply
take it as dogma.27 Its undermining of itself forces the individual to seek for an alternative
theory of knowledge; but Nietzsche thinks that all such theories undermine themselves in
some way. As such, the individual who is actually receptive to these possibilities of under-
mining is not simply going to alight on another theory of knowledge; they are going to
25Gemes, ‘Life’s Perspectives,’ 567.
26See Albert Cinelli, ‘Nietzsche, Relativism and Truth,’ Auslegung 19, no. 1 (1993): 43.
27Nietzsche often presents a theory in such a way that he wants the reader to question it. He says of will to
power, for example, ‘Granted, this is only an interpretation too – and you will be eager enough to make
this objection? – well then, so much the better’ (BGE 22).
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continue to be sceptical, just as perspectivism prescribes. Something like this will feature
in the next chapter, albeit with the notion of scepticism as an identity.28
I think Gemes takes a valuable step in shifting the focus towards perspectivism as a
means to health. I also agree that at bottom, Nietzsche is more concerned with health than
truth. However, I also think that perspectivism’s content – and it needs content, even if
it is a tactical deployment – is not captured by the psycho-biological account, which is as
vulnerable as any other to accusations of self-refutation and is not supported by the text.
In the next chapter, I focus more on the criterion of health that underpins Nietzsche’s
philosophy.
28An alternative strategy is to adopt ‘weak perspectivism’of the kind that Hales and Welshon put forward.
They claim that perspectivism is true in all human perspectives, which is not to say that it is extra-
perspectivally true. Moreover, they claim that this is one of a very limited set of such things (logic being
another). On this reading, we might think of the activity of the free spirit as a continual testament to weak
perspectivism. In every perspective he occupies, the free spirit demonstrates the truth of perspectivism by
undermining that particular perspective. See Hales and Welshon, Nietzsche’s Perspectivism, 31.
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Chapter 5
Progress
Nietzsche’s works are full of expressions of his preferences for various qualities in indi-
viduals, institutions, and cultures. Some of these can be interpreted as following on from
deeper commitments that he has; others can be attributed to his character and its con-
text. By preferences I simply mean values that have no obvious place within a larger value
structure. My preference for oranges over apples need does not make reference to any
other values that I have; but I might well value oranges over apples with reference to other
values and this is less amenable to being spoken of as a matter of preference. Once we
accept a value or set of values, we can make sense of progress as measured relative to the
instantiation of that value. Applying this to Nietzsche, it is possible to understand Nietz-
schean progress as being based on his preferences. One form of this approach is to talk
about that which Nietzsche takes to be ‘higher’ or to belong to ‘higher individuals’ with-
out specifying the criteria that decide whether something is higher or lower. Ruth Abbey,
for instance, adopts this approach. She writes passages such as the following: ‘the major
factor separating higher from lower seems to be the degree of rivalry one feels, the extent
to which one takes independent pleasure in the self rather than needing to subordinate
others for self-aggrandisement’.1 The danger in such an approach is that one ends up in a
tight and explanatory circle: some types are higher because they possess certain qualities;
those qualities are higher because they are possessed by higher types.That is not to devalue
Abbey’s work, which does a fine job of assigning the proper focus to various elements in
FSW , many of which define it as distinct from the later works. However, this is largely
a descriptive enterprise which rests on taking Nietzsche’s division of qualities into higher
and lower at face value. The alternative is to try to identify from where Nietzsche derives
these values. I suggest that his higher qualities have their root in a quasi-biological concep-
tion of life. The individual virtues derive their value from their instrumental relation to the
seeking of knowledge and the project of incorporation. This in turn rests on the concept
of life which, in the later works, will become the will to power. This is the foundation that
1Abbey, Nietzsche’s Middle Period , 59.
provides a way to measure progress. I address these topics in the order of their reduction:
virtues, knowledge, health, power.
5.1 Virtues
There is evidence that Nietzsche takes virtues to be valuable as means rather than ends.
That is to say, virtues are not constitutive of flourishing, but only instrumental to it. This
is captured best inWS 212:
morality (inherited, handed down, instinctual acting in accordance
with moral feelings) is on the decline: but the individual virtues,
moderation, justice, repose of soul, are not – for when the con-
scious mind has attained its highest degree of freedom it is invol-
untarily led to them and comes to recognize how useful thay [sic]
are.
We already know that freedom is associated with the search for knowledge. Virtues can be
said to aid in that search in two main ways: directly and indirectly. Honesty falls into the
former category, since Nietzsche mostly uses the term not to talk about honesty regarding
oneself and one’s experiences, rather than as regulating one’s exchanges with others. This
is tied closely to his notion of the intellectual conscience, which is partly what allows an
individual to free himself from the grip of a perspective that seeks dominance over his
experience. Circumspection is another virtue that, although not traditional, is described
as ‘the virtue of virtues, their great-grandmother and queen’ (WS 294). This is the virtue
that finds its expression in Nietzsche’s original discipline, philology. In talking about books
he tells us ‘to read slowly, deeply, looking cautiously before and aft, with reservations, with
doors left open, with delicate eyes and fingers’ (D P:5). Nietzsche sees experience as a text
and this approach to reading extends into an approach to experience more generally. Once
again, we have here the means to finding in our perspective the cracks that eventually allow
us to prise it apart.The battle against dogmatism is not fought only through the destruction
of perspectives, but through close attention to oneself as the source of convictions, which
‘grow up in us like fungus: one morning they are there, we know not how’ (D 382). Full
access to the subconscious may be precluded, but close attention to what we can discover
and its relation to our experience plays a role in the project of incorporation.
Virtues that can be said to indirectly serve knowledge include bravery andmagnanimity.
Bravery is needed by those who undermine the very foundations that give meaning to
them and their culture. In an ‘age full of danger’, Nietzsche writes, ‘bravery and manliness
become more valuable’ (D 172); an enlightenment requires ‘brave soldiers of knowledge’
(D 576). Magnanimity is brought together with bravery in Nietzsche’s use of imagery
borrowed from knighthood and aristocracy. In EH , he even uses the phrase ‘knight of
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knowledge’ (EH P:4). Nietzsche connects magnanimity to ‘knightly virtue’ (D 191), and
describes it as the ‘fairest virtue of the great thinker’ (D 459). This knightly life suits the
reality of Nietzsche’s free spirits rather well. They must be able to live with a degree of
indifference to the opinions of others and to external contingencies; but they must also
be able to face those things which impinge on them despite their attempted indifference.
The way Nietzsche writes about knighthood suggests that he not only sees it as useful, but
that he himself is drawn to it. There is room for both of these, but it is in the former that
further work can be done with his texts. Having said that, chapter 6 will show that the
romantic aura that surrounds knights is something Nietzsche is not only drawn to, but
which he exploits. For now, there is a final virtue to discuss: moderation.
Moderation is a running theme in Nietzsche’s middle period; the word itself features
twenty-seven times across the works. Although it does not immediately present itself as
epistemically relevant, it actually provides a rich understanding of the relation of virtue
to knowledge when tracked in the text. Moderation allows an individual to remain sober
(AOM 326). This is an important link to knowledge because sobriety is opposed to intoxi-
cation, and intoxication has strong epistemological connotations in FSW . Intoxication is
mentioned in a few contexts, including religious and artistic feeling. What connects many
of these instances is the idea of being lost in something, whether it be an idea, a belief or
a mood. There is a sense of total commitment to that thing. For instance, intoxication is
linked to Christianity’s declaration that doubt is a sin (D 89). This is seen as an attempt
to keep the individual locked into a particular belief system rather than engaging in the
circumspection mentioned above. Intoxication in this context relies on shutting out every-
thing but that with which one is intoxicated; this is captured with the nearby concept of
infatuation. Just as with literal intoxicants, the strength of one’s intoxication is propor-
tional to the loss of one’s faculties of judgement. Intoxication is not exclusive to religion,
but can be found in any area that fosters strong, narrow feeling. There is one aphorism
that provides a strong link between intoxication and perspectivism: GS 57, To the realists.
Here, Nietzsche accuses those that call themselves realists of believing themselves to be
free of a drunkenness, which they presumably associate with metaphysics, art and religion.
Nietzsche claims that their obsession with reality, with avoiding the drunkenness they see
in others, is, in fact, its own form of drunkenness. In other words, the world they take
to be real is constructed by the forces of interpretation that all appearances spring from.
Nietzsche, unlike these realists, recognises that we cannot help but be embedded in such
a world; the difference comes down to this: the realist believes themselves to have escaped
intoxication, whereas Nietzsche and his free spirits recognise that they are embedded in
such intoxication, but employ methods to limit it. That is, they strive to be sober to the
extent that such a thing is possible, using the incorporation of truth as I have outlined it.
The downfall of the realist is in their taking there to be a single correct perspective – that
which reveals the world they designate ‘real’ – and, as a result, they are in fact as intoxicated
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as anyone else.
This is the danger that faces the free spirit, namely that they are tempted at points
in their journey by perspectives that appear to be the ‘true’ perspective. This could be a
scientific theory, a metaphysical system, or a moment of religious transcendence. These
moments seem to the free spirit to challenge the doctrine of perspectivism by offering to
encompass all reality without remainder. Despite presenting themselves as the release from
intoxication, they are simply a new form of it. The danger for the free spirit of these per-
spectives is that he run aground on them, unable or unwilling to launch himself back into
the sea of becoming.The realist, despite his disavowal of the metaphysical commitments of
religion, actually exhibits what Nietzsche calls ‘the metaphysical need’. This is the need to
feel that one is in touch with the singular, stable substratum to reality. That the free spirit
must resist the metaphysical need is stressed more than once in FSW (e.g. HH 153).
The idea of becoming stuck in a single perspective surfaces again in the preface toHH ,
where Nietzsche talks about the free spirit emerging from his isolation. . .
. . .to that mature freedom of spirit which is equally self-mastery
and discipline of the heart and permits access to many and contra-
dictory modes of though – that inner spaciousness and indulgence
of superabundance which excludes the danger that the spirit may
even on its own road perhaps lose itself and become infatuated and
remain seated intoxicated in some corner or other, to that super-
fluity of formative, curative, moulding and restorative forces which
is precisely the sign of great health. . . (HH p4)
This dense passage contains some key ideas that I have been discussing. First, there is the
idea of inner spaciousness, which I take to refer to the fact that the individual is not com-
mitted to a single, narrow perspective, but is rather a traveller and explorer of perspectives.
This is what Nietzsche means by ‘contradictory modes of thought’: they are contradictory
because each presents a different world. Second, the concepts of intoxication and infatu-
ation are mentioned in the same breath as a danger that the free spirit avoids. Given the
context, this infatuation should be taken to pertain to single perspectives.The idea of being
seated in a corner somewhere also speaks in favour of this: a corner is a narrow dead end
in the world. This is precisely what the great health avoids.
The foregoing can be boiled down to the claim that intoxication, although having
connotations of an elevated mood, is, a great deal of the time, an epistemic phenomenon.
In light of this, we should understand sobriety not only as a way of being that relates to one’s
mood, but as a matter of refraining from being drawn to deeply into a single perspective
such that one risks becoming stuck. This analysis carries over to moderation, which can
now be understood as an epistemic virtue. Being moderate consists in not allowing drives
to flare up whenever the opportunity for their satisfaction is present; but a significant
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part of drive activity is interpretation and it is these interpretations by which drives create
domineering perspectives that moderation helps to guard against. This is why Nietzsche
continually connects the aloofness of the free spirit to his ability to encounter a range of
perspectives. It is his moderation that allows him to avoid being dragged into the tumult
of human life.
It should be noted that there is a balancing act here between being stuck in a perspective
and entering into perspectives for the purpose of incorporating truth. The individual must
allow their experience to be alteredwithout being at the whim of perspectives.Thismeasure
of control reaches its fullest expression when Nietzsche compares to a dance in HH 278.
He talks about the need to enter into metaphysics, religion and poetry, a clear sign that
a retreat to pure stoic contemplation is not an option. But he also warns of the danger
of ‘a feeble vacillation back and forth between different drives’. This motion, he claims, is
to be distinguished from a dance, which involves tightly controlled but also free-flowing
movement.The dancer throws themselves into various often passionate movements, just as
the thinker throws themselves into perspectives, committing temporarily to them. Great
dancers do not lose themselves in such passion. They maintain strict control over their
timing, their posture and so on. Indeed, at least in the case of dancing, this control is what
allows them to give the appearance of losing themselves in the moment. Similarly, the free
spirit cultivates the moderation to avoid becoming genuinely lost in a perspective, but that
does not exclude losing himself as the dancer does, namely as part of a bigger project, and
with the intention to emerge from that perspective to move to the next. Just as dancers
train for many years to achieve this control, so the free spirit must cultivate his virtues to
allow for this intellectual dance. This, ultimately, is the moderation that I think Nietzsche
has in mind. It is not a permanent retreat from human life into quiet contemplation and
solitude. True, the free spirit craves these things as well, but he does so as part of a greater
cultural project that includes working one’s way deeper into human life than those who
are engaged in it. Moderation, read in the context of the parable of the dance, should be
read as self-control even in one’s deepest perspectival experiments.
Virtuous individuals are capable of entering into the project of incorporating truth.
FSW details many ways in which this is so. It remains valid to say that higher individuals
possess certain virtues, but now we see that what unites those virtues is a deeper project.
Measuring progress can no longer consist in simply measuring the degree to which certain
virtues are instantiated, but should make reference to the degree to which truth is incor-
porated. In the remainder of the chapter, I will try to show that incorporation should be
understood as connected to health, which is in turn derived from what it is to be a living
thing. This separates virtues from health such that it no longer makes sense to say that
health, even of the ‘soul’, consists in possessing certain virtues. Rather, health will prove
to be a matter of expressing the maximum will to life.
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5.2 Health
5.2.1 The common conception
To be in good health ordinarily means that one’s vital systems are functioning as they ought
to: kidneys filter waste effectively, the heart pumps blood, and the blood carries oxygen to
cells and waste away from them.While there are other uses for the term, such as mental or
spiritual health, this basic notion of physical health is the most well-defined and universal.
In each of the examples given, an organ or part of the body has a function and its health
consists in fulfilling that function. It is only in virtue of having a function that a part of
the body is subject to the normativity inherent in the notion of health. These functions are
in turn determined by a particular end, namely survival and reproduction. The filtration of
waste is only the function of the kidneys because it allows for the survival to reproductive
age of the organism. The evolutionary history of the kidneys is what fixes their function
and their continued functionality is what, in part, explains their continued appearance in
nature.
The above is a simple evolutionary account of health, but one can have a conception
of physical health without knowing anything about evolution. However, one cannot have
such a conception without some notion of function. The Ancient Greeks did not need to
know evolutionary theory to recognise that the heart serves to pump blood round the body,
nor did they require it to know the difference between a faulty and a working pump. That
is to say, they could recognise a healthy heart without knowing the evolutionary history of
the heart. Nonetheless, they connected health to survival and reproduction, as does anyone
employing the notion in its common form. Both the evolutionary thinker and the layman
conceive of health as a matter of perpetuating life, whether within or across generations.
When restricted to bodily health, this is compatible with range of positions on the health
of the soul which choose to assign human beings some purpose over and above survival
and reproduction. So spiritual health might be taken to consist in happiness, greatness,
creativity and any number of criteria without these impacting the way we conceive of
bodily health.
For an organism to be healthy, its parts must serve the whole, each fulfilling their
function in the overall structure. This organisation is where organisms get their name.
When an organ fails to fulfil its function, the survival and reproduction of the organism
is threatened; it is said to be unhealthy. That is not to say that the organisms chances of
surviving and reproducing are limited every time it becomes unhealthy: there are many
cases where poor health does not affect these, for example having a minor cold. The claim
more precisely is that the health of the organism is historically determined by its ability
to survive and reproduce, and this bestows on the parts their own function within that
whole. That organ’s function can be expressed in terms of survival and reproduction. Once
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this function is assigned, any impediment to the organ fulfilling its function can be labelled
unhealthy, and it is only in virtue of it having this function that such a label means anything.
On this simplified view, the conditions of life are that each part of an organism fulfil
its function and that the organism as a whole control the functioning of those parts. It is in
virtue of maintaining this relationship of executive control by the whole on the parts that
an organism can be distinguished from a mere collection of organs or agglomeration of
biochemical material. These basic conditions of life yield a notion of health that captures
the vast majority of our use of the term to talk about the body. Diseases, malfunctions,
defects, cancers – all can be understood as impediments to the functioning of the body
as defined in terms of survival and reproduction, or a breaking down of the its structure.
Contained in this account are several ideas that Nietzsche attacks in his middle period.The
key ones are first that there is a single end – survival and reproduction – that is universal to
everyone and second that it makes sense to talk in teleological terms about nature. Rather
than address these here, I want to further elaborate health, but in the context of Nietzsche’s
own biological commitments.This will help us not only to understand how he conceives of
health, but also why he opposes the claims I have just mentioned. The first step is to look
more closely at Nietzsche’s conception of life, the conditions of which determine health.
5.2.2 Nietzsche on Life
The importance of the notion of life for the current chapter is that it forms the basis
for understanding health for Nietzsche. That which constitutes life is that which allows
health to bemeasured.The common conception of health that I have outlined follows from
attention to the conditions of survival for a life form. For Nietzsche, mere survival should
be distinguished from flourishing, which for him involves an abundance of life within the
individual. Clearly survival is a condition of this abundance, but it is not equivalent. In this
section, I will argue that Nietzsche’s understanding of the nature of life leads him to offer a
conception of health that supplements and extends the common conception. Contrary to
some of what he appears to say, Nietzsche does not seek to abolish the common conception
of health. We will see why this is so at the end of the section. First, the task is to see what
precisely Nietzsche finds unacceptable in the common conception of health and the notion
of life that he employs.
On the Darwinian account that I have given, the health of organs follows directly
from their function in aiding survival. The organism is healthy when its organs function
correctly. From a Nietzschean perspective, this presents two problems. First, it assumes
that the governing principle of life is survival. Second, the functional account cannot be
applied to organisms unless they too have a function; but no such function is apparent.The
organism is not itself an organ, nor is its function survival. To understand both points, we
first need to know more about Nietzsche’s criticism of and alternative to Darwinism.
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The organism, as the name suggests, involves organisation. Since the healthy organism
is one in which the parts – organs and cells – serve the whole, we would be forgiven
for using the analogy of a cooperative commune in which every member fulfils their role
for the good of the whole. But if the organism is a community, then for Nietzsche it is
not a peaceful, cooperative one, but a tyranny in which the tendency of individuals to
overpower, dominate and threaten the whole needs to be constantly kept in check. For
Nietzsche, it is the nature of living things, including cells, to expand, grow, assimilate and
overpower; it is only the command structure of the organism that manages this struggle
such that the whole remains intact. Nietzsche’s source for this idea is biologist Wilhelm
Roux’s workThe Struggle of Parts in the Organism. This view answers a sceptical worry that
Nietzsche has about Darwin’s explanation for evolution. The best survival strategy is to
stick with what has proven to be successful. After all, some of the simplest organisms on
earth are some of the most successful. With change, Nietzsche reasons, comes risk. On
Roux’s picture, living things at every level exhibit an expansive force. Change within the
whole is therefore a constant. Evolution, in theminimal sense of change, occurs at different
rates depending upon limiting conditions. So some changes can be suppressed, for example.
Nietzsche thinks that natural selection involves the suppression, or slowing, of change and
therefore of evolution. The formation of new parts in the organism occurs on account of
the inherent expansiveness of its constituents. Moreover, survival is neither a driving force
of this change, nor does it guide it at every stage. Nietzsche’s clearest expression of this
opposition to Darwin is in his later notebooks. For instance, he writes the following in
1886:
For the longest time during which a quality is being formed, it
does not preserve the individual and does not benefit him, least of
all in the struggle with external conditions and enemies. . . . The in-
dividual itself is a struggle of parts (for food, space, etc.): its devel-
opment associated with victory, hegemony of individual parts with a
stunting or ‘reduction to organs’ of other parts. . . (NF 1886 7[25])2
This thought has its counterpart in FSW . In D 122, Nietzsche talks about the evolution
of the eye, claiming that ‘vision was not the intention behind the eye. . . vision appeared,
rather, after chance had put the apparatus together’. The question of teleology arises here,
which will be discussed momentarily. The other point that I take Nietzsche to be making
is that the process by which new features of an organism develop is divorced from the
function that they come to serve. Therefore, the function cannot explain the development.
Vision cannot explain the development of the eye because vision is a function that is only
2die längste Zeit, während deren eine Eigenschaft sich bildet, erhält sie das Individuum nicht und nützt
ihm nicht, am wenigsten im Kampfe mit äußeren Umständen und Feinden. . . . Das Individuum selbst
als Kampf der Theile (um Nahrung, Raum usw.): seine Entwicklung geknüpft an ein Siegen, Vorherrschen
einzelner Theile, an ein Verkümmern, „Organwerden“ anderer Theile. . .
110
subsequently bestowed upon it. Christian J. Emden has claimed that for Nietzsche ‘The
emergence of biological forms. . . could not be seriously detached from the functions they
perform’.3 His evidence is Nietzsche’s claim that ‘a new form will not for long be without
a relation to a partial advantage and subsequently develop with ever greater perfection ac-
cording to this use’ (NF 1886 7[25]).4 But since the eye, for example, is already a complex
form, development clearly can be detached from function, since to say that the function
of the eye is only subsequently assigned is to allow a great deal of functionless develop-
ment, so to speak. In my opinion, Emden underplays the distinction between Nietzsche
and Darwin on the question of gradual evolution, where every stage of which must be
beneficial.5 This clashes somewhat with the idea that organs are defined in terms of their
function. If the eye is that which sees, it is not clear how it could have developed before
having the function of vision. This never seems to occur to Nietzsche and he gives little
auxiliary comment on it. I suspect that is because his real target is the idea of evolution
aiming at a function rather than that function explaining evolution in a non-teleological
way. That is to say, his desire to combat strong teleology spills over into his views on the
development of organs in this passage.
Although I think Emden exaggerates the degree to which function is part of Nietz-
sche’s evolutionary explanations, he is right that Nietzsche thinks of natural selection as
having a role in the preservation of certain features of organisms. Once the eye comes to
have the function of vision, it serves to help preserve the organism.Those lacking vision are
out-competed by those with it. There are many occasions on which Nietzsche talks about
survival pressure being responsible for the continued presence. In GS, he claims that the
interpretive practises by which we constitute experience are the result of natural selection:
Through immense periods of time, the intellect produced noth-
ing but errors; some of them turned out to be useful and species-
3Christian Emden, Nietzsche’s Naturalism: Philosophy and the Life Sciences in the Nineteenth Century (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 140.
4Quoted from Emden. Original: eine neue Form nicht lange ohne eine Beziehung zu einem partiellen
Nutzen stehen wird, und dann dem Gebrauche nach sich immer vollkommener ausgestaltet. See ibid.
5At another point, Emden again read these thinkers as closer than they are by emphasising the fact that for
Darwin, evolution need not proceedmethodically, but could take place according what Gould and Eldredge
call ‘punctuated equilibria’. That is, it could occur rapidly in short bursts, interspersed by periods of little
change. The problem with applying this to Nietzsche is that these bursts still involve multiple generations
with small changes; the theory does not refer to mutations that lead to new complex structures within a
generation. The void between Darwin and Nietzsche regarding gradual development is not affected by this,
since the former still thinks that many small steps that are beneficial occur in evolution, whereas the latter
does not think that selection applies until after the formation of a quality. The ‘leap’ that Emden sees in
Nietzsche – involving the creation of morality – seems to be one that occurs at a definite point in history,
but the kind of leaps that Gould and Darwin hypothesise are still on a relatively large time scale, albeit not
when compared with evolution as a whole. They are still gradual in the sense of being spread over many
generations. See Emden, Nietzsche’s Naturalism, 195f. On punctuated equilibria see Stephen J. Gould and
Niles Eldredge, ‘Punctuated Equilibria: An Alternative to Phyletic Gradualism,’ in Models in Paleobiology,
ed. T. J. M. Schopf (San Francisco: Freeman, 1972), 82–115.
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preserving; those who hit upon or inherited them fought their
fight for themselves and their progeny with greater luck. (GS 110)
This complicates Nietzsche’s critique of Darwin. What he really seems to be opposed to
is the view that change is generated in response to survival pressure. This is certainly not
Darwin’s own position: variation is the keystone in Darwin’s argument.6 But in the Ori-
gin at least, he remains agnostic as to its cause, and certainly would not commit to the
view that their future survival value actually caused variations to appear. Natural selection
is the process by which less advantageous variations are eliminated, leaving the more ad-
vantageous ones to be passed on and spread through the population. So in one respect,
Nietzsche’s expansive life force is actually a supplement to Darwin in that it provides an
explanation for the ‘raw material’ of evolution, namely variation. There is still a crucial dif-
ference between the two, however, which is that for Darwin, all evolution is gradual and
natural selection operates at every stage. For Nietzsche developments can reach a degree
of complexity before they are assigned a function and assimilated into the economy of the
organism.7
Nietzsche’s real target to be those who conflate function with goals or purposes. InGM ,
where we are told that ‘The “development” of a thing, a tradition, an organ is therefore
certainly not its progressus towards a goal, still less is it a logical progressus, taking the
shortest route with least expenditure of energy and cost’ (GM 2.12). In the same passage,
functions are still part of the natural order. Indeed, for human beings at least, goals and
purposes are also meaningful. We can have goals, but to read that ability into evolution is a
mistake. We plan things by projecting or representing future states that guide our current
actions, which is a perfectly natural activity enabled by our representational capacities.This
is not a matter of backwards causation because the future state is represented in the present,
and it is the representation that causes us to behave in certain ways. This does not map
onto the evolutionary process itself. Nietzsche reacts to this lack of foresight by falling back
on mere chance and randomness, without appreciating that this is a false dichotomy. The
function of vision explains the evolution of the eye in way that makes its existence non-
random, but it does not explain it in virtue of their being a final state of sophisticated vision
that was the target of the process of development from basic to complex eyes. Perhaps
Nietzsche is best read as claiming that there is an irreducible element of chance in evolution
such that nothing inevitably evolves.8 As I noted before, however, Nietzsche does not deny
that the eye has the function of vision, only that this was not the reason that it first evolved.
6See Charles Darwin, On the Origin of Species ( John Murray, 1859; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008),
38.
7I have claimed that Nietzsche gets Darwin wrong in several respects, but this assumes that Nietzsche
is actually aiming his critique at Darwin. Extensive work has been carried out by Emden to show that
Nietzsche is really engaging with a range of Darwinist positions around at the time. Even calling Nietzsche
an anti-Darwinist is misleading given that Darwinismwas not a consistent position at the time. See Emden,
Nietzsche’s Naturalism, ch. 3.
8This is Emden’s position. See ibid., 102.
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A useful metaphor for understanding Nietzsche’s position is that of pushing and
pulling. In the case of purpose, there is a pulling force exerted by a future state that
ensures development arrives at that state. It is as though something were tied to a rope
and then thrown randomly into a maze before being reeled in. Such an object inevitably
escapes the maze, taking a path that is determined by the position of the rope. So in
the case of the eye, the completed state of the eye with the function of vision pulls the
development of the eye along a historical channel. Nietzsche erroneously sees Darwin’s
view as subscribing to something like this on a larger scale in that the preservation of life
is an aim towards which life is constantly pulled. Nietzsche’s view is that development is
the result of a pushing force. Life is constantly expanding, multiplying and diversifying;
development occurs because of this force. It is as though the maze had at its centre a
spring that constantly pumped water. As the water spreads out it fills various channels;
where it meets resistance, pressure builds until that resistance is overcome, or pressure
builds to the point that the water backs up and ends up flowing more vigorously down
an alternate path. Thus development is inevitable, provided the spring continues to flow,
but the paths down which that development occurs are not chosen in advance. Like all
metaphors, this one is limited. While life is expansive, it is more than mere energy; living
things have a certain structure and they only continue to live in virtue of that structure
remaining intact. The expansion of life is not only the reproduction of cells, but also the
formation of ever more complex, dynamic systems.
Nietzsche’s anti-Darwinism is not a complete denial of the role of natural selection, nor
does it emphasise dynamism at the expense of stability. Rather, it seeks to restore a balance
into evolutionary theory such that it is not exhausted by themechanism of natural selection.
If we are to conceive of health as based on the nature of life, then on this new picture, it
should make reference both to the survival of the organism and to its inherent expansive
forces.The problemwith the common conception of health is that it prioritises the survival
of the individual at the expense of the expansive life energy which Nietzsche sometimes
refers to as the abundance of life. There is a final nuance to this picture which will help
make sense of the notion of great health later on. The regulation of the organism that
allows it to survive is not the exclusive remit of natural selection. It is also a manifestation
of that force in all life that tends to expand the sphere of its influence. The parts of the
organism constantly impose themselves on the other parts; the organism as a whole is
command structure that imposes its authority on the struggling parts. If this account is
reminiscent of the later notion of will to power, that is because, as I will later argue, will to
power and will to life are already present in some form in UM and FSW . I have answered
Nietzsche’s first problem with the common conception of health, namely that it overlooks
the expansive force of life in focusing on survival. The task now is to deal with the second
problem with the common conception, which is that it relies on a functional account of
organs and life systems, which, given that organisms lack a comparable function, makes
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the overall health of the human being a different prospect.
Whether we should or not, we can talk about the goal of an organism being survival,
but to say that survival is its function is to posit a larger system of which it is a part.
Leaving aside the case of societies or communities that might well assign a function to
organisms, function is not the best way to characterise the health of an organism. The
function of the heart is to pump blood and anything that performs that function in the
body is legitimately called a heart. An artificial heart is still a heart even if it performs the
function of pumping blood in a completely different manner than that which it replaces.
A living thing, by contrast, is characterised not by function, but by various processes. The
precise details of this are a matter of ongoing debate in biology. Some common features of
life are less contentious than others. Ernst Mayr identifies eight ‘characteristics’ of living
things, which in turn imbue them with a further seven ‘capacities’:9
Characteristics: evolved programs; chemical properties; regulatory mechanisms; organi-
sation; telenomic systems; limited order of magnitude; life cycle; open systems.
Capacity for: evolution; self-replication; growth and differentiation via a genetic pro-
gram; metabolism (the binding and release of energy); self-regulation, to keep
the complex the system in a steady state (homeostasis, feedback); response to
stimuli from the environment (through perception and sense organs); change
at two levels, that of the phenotype and that of the genotype.
Mayr’s list is by no means the only one and some of its items are problematic than others.
For instance, the characteristic chemical properties of living things are that they consist of
molecules ‘not found in inanimate nature’; these include ‘peptides, enzymes, hormones’.10
The controversy of this claim arises from the efforts of those for whom life is a matter of
form. That is to say, it is conceivable that one could replace cells with nano-robots that
perform the same tasks and need not employ any of these chemicals. It would be mislead-
ing to describe an organism in which this occurs as dead. But this is not the technological
circumstance under which the controversy arose. Rather, it was the project of making arti-
ficial life, which consists for the most part in programming computer simulations of living
systems. Many of those engaged in such projects reject the label ‘simulation’ to describe
those systems, because, they argue, life is not a matter of matter but form.11 Provided the
9Ernst Mayr, This is Biology: The Science of the Living World (Cambrige, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1998), 21f.
10Ibid., 21.
11C.G. Langton writes ‘Life is a property of form, not matter, a result of the organization of matter rather
than something that inheres in the matter itself ’. See C.G. Langton, ‘Artificial Life,’ chap. 1 in The Phi-
losophy of Artificial Life, ed. Margaret A. Boden (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 53; This A-life
position has been heavily criticised, but the debate is far from over.See Elliot Sober, ‘Learning from Func-
tionalism: Prospects for strong artificial life,’ chap. 16 inThe Nature of Life, ed. Mark A. Bedau and Carol
E. Cleland (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Kim Sterelney and Paul Griffiths, ‘What is
Life?,’ chap. 28 in The Nature of Life, ed. Mark A. Bedau and Carol E. Cleland (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2010).
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computer system exhibits the structure of a living thing, it is alive. This threatens several
other members of Mayr’s lists. ‘Limited order of magnitude’ stipulates that organisms oc-
cupy a ‘limited range in the middle world’, something to which the formal account would
not assent. The references to genetics are also problematic if genes are not defined in terms
of their information-carrying function, but in terms of their chemical makeup. ‘Evolved
programs’ makes reference to the specific history of life as we know it on Earth. If Mayr
is taken to be putting forward a definition of life, this stipulation makes identifying life
elsewhere in the universe, with its own unique history, a contradiction in terms.
Placing Nietzsche within such debates would be time-consuming and of questionable
value given the limitations of biology in the nineteenth century. Nonetheless, the emphasis
on structure over chemical composition will become relevant to Nietzsche’s understanding
of culture as detailed in chapter 6 of this thesis. More relevant here is that many of the
less controversial features that Mayr identifies are ones to which Nietzsche would assent.
UM and the surrounding Nachlass contain many references to digestion and assimilation.
HL can be seen as the attempt to prescribe the use of different kinds of history as reg-
ulatory mechanisms within a culture. This is taken as an extension of the conditions of
life, ‘whether this living thing be a person or a people or a culture’ (HL 1). The biologi-
cal processes outlined enable the organism to survive and reproduce. More accurately, the
survival of the organism just is the continuation of these processes. But as we know, for
Nietzsche, the development of life is not explained only in terms of survival; it is charac-
terised by excess, expansion, growth and so on. This leads Nietzsche to view health, as an
extension of the principles of life, to consist in engaging in these processes to themaximum
extent possible without destroying the organism. This is true even in HL:
[T]he most powerful and tremendous nature would be character-
ized by the fact that it would know no boundary at all at which the
historical sense began to overwhelm it; it would draw to itself and
incorporate into itself all the past, its own and that most foreign
to it, and as it were transform it into blood. (HL 1)
With the phrase ‘into blood’, Nietzsche is only hinting at a biological underpinning to his
notion of a strong form of life. When Nietzsche encounters Roux and others, he synthe-
sises from their work a biological framework to support his notion of life. This is evident
in 1881:
The freest person has the greatest feeling of power over himself,
the greatest knowledge of himself, the greatest order in the nec-
essary struggle of his powers, the comparatively greatest indepen-
dence of his individual powers, the comparatively greatest struggle
in himself: he is the most discordant being and the richest in fluc-
tuations and the longest living and that with the richest appetite,
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self-nourishing, that which excretes the most from itself and most
renews itself. (NF 1881 11[130])12
Here we see Nietzsche moving from mental realm (knowledge, feeling) to the biological
(excretion, nourishment). It is telling that he makes this transition because it shows that
while he adopts a certain picture of biology, he does not limit it to biology. Nietzsche
understands these principles to apply, for example, at the level of the psyche, which is a
structure composed of drives that follow these biological principles. It not clear what to
make of Nietzsche’s movement between different domains in this way. Is the life of the
psyche not metaphorical? How about culture as a living entity? Surely that is a metaphor.
Nietzsche’s relationship with metaphor is complex. We saw in chapter 2 that concepts
originate as metaphors. Nietzsche could simply say that in calling these things living enti-
ties, he is proceeding as if the properties shared by such entities were essential, the others
being incidental. This is of course the strategy adopted by the formal account, which claim
that chemical make-up is incidental, but that self-regulation is essential to life. Nietzsche,
then, is best viewed as a kind of formalist for whom life manifests in different systems not
all of which are traditionally biological. It is unlikely that modern formalists would accept
Nietzsche’s practice here. After all, psyches and cultures are sufficiently different from one
another and from organisms to make this unappealing, where artificial life shares a great
deal more in common. But we should be careful about reading into Nietzsche a degree of
caution in his reductionism that he never actually displays. With that in mind, we are in
a position to talk about Nietzsche’s alternative conception of health – the great health –
which, I will argue, takes place in the domain of perspectives, but which maximises the
features inherent to life.
5.2.3 Great Health
Taking health to be the grounding value of Nietzsche’s cultural project is made difficult by
his apparently contradictory attitudes towards it. InGS, he is scathing of the will to health,
asking whether it ‘is not a prejudice, a cowardice and a piece of most refined barbarism
and backwardness’ (GS 120). But particularly in the later additions to FSW , Nietzsche
advocates strongly what he calls the ‘great health’. Faced with this tension, wemight simply
respond that Nietzsche changes his view on health after FSW . But if so, we would be left
wondering why he chose to emphasise it so strongly when returning to the works to add
material. When we look more closely at his comments in GS 120, we see that his worry
is actually ‘whether especially our thirst for knowledge and self-knowledge do not need
12Der freieste Mensch hat das größte Machtgefühl über sich, das größte Wissen über sich, die größte Ord-
nung im nothwendigenKampfe seiner Kräfte, die verhältnißmäßig größteUnabhängigkeit seiner einzelnen
Kräfte, den verhältnißmäßig größtenKampf in sich: er ist das zwieträchtigsteWesen und daswechselreichste
und das langlebendste und das überreich begehrende, sich nährende, das am meisten von sich ausscheidende
und sich erneuernde.
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the sick soul as much as the healthy’. Yet great health is closely related to knowledge. In
the preface to HH , the free spirit undergoes ‘years full of variegated, painfully magical
transformations ruled and led along by a tenacious will to health’ (HH P:4). When we
allow that there are two notions of health operating here, things become easier. GS 120
can be read as attacking the will to health understood in the common way, namely as
mere survival. This would involve wanting simply to avoid anything that challenges one’s
constitution. Great healthmight then be seen as adhering to that expansive principle of life
outlined previously. Expansion and growth might only be possible by taking on sickness.
What Nietzsche really opposes is a pure will to survival free from challenges, the biggest
of those being found in the search for knowledge.
Earlier in the aphorism Nietzsche proposes that health even at the biological level
depends on one’s goal. This suggests a reading on which what Nietzsche is simply trying
to displace survival as the aim of health. He would thereby be abolishing the common
conception of health in favour of an individualist account. I think we should resist this
reading for a number of reasons. First, in adopting it, we no longer allow ourselves the
possibility of talking about sacrificing our health for the sake of some further goal, such as
knowledge. If something serves our goal, we could no longer call it sickness, since health
and sickness would be determined only by that goal. Second, any goal that an individual
might have is conditioned on their surviving to pursue it. This is consistent with criticising
the undue prioritising of survival by avoiding risks, whichmight inhibit one from achieving
one’s goal. Provided survival remains part of the picture, it makes sense to talk in terms of
health as commonly understood. Nietzsche plays with the idea of balancing this survival
with a greater form of health when he uses the phrase ‘dangerously healthy’ to suggest
not just that one must overcome danger to preserve health, but that great health seeks out
danger. Great health requires not that one avoid risk, but seek it out.
The most explicit formulation of what great health actually involves can be found in
the already-quoted GS 382:
Anyone whose soul thirsts to experience the whole range of previ-
ous values and aspirations, to sail around all the coasts of this ‘in-
land sea’ (Mittelmeer) of ideals, anyone who wants to know from
the adventures of his own experience how it feels to be the discov-
erer or conqueror of an ideal, or to be an artist, a saint, a lawmaker,
a sage, a pious man, a soothsayer, an old-style divine loner – any
such person needs one thing above all – the great health, a health
that one doesn’t only have, but also acquires continually and must
acquire because one gives it up again and again, and must give it
up!
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The beginning of the passage is a clear expression of the project of incorporation as I have
described it, namely an ongoing process of occupying different perspectives. Emphasis is
not placed on learning about alternative perspectives, but on experiencing the world that
they create. The end of the aphorism also hints at the continual nature of this enterprise:
there is no end goal specified here, but rather an unending mission. It is also clear that this
is not bodily affair, but instead occurs at the level of conscious experience.13 I claimed in
the previous section that Nietzsche sees the principles of life operating at multiple levels.
The remainder of this section will offer a way to understand the above quoted passage that
brings together the biological conception of life and the project of incorporation.
The first step in understanding how the sphere of conscious experience can be related
to biology is to understand what kind of risk is actually involved in pursuing a perspectival
project. In biology, risk to an organism’s health can be understood in terms of death or
reduced chances of producing viable offspring. But, exceptional circumstances aside, the
free spirit does not risk death in pursuing the incorporation of perspectives. The kind of
risks that immediately spring to mind are broadly psychological. To some extent, we all
find ourselves in a fluctuating world and our conception of ourselves undergoes similar
fluctuation. But we still have some degree of consistent identity and we still experience a
meaningful world of stable objects. To lose these things would amount to the cessation of
our psychological selves. A bundle of perspectives is not a self in any clear way. Selfhood re-
quires the imposition of structure on experience.The individual could in principle lose this
by undermining every meaningful world and every image of themselves that offered any
stability. The resultant chaotic psyche would resemble complete insanity. In practice, it is
questionable whether an individual could philosophise their way into madness. The claim
that Nietzsche himself went mad as a result of his philosophy has proven to be a myth, the
consensus being that it resulted from a pre-existing neurological condition. Even so, Nietz-
sche at times entertains the possibility, claiming, for example, that ‘in that age in which
Christianity proved most fruitful in saints and desert solitaries, and thought it was prov-
ing itself by this fruitfulness, there were in Jerusalem vast madhouses for abortive saints,
for those who had surrendered to it their last grain of salt’ (D 14). Although Christians,
these saints were prototypical free spirits. Just like an organism, the psyche has its own
organisation and regulation without which it perishes.
The more likely reason to fail to achieve or maintain great health is becoming enam-
oured with a single perspective and thereby falling into dogmatism. Nietzsche describes
the great health as guarding against ‘the danger that the spirit may even on its own road
perhaps lose itself and become infatuated and remain seated intoxicated in some corner
or other’ (HH P:4). Within HH itself, Nietzsche talks about the need for the free spirit
13It is necessary to acknowledge here that for Nietzsche, this is a problematic idea, since everything is, in a
sense, a matter of the body for him. Nonetheless, since the relation between body and conscious experience
is far from fleshed out in Nietzsche, it still makes sense to draw this distinction provided one does not take
it to be ontological.
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to be on his guard against the ‘metaphysical need’ (HH 153). Where common health in
a bodily sense involves the avoidance of that which threatens the functions of the body,
its psychological analogue is the adherence to a narrow perspective that renders the world
familiar and meaningful. This is most evident in mythopoeic cultures that were the norm
for millennia and within which, Nietzsche claims, the morality of custom and conscious-
ness itself was formed. The greatest health, then, requires living as close to the precipice
of dissolution as possible without destroying the unity and meaning that is required to
maintain the psyche.
As we have seen, organisms contain diverse, struggling parts that are kept in check by
the executive control of the organism. They also undergo transformations, taking in and
excreting material, while regulative processes maintain their organisation through these.
By taking on more material, an organism is forced to exercise this regulation and unifi-
cation to a greater extent. This expansion is an expression of the fundamental expansive
nature of life; but the organisational and regulative forces that are forced to strengthen
in response to this are also an expression of this force. The great health involves pursu-
ing a similar expansion in the realm of perspectives, taking on new perspectives and in
the process overcoming previous ones. In doing this, the individual’s self-conception – his
perspective on himself – is forced to strengthen to prevent his existence dissolving into
chaos. He is forced to unify a highly diverse, overturning experience. Although there is a
balance struck here between unity and diversity, Nietzsche’s comments suggest that it is in
the response of the stabilising processes to the challenge of diverse perspectives that great
health is located. It is something that one gives up repeatedly in the process of incorpo-
ration. Only in so doing can one acquire that health even more strongly. The closest that
Nietzsche gets to definition of great health is in the preface to HH , where he talks about
a ‘superfluity of formative, curative, moulding and restorative forces which is precisely the
sign of great health, that superfluity which grants to the free spirit the dangerous privilege
of living experimentally and of being allowed to offer itself to adventure’ (HH P:4). It is
these forces, which are analogous to the self-regulatory and organisational forces of the
organism, that are strengthened in the project of incorporation.
So far, we have seen that the inherent risk of living experimentally is the loss ofmeaning
and identity, which is prevented by the aforementioned forces of great health. This helps
provide a degree of clarity on the nature of those forces: they involve meaning and identity.
They are the psychological equivalent of the processes by which the integrity and order
of an organism is maintained. At this point, it helps us to invoke certain passages from
UM . In HL, the strongest nature is one that can take in material (in this case history)
without ever being overwhelmed thanks in part to self-regulatory mechanisms (HL 1).
These allow it to ‘digest’ that which to those who lack that nature amounts to ‘a huge
quantity of indigestible stones of knowledge’ (HL 4). The influx of historical knowledge
is tantamount to being exposed to radical flux or becoming, something that is of great
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concern to Nietzsche in SE:
He who regards his life as no more than a point in the evolution
of a race or of a state or of a science, and thus regards himself
as belonging wholly to the history of becoming, has not under-
stood the lesson set him by existence and will have to learn it over
again. This eternal becoming is a lying puppet-play in beholding
which man forgets himself, the actual distraction which disperses
the individual to the four winds, the endless stupid game which
the great child, time, plays before us and with us. That heroism of
truthfulness consists in one day ceasing to be the toy it plays with.
(SE 4)
The disjunct between UM and FSW is evident in the opening to the quotation. In FSW ,
being part of the history of science is seen as noble. Acknowledging the infinitely complex
conditions that have led to one’s own existence is part of Nietzsche’s project from HH on-
wards. We could divide UM from FSW according to the concern Nietzsche demonstrates
for the potential consequences of facing the stream of becoming, something with whichBT
also occupies itself. But as the quote from HL above shows, Nietzsche is already thinking
of facing up to becoming as potentially having a strengthening effect. In this SE passage,
he is concerned with the threat to individual identity that arises from being ‘dispersed’. He
is called upon to assert an identity that persists despite the forces that threaten to pull it
apart. Here, the emphasis is on a denial or at least refusal to yield to becoming: it is seen
as a lie. So we have two moments in UM , one of strength in being able to face and digest
becoming and another of imposing one’s being on the stream of becoming.
Contained in UM are the as yet disjointed elements that eventually become the great
health.The expansion and digestion of foreign material, and the imposition and regulation
of order (or in this case identity, which for an organism is tantamount to the order of the
system) in the face of chaos. In what follows, I want to present an account of great health
that makes sense of these comments in UM and which allows for FSW ’s commitment
to not denying the multitude of perspectives of history. It offers a way to mediate the
conflict between the conflicting demands of life and knowledge. From SE, it borrows the
concept of a heroism of truthfulness, turning this idea into the cornerstone of the project
of incorporating truth as I have construed it.
Maintaining one’s identity involves taking a perspective on oneself. Sometimes for
Nietzsche this amounts to constructing a narrative that joins certain points in one’s past.
But this in turn involves thinking of oneself as a certain kind of person in the present. The
free spirit, for example, recognises his own free spiritedness: he thinks of himself as a free
spirit.This interpretation of himself leads him to act in certain ways that he associates with
being that kind of person. Someone who conceives of themselves as, for example, being of
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a certain nationality or class both sees their past through this lens and acts in ways that they
see prescribed by this identity, which is a perspective on the individual themselves, but it
also has a bearing on the meaningful world that presents itself to the individual. It is nar-
row parochialism that the free spirit seeks to overcome. The past perspectives that the free
spirit seeks to re-occupy were all, at one point, the remit of individuals whose identity was
bound up with a particular worldview and a way of conceiving of themselves, even if they
were not aware that they were engaged in such self-constituting practice. Such individu-
als, who represent ‘unconscious’ stages of culture, occupy what we might call first-order
perspectives on themselves. When Nietzsche talks about strong natures in HL, it is first-
order perspectives that he has in mind. The strong individual maintains their perspective
on themselves despite facing the flux of the past. They simply incorporate that material by
finding a place within their identity for it. In UM , this effectively involves falsifying it. So,
for example, someone who forges their identity in association with a particular artistic or
intellectual paradigm could interpret everything they learn about through the lens of that
paradigm. The romantic could find the romance in everything; the pessimist could find
the suffering. While this is the kind of interpretive practice that FSW will fight against, in
UM it is precisely the kind of thing that allows life to continue in the face of knowledge.
The strongest nature in this context is apt to render everything they encounter meaningful
in line with their perspective on themselves and the world.
We can distinguish first-order perspectives from second-order ones. A second-order
perspective is a perspective on the activity of creating andmaintaining an identity bymeans
of taking a perspective on oneself. We can illustrate this with Nietzsche’s own comments.
The romantic and the pessimist are both instances of what we might call a hero of truthful-
ness following Nietzsche’s own phrasing. At one level, their identity is different because it
involves different perspectives. But they share an identity as individuals that are adept at
imposing meaning on the realm of becoming. Being a hero of truthfulness is compatible
with a range of first-order identities. Although Nietzsche is in favour of certain first-order
perspectives, mostly for their consequences, his real values lie at this second order. What
he sees in the great figures of history is a meaning-making ability. It is from this that the
notion of great health arises. In FSW , meaning-making is not simply an individual affair,
but is the history of culture. Indeed, culture for Nietzsche centres around the creation of
meaningful worlds and individuals in the ways that chapters 2 and 3 deal with.
Thinking in terms of this second-order perspective on meaning-making helps give
content to Nietzsche’s description of culture as ‘conscious’ (HH 24). HH is described as
a ‘book for free spirits’ and in reading the book the free spirit cannot help but come to
be aware of this understanding of cultures and individuals as creating meaning. Once this
insight is adopted, the free spirit is not in a position to engage in the naive first-order
meaning making. Nietzsche’s own identification of these conditions of life makes the con-
scious awareness of such practices inevitable provided he is actually read and understood.
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In HL, engagement with history requires different approaches at different times, some of
which – particularly monumental history – involve falsification. But to manage this effec-
tively requires that at least some individuals are aware that they are engaged in falsification.
Nietzsche’s own in that work is already a degree of remove from those who simply engage
in certain kinds of historical practice. Nietzsche seeks to control knowledge in HL, but to
do so he requires knowledge of the conditions of life.This tension eases when he makes ex-
plicit this commitment inHH . So the free spirit is aware of the fact that they are engaged
in meaning-making. Understanding how this self-awareness combines with incorporation
gives us a way to understand how to achieve great health.
At the beginning of this chapter, I detailed the virtues that allow the free spirit to
engage in seeking knowledge, where this is understood in terms of the incorporating truth
by moving through perspectives. But the more general characteristic of the free spirit is
scepticism, which should be understood as facilitating that continued undermining of the
pictures of the world presented by particular perspectives.This is a new form of the heroism
of truthfulness. It is heroic in a way that fits with heroism as it is found in mythology: the
hero takes on dangerous challenges in a noble manner. Nietzsche’s imagery surrounding
the free spirit testifies to the degree to which he has this kind of heroism inmind. But while
heroism of truth undermines stable meaning, threatening to destroy the individual, it also
provides him with a new identity. His identity consists precisely in this ability to take on
the meaninglessness that threatens in the project of incorporation. To put it another way,
he derives meaning from the very activity of undermining meaning. His own meaning-
making ability is tested to its limit by the challenges that he sets it. The danger here is
that since this perspective on himself as a sceptic, free spirit and hero of truth is vulnerable
to being undermined by its own practice. But notice that even in the act of questioning
his interpretation of himself as all of these things, the individual is actually providing one
more confirming instance of the hypothesis that he is a sceptic. His identity is confirmed
by its own attempts to undermine itself. This complex and highly reflexive way of being
could place the individual at the cusp of dissolution into madness, but at the same time,
it tests those forces of great health to the limit. But by channelling those forces through
a conception of the self as engaged in the practice of incorporation, the individual need
not be pulled from the precipice in order to convalesce. Their activity of threatening their
health is the same activity that their health as seekers of knowledge consists in. This is
what Nietzsche means by being ‘dangerously healthy’.
For all of his talk of health as a purely individual affair, great health for Nietzsche has
the same structure for all individuals. It involves a strong meaning-making force to main-
tain the individual’s identity despite their continued undermining of stable perspectives.
This is an extension of his biological picture of organisms. The organism maintains its
unity with various processes that struggle against the forces that threaten to dissolve that
organism: it preserves a homoeostatic equilibrium. Human beings as meaning-making an-
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imals hold their consciously experienced world and the self that experiences it together
in the same manner. This is more than an analogy: both are simply instances of life. But
nature is not only about preservation; it is about expansion and growth. The strongest
organism expands and assimilates as much as it can without being overwhelmed. Great
human beings in their meaning-making practices have been able to do this throughout
history; however, their has always been the countervailing, stabilising force that seeks to
limit this. For human beings to live according to nature would require that they embrace
both the stabilising and the expansive aspects of life. Those with great health are those
who are able to expand into many perspectival domains while remaining unified. This ex-
pansion is as a testament and stimulant to their inherent abundance of life. Before moving
on, it is necessary to deal with a potentially serious objection regarding the universal status
of Nietzsche’s prescriptions.
5.2.4 Universality vs. Idiosyncrasy
The great health as I have outlined it is derived from a conception of life that is universal.
But in certain places, Nietzsche denies that there can be a universal concept of health.
Nowhere is this more explicit than in GS 120:
For there is no health as such, and all attempts to define such a
thing have failed miserably. Deciding what is health even for your
body depends on your goal, your horizon, your powers, your im-
pulses, your mistakes and above all on the ideals and phantasms of
your soul.Thus there are innumerable healths of the body; and the
more one allows the particular and incomparable to rear its head
again, the more one unlearns the dogma of the ‘equality of men’,
the more the concept of a normal health, along with those of a
normal diet and normal course of an illness, must be abandoned
by our medical men.
It would seem that my attempts to ground health in life are misguided. However, things
are not actually that simple. On the one hand, Nietzsche claims that individuals should
tailor their virtues; on the other, he names certain virtues ‘cardinal’, as we saw at the begin-
ning of this chapter. He denies that health has a common goal, yet he seeks to cultivate
individuals whose shared goal is the incorporation of truth. There is a tension here that
runs throughout Nietzsche’s thought, namely that between the idiosyncratic individual
and the shared project of culture of which they are a part. In light of this tension, passages
such as that above need to be interpreted carefully. We need to take seriously Nietzsche’s
stress on individuality, but we also need to reconcile it with his outline of a great health in
which great individuals partake.
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Health and great health were connected by their involving a degree of control by a
single force over a diversity of material; this is part of what it is to be alive. In the quoted
passage, Nietzsche is suggesting that the goal of survival, which defines physical health in
its most basic sense, can be replaced with other goals. For instance, one might seek to be
a great artist. With that as one’s goal, one might be willing to sacrifice one’s ‘health’ other-
wise construed. As I claimed earlier, I do not think that Nietzsche abolishes the common
conception of health, since he wants to allow that health can be sacrificed in the name of
some other goal, which is now presumably being labelled ‘health’. However, our example
of the artist is not that of the great health. The great health is only achieved by those who
enter into the very specific epistemic practices that Nietzsche outlines.This suggests a third
kind of health that sits somewhere in between the two, perhaps a transitional phase. This
makes sense of a curious fact about Nietzsche’s corpus, namely that he does not condemn
in equal measure all historical figures who commit to metaphysics or religion. On the con-
trary, he singles out several figures whom he sees as having not only an important role in
the history of culture, but as possessing a certain vitality lacking in their contemporaries.
I believe some of these figures hold the key to finally clarifying these opposing kinds of
health.
Nietzsche takes the comparison of cultures and the resulting relativism to be a fairly
recent phenomenon. The acknowledgement of the perspectival nature of reality, which
is a prerequisite for great health, is even more recent. This tells us something important,
namely that great individuals of the past took their perspective on the world to be true
rather than their own creation. This is a distinction that Nietzsche outlines explicitly in
GS. In GS 55, he describes the noble spirits that existed in past stages of mankind. Such
spirits hit upon novel perspectives, furnished themselves with new goals and ‘discovered’
new values; but, asGS 3 points out, a noble individual of this sort ‘believes that the idiosyn-
crasy of its taste is not a singular value standard; rather, it posits its values and disvalues as
generally valid’. These past nobles are neither fettered nor free spirits: they escape univer-
sal demands of the herd perspective to a certain extent, but only to ground a perspective
that takes itself to be a universal demand. This model applies to artists who take them-
selves to have discovered a true perspective, but hitherto unrecognised, perspective on the
world, and to those who found new religions that they take to be the one true religion.
Such rebellions have an important place in history for Nietzsche in that they break the
hold of other dogmatic perspectives. They also represent for him an expression of a strong
life force in that they seek to encompass a wide range of material in a new way for the
individual in question. As such, individuals in possession of such a perspective exhibit a
kind of enhanced health. However, they still fall short of the free spirit, who is aware that
perspectives he occupies are relative. The free spirit’s much more subtle engagement with
perspectives, and his ongoing scepticism, is what allows him to continually grow and de-
velop. The danger for the intermediate noble spirit is that they escape the stagnation of
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culture only to become trapped in a narrow perspective of their own.
For these individuals,GS 120 holds true.They have unique goals that mean that health
for them can be understood in a unique way. GS 120 can be read as an attempt by Nietz-
sche to open up the possibility for redefinitions of health that complements the goal of
survival with alternative goals. As we have seen, he sees the great health as being achieved
when a new goal – knowledge – comes to take the place of survival as primary. However,
even this intermediary health does not differ from the great health, or the common con-
ception of health, entirely. It still involves the fundamental structure of health, which is
the unification of diversity. Regardless of an individual’s goal, their health still consists in
their bringing everything else in line with that goal. Clearly the content of such health will
differ depending on the goal, but the form remains the same. This brings us to the heart
of what Nietzsche opposes in GS 120. He is undermining the claim that individuals are
all alike and that, as such, they can be brought to health with blanket prescriptions.
Seen from this perspective, Nietzsche’s view is less radical than it first appears. Even
within traditional medicine, cures need to be tailored to individuals. Some people react to
foods differently, some tomedicines.The view that individuals are identical is not appropri-
ately attributed to any competent physician. This gives us a way to resolve, at least to some
extent, the tension between individuality and commonality. When we apply this logic to
the seeking of knowledge, we see that there too, the course of an individuals progress is
determined to a large extent by their unique features. For example, take the fact that be-
coming a free spirit requires that one free oneself from various cultural perspectives that
one has adopted over the course of growing up. Prescriptions for one individual would
differ greatly from those for another. Nietzsche even goes as far as to claim that being
a free spirit is a relative concept, relative, that is, to one’s starting point in culture. The
achievement of great health might take the same form for different individuals, but the
methods for achieving it, the balance of virtues required, and so on will need to be tailored
by the individual to themselves. Even those symbols that Nietzsche attaches to seekers of
knowledge – the sailor, the bird, the knight – might carry less weight to someone in whose
culture such symbols are lacking or diminished. Such an individual might need their own
versions of these. The narrative that the individual constructs of themselves as a seeker
of knowledge will always be unique insofar as it refers to personal struggles and employs
symbolism that they find to be particularly evocative. Nonetheless, the end result is still
great health of the form I have outlined. It is requires the freedom from dogmatic perspec-
tives, facilitated by a cultivated scepticism, which in turn enables the individual maximum
expression that unifying force that defines all life. The question now is: what is the nature
and force of this idea as a normative foundation for Nietzsche’s project?
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5.3 Normativity
The aim of this chapter was to outline the criteria by which progress can be measured.
The concept of life and that of health with follows from it has been put forward as a
criterion. But one could specify any number of criteria that would allow for the comparison
of individuals and cultures. Happiness, courage, knowledge: anything that can be attained
to differing extents serves to provide a scale of measurement. The first problem, then, is
how to justify prioritising the notions of health and life. A further problem arises from
the notion of justification being used here. Specifically, what lends health its normative
force? Even if we know what being healthy entails, why ought we to be healthy? Or, to
weaken the question, what makes health a more compelling value than other candidates?
Without at least addressing these questions, any account of progress in Nietzsche threatens
to reduce to either assuming certain criteria or to describing the kinds of future states that
Nietzsche wants to bring about without understanding why he wants to do so and why
anyone else might agree with him.
One reading of Nietzsche we can exclude straight away sees normativity as pertaining
to a transcendent moral order from which norms get their force. But we also need to be
wary of talking about what we ‘ought’ to do, since Nietzsche’s sustained attack on morality
makes the idea of there being anything commanding us to act problematic. We also have
good reason to be cautious of universalisability, although, as I have claimed, there is a uni-
versal dimension to Nietzsche’s understanding of health. It is against the backdrop of these
concerns that accounts of normativity in Nietzsche have been and continue to be formu-
lated. The interest in this topic is steadily growing and has yielded excellent work.14 We
can broadly distinguish two positions on this question in the literature. One holds that the
normative dimension arose in the course of human social evolution. Human beings were
‘tamed’ in various ways, becoming consistent in their behaviour and capable of following
and creating rules or norms. The other position holds that normativity is present in the
notion of will to power or will to life. Overcoming resistance, assimilation, growth – all of
these are features of the organic world that make it already normative. These positions are
not necessarily or even in practice at odds with each other. There is no a priori reason to
think that they cannot be combined. Indeed, I take both to capture something important
in Nietzsche’s project. The first position is put forward by Richard Schacht in a way that
chimes with much of what has been presented in this thesis. It is his paper that I engage
with to outline this view before moving on to the second position.
14For example, see Christopher Janaway and Simon Robertson, eds.,Nietzsche, Naturalism, and Normativity
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
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5.3.1 Normativity as Arising from ‘Forms of Life’
In his 2012 paper, Nietzsche’s Naturalism and Normativity, Schacht presents an account of
normativity in Nietzsche that he contrasts with Korsgaard’s classic account.15 He focuses
on Korsgaard’s claim, as he renders it, that ‘real normativity is a matter of “oughtness” with
respect to those things that one (“we”, anyone, everyone) really ought or ought not to do’.16
He identifies two requirements here for any account of normativity: one must account
both for the content of any normative requirement and for the force that requirement. In
other words: what ought we to do? and in virtue of what does that ‘ought’ have authority?
This is the context in which Schacht develops an account of normativity in Nietzsche; he
characterises this account as ‘naturalistic’.17
Schacht sees normativity as naturalistic in the sense that it arise in the natural course of
human history. It can be explained in evolutionary terms, where evolution does not neces-
sarily entail Darwinism. Although specific normative content might make reference to the
supernatural, the history of such content would be amenable to explanation in naturalistic
terms. In short, normativity is a feature of the life of the human animal. Human commu-
nities have developed rules that govern their behaviour and as a member of a community,
one internalises those rules:
Forms of human linguistic, social, cultural, and institutional life
are normatively structured. When one identifies with them, buys
into them, and internalizes them, those structures and the under-
girding and surrounding values are parts of what gets internal-
ized.18
Although Schacht discusses morality, he does not limit himself to it; rules that are not nec-
essarily moral are included.19 Instead, he talks about what he calls ‘forms of life’, which are
normative frameworks in which individuals are embedded.20 Schacht commits Nietzsche
to pluralism about these forms of life: there are many such forms in existence and many
more that have existed. Normative content, then, is part of the history of human social
evolution. Korsgaard would of course acknowledge that there are many normative claims,
but, at least as Schacht reads her, she is interested in ‘real’ normativity. This is where Nietz-
sche and Korsgaard diverge for Schacht. For the latter, we cannot decide which form of
life – which set of norms – we really ought to adopt because there exists no normative
15Richard Schacht, ‘Nietzsche’s Naturalism and Normativity,’ in Nietzsche, Naturalism, and Normativity, ed.
Christopher Janaway and Simon Robertson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 236–58.
16Ibid., 246.
17Ibid., 236.
18Ibid., 255.
19This is less of a clean division when thinking in terms of the morality of custom, which arguably renders
anything customary a moral issue.
20Schacht, ‘Nietzsche’s Naturalism and Normativity,’ 247.
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framework that is not itself one of these forms of life. Without such a framework, there
are no external criteria with which to assess the normative claims contained in a form of
life. To even talk in normative terms, one must already have adopted one of many possible
normative frameworks and any claim about what we really ought to do is just an expression
of that particular framework. All we can do is internally critique a set of norms.
This connects to the question of force. Were there something external to a form of life
that could ground universal normative claims then the particular claims within a form of
life could be assessed. But since normativity only exists as a result of the particular rules that
govern each form of life, normative force is limited to that form of life. Forms of life are
inherently normative, being governed by rules, making demands and so on. Insofar as one
is invested in a form of life, one is subject to those rules and demands. This is distinct from
claims to effect that since one has signed a contract to be part of a form of life, so to speak,
one really ought to uphold that contract. Rather, the claim is that adhering to certain rules
and responding to certain demands is constitutive of being invested in a form of life. But
human beings cannot help but be invested in some form of life and there is therefore no
mystery as to the origin of the force of normative claims. With this commitment in place,
we need not point to something universal that compels individuals one way or another.
This does not mean that one really ought to obey that which is commanded by the form of
life in which one is invested. It is that there are claims to the effect ‘you ought to do such
and such’ that are natural products of human social organisation and whose force is simply
part of the minimal commitment that the individual has to have to a normative framework
to be taken to be participating in the relevant form of life. I say ‘minimal’ because within
any form of life, it is still possible to identify conflicting normative claims; thus individuals
need not adopt and act on every single norm. Forms of life can be brought to task for their
various inconsistencies and changed as a result. Normative conflicts can also be settled by
determining the priority of claims. Schacht sees this as Nietzsche’s main task, which he
calls determining an ‘order of rank’ of values.21
Schacht’s account is very close to my own in key respects. I have attributed the rise
of consciousness and, with it, the world of appearances to the development of normative
frameworks like the ones Schacht describes in his notion of a form of life. In this context
it is clear why we cannot help but be invested in a form of life, since to fail to be so would
amount to a dissolution of structured consciousness. This notion of being already invested
in a normative framework will prove crucial to the project of cultural transformation in
chapter 6. However, there are some issues with Schacht’s account. For instance, his em-
phasis on the plurality of forms of life renders Nietzsche’s criticisms of them mysterious.
Nietzsche passes judgement on almost every past form of life at some point. He praises
the Greeks, admonishes Christianity, and is ambivalent towards asceticism and pessimism
21On this idea in Nietzsche see HH P:7, BGE 221, GM 1.17. For Schacht’s claim about its priority in
Nietzsche’s project see Schacht, ‘Nietzsche’s Naturalism and Normativity,’ 251.
128
depending on where one looks. How is this possible if his pluralism is as pronounced as
Schacht suggests? According to what normative framework does Nietzsche take specific
forms of life to task? One response might be that there is significant overlap in these
forms of life. All those listed are in the same Western tradition of thought, for example.
But Nietzsche also engages with so-called ‘savage’ cultures, knowledge of which he gets
from extensive accounts in, for example, the work of Lubbock. If we allow that despite
the plurality of normative frameworks, there is significant overlap between them, then a
universal normativity is possible. One need only make reference to that which is shared by
all. Korsgaard and Kant point to reason as something shared by all agents in virtue of their
being agents; this is where they locate normative force. Schacht quotes GS 335 to support
the claim that Nietzsche is irreducibly pluralist. Nietzsche talks about ‘human beings who
are new, unique, incomparable, who give themselves laws, who create themselves’.22 But
this passage expresses what we might call a second-order value, namely the value of indi-
vidual self creation. Nietzsche values those who share the characteristic of creating their
own values. Even where such individuals do not share first-order values, they are united
by their pursuit of individuality. Nietzsche’s emphasis on pluralism does not arise from
nowhere: it is derived from his conception of the human being and life more generally,
which Nietzsche takes to apply universally. That is how he is able to determine which
forms of life are ‘better’.
Forms of life are the source of many specific norms which give rise to meaningful
worlds. But the forms-of-life interpretation needs to be supplemented with discussion of
the form if life. Human beings are united by the fact that they create forms of life with
normative commitments, creating worlds for themselves. This is in turn an extension of
the activities engaged in by all living things.23 This is not to say that there are formal codes
of conduct laid down for living things to adhere to, but there are rules which if followed
enhance or restrict life in line with the definition of what being alive entails. This provides
the criterion by which Nietzsche assesses forms of life: he compares them according to
whether they enhance or restrict life as such. The later Nietzsche cashes this out in terms
of will to power. One place that Nietzsche is clear that we can compare forms of life is the
preface to GM , where he proposes that the value of any given morality has now become
a central question. In other words, values embedded in forms of life should be brought to
task (GM P:6). This brings us to the second position on which normativity is a feature of
organic life as such.
5.3.2 Normativity as Life and Power
Accounts of the normativity inherent in nature tend to focus on the will to power, which
in turn is associated with the later works. There we find the suggestion that morality as
22Quoted in Schacht, ‘Nietzsche’s Naturalism and Normativity,’ 254.
23That is not to say that all living things construct worlds.
129
involving the unthinking adoption of values and blind adherence to norms would be to
blame ‘if man, as species, never reached his highest potential power and splendour’ (GM P:6).
He is clearly critiquing forms of life, and, moreover, power as an overall criterion is central
to his critique. Throughout the later works, power is connected with life. For example, the
tendency among Darwinists to focus on adaptation to external circumstances as the motor
of evolution is criticised as follows:
But this is to misunderstand the essence of life, itswill to power, we
overlook the prime importance that the spontaneous, aggressive,
expansive, re-interpreting, re-directing and formative forces have,
which ‘adaptation’ follows only when they have had their effect.
(GM 2.12)
This is basically a continuation of what was discussed above regarding the nature of life.
But Nietzsche is clear in TI that understanding life and power instructs us in how we
should ensure the future flourishing of humanity. Part of that project is to ‘create a new
sense of responsibility for doctors in all cases where the highest interests of life, of as-
cending life, demand that degenerate life be ruthlessly pushed down and thrown aside’
(TI ‘Skirmishes’ 36). Nietzsche uses the term ‘responsibility’ here and the aphorism is en-
titled Morality for doctors. The normativity of life and power is plain to see. I will explore
this normativity further, but before doing so I can no longer delay in addressing an objec-
tion to the entire thrust of the chapter so far, namely that the will to power and even the
will to life are not applicable to FSW , but are later ideas that could not have been at the
heart of those works.
Life and Power in FSW
The phrase ‘will to power’ [Wille zur Macht] appears as early as 1876, at the beginning of
Nietzsche’s preparations forHH (NF 1876 23[63]). At this point, it is merely one among
many psychological phenomena that Nietzsche is thinking about; it serves no theoretical
role. In HH , power appears as a motivation alongside several others that underlie pity
(HH 103). The phrase does not appear at all in the FSW works as originally published.
However, close approximations of the phrase do appear.HH 137 contains the phrase ‘lust
for power’ in a context that echoes the discussion of the ascetic ideal in GM ; HH 142
connects this lust for power with ‘the feeling of power’. When we reach D, this latter
expression becomes very common, being invoked to explain a wide range of phenomena.
Nietzsche begins to italicise the phrase, suggesting both that he places great importance
on it and that he is manoeuvring it into position as a theoretical construct. The level of
Nietzsche’s commitment to the concept can be seen in D 23, where he writes that ‘It
has become [man’s] strongest propensity; the means discovered for creating this feeling
130
almost constitute the history of culturek’. If we take this seriously, then the interpretive
activity that creates a meaningful world for humanity is the result of an associated feeling
of increased power that such activity engenders. During GS, we see the feeling of power
used to unite what was previously taken to be opposed. Helping and hurting other people
are both viewed as expressions of power (GS 13). HH 104 is the place that Nietzsche gets
closest to aligning life with power. Nietzsche first define pleasure as the ‘feeling of one’s
own power, of one’s own strong excitation’, before going on to claim that ‘Without pleasure
no life; the struggle for pleasure is the struggle for life’. Adding these together yields the
claim that the struggle for the feeling of power is the struggle for life. This is remarkably
close to the claim in GS 349 that ‘the will to power. . . is simply the will of life’.24
In UM , life is an expansive force that is characterised by incorporation In HL, it is
only through incorporation and assimilation that life can deal with knowledge. Nietzsche
not only seeks to protect this force, but also to encourage and manage it to produce great
individuals. Nietzsche’s characterisation of the ‘tremendous’ natures is as of individuals
who seek to maximise the range of material they can incorporate. Despite Nietzsche’s
warnings about the surplus of history, even here he suggests that greatness is to be sought
in allowing knowledge of the past to enter the individual provided he can still incorporate
it. This is understood in terms of interpretation, which I have claimed is not restricted
to human beings, even if it only takes the form of conscious experience in human beings.
Will to power is a ‘re-interpreting’ and a ‘formative’ force in the later works (GM 2.12).
These are same characteristics that define life in UM , even if Nietzsche does not explicitly
discuss levels below that of psychology in those early essays.
Nietzsche takes this expansive, incorporating force to be the essence of life, right from
UM and through FSW . Growth and expansion are key features of life, as is the mainte-
nance of executive control during that growth and expansion. Indeed, that an organism,
a culture, a society can be said to grow is only possible if it also maintains the structure
that makes it what it is. This is the concept of life that I take Nietzsche to be operating
with. If these conditions are sufficient to fulfil the criteria of a will to power doctrine, then
regardless of whether Nietzsche uses the phrase ‘will to power’, we can attribute him the
claim that life is will to power. This does not amount to a metaphysical endorsement of
will to power, only a biological one. At the heart of Nietzsche’s project of incorporation,
we find this concept of life as power: ‘knowledge became a part of life and, as life, a con-
tinually growing power, until finally knowledge and the ancient basic errors struck against
each other, both as life, both as power, both in the same person’ (GS 110). This is the
conflict that leads to incorporation as a project. The experiment of incorporation has been
in Nietzsche’s work since UM , where life was challenged to incorporate the deliverances
of knowledge. In fact, it should come as no surprise that the drive to knowledge should
24Richardson has helpfully pointed out that the Cambridge translation renders this incorrectly as ‘the will
to life’. I have corrected the quotation accordingly. See Richardson, ‘Nietzsche On Life’s Ends,’ 764.
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be associated with this continual growth: the very notion of drives that Nietzsche begins
to use in D is such that each drive expands unless checked by another drive. That the indi-
vidual is a struggling mass of drives each looking to expand shows that he conceives of life
as conditioned on growth and expansion; that the controlling force in the organism is just
another drive demonstrates his commitment to reducing the organism to a single concept,
in this case the drive concept.
To straightforwardly apply will to power to FSW would be problematic, but Nietz-
sche’s understanding of life already contains the key ideas at this point. One difference that
can be observed between life before and during the later works is in Nietzsche’s emphasis
on structure and organisation. In later works, his emphasis is more on growth, expansion,
assimilation, overpowering, overcoming resistance. But all of these presuppose organisa-
tion and unity. Without some unity of the individual there is nothing into which material
is incorporated or assimilated; nor is there being that can be said to have overcome any-
thing. Those key notions from UM of assimilation and incorporation define the later will
to power and UM ’s emphasis on unity becomes an assumption of the will to power theory.
Indeed, it is UM more than FSW that really offers support for the employment of will
to life as the basis for Nietzsche’s cultural project. As I pointed out in chapter 1, however,
these are the foundation of FSW .WhenNietzsche equates will to life with will to power in
the late book 5 of GS, he is really just making explicit something that Nietzsche is already
operating with in FSW as a whole.
Power and life as normative
We come now to the second position regarding normativity, which takes it to arise from
the nature of life. This is the position that Emden adopts, expressing it as follows:
Nietzsche’s naturalism implied that the value of fitness, or the
value of further growth, could not be seen as external to the
processes described. The reason why the growth and expansion of
life constituted a normative standard was simply that they were a
constitutive characteristic of living things.25
The will to power is neither a metaphysical construct, nor does it
map easily onto evolution if the latter is seen exclusively in terms of
natural selection. Rather, against the background of his reading in
the life sciences, Nietzsche views the will to power as describing
the formal conditions constitutive of living things, such as over-
coming resistance, development, and growth. The will to power,
thus, emerges as a normative principle.26
25Emden, Nietzsche’s Naturalism, 141f.
26Ibid., 146.
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My position is basically Emden’s, but it bears further specification nonetheless. The point
about the value of growth not being external to the processes of life is important because
it avoids Nietzsche’s own critique of attempts to provide a foundation to normative claims.
He writes ‘To know “this is health, this preserves life, this harms one’s offspring” – is defi-
nitely not a regulative morality! Why live? Why live completely joyously? Why offspring?’
(NF 1880 6[123]).27 Just a few notes later, we find this line of thinking continued:
The moralist who wants to establish a morality is driven to state a
final purpose. ‘If you want to be healthy you must be moderate.
But you must want to be healthy: for it is the condition of being
happy or achieving your goals etc.’ A new goal manifests behind
every goal: and the moralist ends up having to state the purpose
of existence. I can say: there is no purpose to existence, and it
is therefore impossible to arrive at a morality based on purpose.
(NF 1880 6[134])28
The reduction here, which pursues instrumental purposes down to their roots in an ulti-
mate purpose, bears similarities to that which I have attributed to Nietzsche. He too takes
virtues to serve knowledge, knowledge to serve health, and health to be an expression of
life. Yet for Nietzsche, life, or existence as he puts it here, has no purpose. This seems
to rule out the possibility that life – even in the form of expansion, growth or power –
can serve as a final goal. Life cannot refer to anything beyond itself if it is to serve as a
normative foundation.
Emden correctly points out that Nietzsche’s view on evolution does not require that it
be measured in terms of something external to it. Darwin, by Nietzsche’s lights, postulates
such a goal, namely preservation. Nietzsche’s own conception of evolution is that it has no
external goal. In D 108, he writes:
Evolution does not have happiness in view, but evolution and
nothing else. – Only if mankind possessed a universally recog-
nised goal would it be possible to propose ‘thus and thus is the
right course of action’: for the present there exists no such goal.
(D 108)
I take the statement that evolution only aims at evolution to amount to the claim that
evolution is simply change that perpetuates itself.That is, that organisms grow, expand and
27Zu wissen, „dies ist gesund, dies erhält am Leben, dies schädigt die Nachkommen“ — ist durchaus noch
kein Regulativ der Moral! Warum leben? Warum durchaus froh leben? Warum Nachkommen?
28Der Moralist, der eine Moral gründen will, wird getrieben, einen letzten Zweck anzugeben. „Wenn ihr
gesund sein wollt, so müßt ihr mäßig sein. Aber ihr müßt gesund sein wollen: denn es ist eine Bedingung,
um glücklich zu sein oder um seine Ziele zu erfüllen oder usw.“ Ein neues Ziel zeigt sich hinter jedem
Ziele: und der Moralist endet, den Zweck des Daseins angeben zu müssen. Ich könnte sagen: Zweck des
Daseins giebt es nicht, also ist eine Moralität um einen Zweck des Daseins zu erreichen nicht möglich.
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change is just a feature of them rather than something that they aim at. Certainly, evolution
does not aim at happiness, but neither does it aim at health. Health is just constituted by
the continuation of those processes. This distinguishes between a principle of life and a
goal of life.29 To say that human life does not have a single goal or set of goals is not to
say that it does not, at some level, operate by a single principle or set of principles. That
principle is will to power; it is ‘life alone, that dark, driving power that insatiably thirsts
for itself ’ (HL 3), as Nietzsche renders it even before FSW .
There is a further important point to be made here, namely that just because will to
power is a constitutive principle of life does not mean that living things automatically max-
imise their will to power. As Emden points out, Nietzsche is critical of Herbert Spencer
for his belief in the inevitability of progress. He quotes the following note: ‘Spencer’s image
of the future of humanity is not a scientific necessity, but awish according to the ideals of the
present’ (NF 1881 11[98]).30 Nietzsche thinks that human beings have consistently failed
to make any progress because they have failed to maximise their power; in fact, they have
produced ways of living that hinder that maximisation. This makes more sense if we take
into account that will to power functions at different levels. Drives are governed by it just
as individuals are. One drive’s growth and expansion can inhibit that of others. So a drive
can become powerful in an individual to the detriment of their other drives. This leads to
their overall potential being squandered. This is a case of the maximum expression of life
at one level hindering it at another level. I take it that this is a big part of what Nietzsche’s
project is all about. It connects directly with my notion of incorporation as preventing the
ascendancy of dogmatic perspectives whose rule would hinder others from being expressed.
This basic idea also features in those who view Nietzsche’s conception of health in drive
terms. Gemes, for example, writes ‘ascending life, health life, is a collection of drives that
through sublimation has achieved concerted, maximul expression’.31 Sublimation is the
alternative to repression, which involves certain drives preventing others from expressing
just as I have described.
So far, we have seen that will to power or life is a principle that governs all life, including
human life. It allows us to measure the strength or health of a form of life; we might even
say it helps measure the ‘aliveness’ or vitality of a form of life. This is a norm only in the
sense that it allows for success and failure: it is a constitutive norm. A game of chess serves
as a good illustration of this kind of norm. One is only playing chess if one moves pieces
in a certain way. Someone who moves bishops along ranks and files rather than diagonals
29Thus we find in BGE the principle of will to power, but the staunch denial of a goal: ‘Above all, a living
thing wants to discharge its strength – life itself is will to power –: self-preservation is only one of the
indirect and most frequent consequences of this. – In short, here as elsewhere, watch out for superfluous
teleological principles!’
30Emden’s translation. Original German: ist das Bild Spencer’s von der Zukunft des Menschen nicht eine
naturwissenschaftliche Nothwendigkeit, sondern einWunsch aus jetzigen Idealen heraus. Emden, Nietzsche’s
Naturalism, 165.
31Gemes, ‘Life’s Perspectives,’ 573.
134
is not playing chess, but some other game. We might say that they ought to move them
along diagonals if they want to play chess. But this is not a moral ought, rather it simply
informs someone of the legal moves available to a chess player. Furthermore, it is not an
instrumental ought. It is not the same as saying ‘if you want to capture her knight you
ought to sacrifice that pawn’. In such a case, the player may or may not want to capture
the knight. The force of this ought depends on something external to it in that she must
additionally have some desire, intention or reason to capture the knight. But to say ‘you
ought to move your bishop along diagonals’ is just another way of saying that insofar as
you are playing chess your possibilities for future moves are constrained. To do anything
else is simply to stop playing chess. Applying this to life means that life as will to power
is normative in the sense that to continue to be a living thing just means to continue to
express will to power. Nietzsche does not need to impel individuals to express will to power;
they cannot help but do so.This is what I take Emden to be getting at: that a description of
life is normative because it specifies criteria for success and failure.32 One cannot describe
life without these criteria any more than one can describe chess without thereby dictating
constraints that apply to the actions within that game.
One can play chess well or badly, which is only possible because of the nature of the
game. Moving pieces randomly along legal paths on the board and taking one’s turn are
not sufficient to be playing chess. Within the game one needs to at the very least aim to
avoid being checkmated. Someone who does not even try to avoid checkmate at a point
that will result in them losing has either given up playing and is merely going through
the motions or has not understood, and is not therefore meaningfully participating in, the
game.33 Applied to life, the claim would be that expressing will to power is constitutive of
being alive, and it is possible to do so better or worse. This can be applied to the various
characterisations of will to power: one can incorporate, assimilate, grow, expand etc. more
or less effectively. To describe chess to someone about to play is already to lay down the
tracks down which future moves must proceed for that person to play chess well. To de-
scribe living things is to lay down the tracks for a the flourishing of living things. Because
will to power, not survival, is constitutive of successful life, proceeding down those tracks
involves maximising will to power.34
32NadeemHussain captures this well when he says ‘To be alive is, in part, at least, to have a tendency towards
expansion, growth, domination, overcoming of resistances, increasing strength, and so on. It is this picture
of life, and the accompanying fundamental evaluative standard, that is present even where Nietzsche does
not use the reductive-sounding locution of the “will to power”’. See Nadeem J. Z. Hussain, ‘Nietzsche’s
Metaethical Stance,’ in The Oxford Handbook of Nietzsche, ed. Ken Gemes and John Richardson (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2013), 402.
33I owe thanks to AdamArnold for pointing out to me that someone might play chess with the aim of losing
if, for example, they stand a better chance of winning the overall tournament in which the game is situated.
That is why I restrict my claim to a single game.
34Railton also maintains that living well is normative in the sense that life has success criteria of the kind
given here and denies that this need be seen as involving a moral ‘ought’to be normative. Rather than chess,
he uses the example of sailing. See Railton, ‘Nietzsche’s Normative Theory,’ 32.
135
The problem we still have is that above Nietzsche asked ‘why live?’ as a challenge to
grounding normativity in life. We cannot tell someone unconditionally that they ought
to live any more than we can tell them that they just ought to play chess. But insofar as
someone is alive, they are already engaged in will to power.35
Only killing themselves puts an end to their participation in the ‘game of life’. Just as
for Schacht, being invested in a form of life brings with it normative force, being invested
in life as such brings with it normative force. Nietzsche and Korsgaard are no longer that
far apart. Korsgaard seeks ‘to explain the normative force of [certain] principles by show-
ing that they are constitutive of reflective mental activity itself ’.36 Nietzsche on the other
hand explains the normative force of the principle of will to power by showing that it is
constitutive of the activity of all life.37 For Nietzsche, all life is will to power even in those
who condemn life. He talks about Schopenhauer, whose ‘enemies held him tight and kept
seducing him back to existence’ (GM 3.7). He goes on to claim that ‘Every animal, in-
cluding the bête philosophe, instinctively strives for an optimum of favourable conditions
in which to fully release his power and achieve his maximum of power-sensation’. Later,
in TI , he writes ‘A condemnation of life on the part of the living is, in the end, only the
symptom of a certain type of life’ (TI ‘Anti-Nature’ 5). This is equivalent on the Korsgaar-
dian picture to something like the claim that to dismiss the importance of rationality by
giving reasons is to actually tacitly accept it.38
None of this supposes that there can be an absolute commanding force that everyone
ought to obey in virtue of being instances of will to power. Nietzsche is well aware that
the goal of maximising one’s will to power is not built into us, but must be adopted. That
is because will to power does not itself set goals, even the goal of power. It simply moves
down the avenues available at a given time. This is what Nietzsche means when he says
that evolution – or life – aims at itself and nothing else. But the end of this aphorism,
which I did not quote, is crucial to understand Nietzsche’s project, and demands being
quoted at length:
Only if mankind possessed a universally recognised goal would it
be possible to propose ‘thus and thus is the right course of action’:
for the present there exists no such goal. It is thus irrational and
trivial to impose the demands of morality upon mankind. – To rec-
35Richardson neatly captures the position that I am proposing: ‘what’s essential is a directedness, at an
end. This end can be achieved or realized to a greater or lesser degree. So there is a scale, running from
lower/worse to higher/better, alongwhich all living things can be ranked—are ranked by their own essential
aiming’. He goes on to identify will to poer as this end, going into more detail than I have space for here.
Richardson, ‘Nietzsche On Life’s Ends,’ 772.
36Christine M. Korsgaard,The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 236.
37Emden captures this point in his discussion of Korsgaard, where he too sees the main distinction as lying
in the fact that Nietzsche seeks to extend his understanding of human agency in the biological rather than
mental world. More accurately, the latter is an extention of the former. Emden, Nietzsche’s Naturalism,
187f., 196ff.
38No doubt Nietzsche could be accused of something like this at times.
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ommend a goal to mankind is something quite different: the goal
is then thought of as something which lies in our own discretion;
supposing the recommendation appealed to mankind, it could in
pursuit of it also impose upon itself a moral law, likewise at its own
discretion. But up to now the moral law has been supposed to
stand above our own likes and dislikes: one did it want actually
to impose this law upon oneself, one wanted to take it from some-
where or discover it somewhere or have it commanded to one from
somewhere. (D 108)
I take Nietzsche’s project to be a matter of supplying mankind with the goal of maximising
will to power – of maximising life. We have the potential to be arrangements of will to
power that deliberately arranging themselves in ways that maximise their overall power.
That is, we are life that has the potential to set as its goal life’s own enhancement. Will to
power is already universal to us as a principle but not as a goal. Part of our naturalisation is
to realign our goals with the principle of life. In the passage, Nietzsche is clear on how this
should be achieved. We cannot go around preaching the maximisation of will to power
as a new obligation of humanity. We must ‘appeal’ to people to take on this goal, which
means we must operate with the values that are already in place. The final chapter of this
thesis takes this idea to a deeper level, using it as the basis of cultural incorporation. To
understand how, it is necessary to recall Schacht’s idea of forms of life. We are invested in
worlds that we create through certain normative frameworks.Those worlds are meaningful
and affectively charged in ways specific to the communities in question. To bring about the
maximum expression of life in individuals and cultures, Nietzsche exploits our investment
in these worlds. That is to say, what he above calls ‘likes and dislikes’ can be understood at
a much deeper level as the affective investment we have in the world we inhabit. So rather
than command mankind as a new prophet of will to power, Nietzsche intends instead
to bring about life-enhancement by tapping into the existing worlds that form culture.
He does this as a way to instil in mankind a goal that is commensurate with flourishing,
understood in terms of life and power.
The appeal to existing values is central to Nietzsche’s project insofar as it allows him to
avoid having to place too much weight on the normative dimension of will to power. I have
argued in this section for a kind of constitutivism regarding will to power. As living things,
we are already will to power. Therefore maximising will to power is maximising what we
already are. But we are still left with the question of why we ought to maximise what we are
instead of simply being what we are, a question that constitutivist readings of Nietzsche
struggle with. If I am already instantiating will to power, what obliges or even motivates
me to maximise it? This kind of pushing back to fundamental normativity in Nietzsche is
misguided if it seeks a foundation that everyone can recognise obliges them to flourish. But
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wemust remember that Nietzsche’s project was never meant to reach everybody. He knows
that some people’s drives are not suitably arranged to be affected by his appeal to concepts
like health, strength and life. He targets those who will respond to him by appealing to
existing cultural frameworks; he seeks to win us over. In doing so, he believes he can effect
not just change in certain individuals but, through them, wider cultural change. Having
said that, he does not believe himself to be fighting against existing justifiable normative
foundations: such things do not exist, and where they are purported to exist, Nietzsche is
the first to question them. In a world without such grounds – an ocean on which we have
‘burned our boats’ (HH 248) – any project of cultural change must appeal to our drives.
What I further hope to have shown in the narrative of this chapter, from virtue to
knowledge to power, is that will to power need not lead to noble blond beast who prey
on slave types. The calm, moderate seeker of knowledge is an expression of ascending life.
Rather than being ruled by a single dominant drive whose expression is left unfettered,
the seeker of knowledge in Nietzsche’s sense is the most diverse being because he prevents
the stagnation that arises when complex drive structures are left to themselves. Careful
management of the drives through thoughtful reflection and experiential experiment al-
lows for the maximum expression of the greatest number of them. If anything, it is the
psychological notion of will to power that yields unpalatable interpretations; the biological
one prescribes a life of knowledge.That is not to say that we should prioritise the palatable
Nietzsche, at least not unless our palate is subject to the kind of scrutiny that his project
dictates. But nor should we use the will to power to portray Nietzsche as someone that,
most of the time, he is not. The concerted effort of scholars in the last century to chal-
lenge this negative image of Nietzsche might well have been motivated by an existing set
of morals or values, but it has, in my view, got Nietzsche broadly correct, something that
I hope this work to contribute to. The task now is to try to bring culture as grounded in
life and power into this environment.
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Chapter 6
Cultural Incorporation
Nietzsche is often held to be a philosopher of radical individuality for whom the produc-
tion of a few great figures should be the aim of entire generations. In the later works,
themes such as aristocracy, enslavement and eugenics surface, and Nietzsche’s position on
them is not one with which a world that has seen incomparable horrors in the previous
century is comfortable. That the subtlety of Nietzsche’s work makes his dismissal on these
grounds problematic is a message that is yet to reach the frontier of his influence. This is
not helped by claims that he makes in later works. In addition to the increased care in read-
ing Nietzsche, there is an increased attention to FSW as the source of a different side to
Nietzsche’s thought. He is still concerned with individual greatness and, at times, it seems
as though great individuals have little time for the concerns of the masses, which proceed
in the ancient cycle of unexamined life. The free spirit, for example, is aloof and solitary,
seeking a ‘free, fearless hovering over men, customs, laws and the traditional evaluations
of things’ (HH 34). Solitude forms a persistent theme in FSW and we would be forgiven
for thinking that although the free spirit is preferable toGM ’s ‘large birds of prey’ who live
by ‘carrying off the little lambs’, his indifference to the larger human world still amounts
to an unacceptable apathy in the face of the plight of humanity. This would be a mistake,
since even though solitude forms an important part of his life, the free spirit is concerned
with culture at large and with the potential for the human species to flourish. Nietzsche
is concerned with culture not just as the cultivation of the prize specimens of the species,
but as the collective framework that binds human groups together. His great individuals,
under various guises in FSW , are charged with the task of caring for culture. How they do
so and by what guidelines that care proceeds are the topics of this final chapter.
6.1 The Cultural Project: Cohen’s Reading
Accounts of culture in FSW are few and far between. One of the most relevant for this
chapter is that presented by Jonathan Cohen, whose book focuses on HH , but takes ques-
tions of culture and free spirits’ interaction with it as central. There are a few points on
which I agree with Cohen’s reading, but there are problems in his account that I think
mine can solve. It should be noted before proceeding that I am not restricting myself to
HH , but covering FSW and the relevant notebooks. Cohen sets his account up by raising
a number of challenges presenting by Nietzsche’s account. The three that I take to be most
significant are:
1. How does the free spirit communicate with culture at large given that he is
both solitary and inevitably misunderstood.
2. What does the free spirit communicate to culture?
3. What makes culture receptive to this communication given that the majority
of people misunderstand and resent the free spirit?
Cohen’s account can be summarised as follows. The free spirit possesses certain opinions,
which he acquires gradually in the course of careful, scientific enquiry.These are the unpre-
tentious truths that Nietzsche talks about inHH 3.1 The free spirit has a different attitude
to these truths than the masses: he takes them to be ‘conditional, probable, and at most
enduring’, whereas the masses take them to be ‘true unconditionally and forever’.2 His
attitude arises from science, which recognises its theories as open to revision. Free spirits
disseminate their truths into culture, but they do so knowing that they will be adopted as
unconditional. The content will make in into culture, but the attitude to that content will
not. This deflects the first question above because it does not require that the free spirit
be understood when he makes truth claims with a certain attitude. Provided the content
is grasped, the attitude can be misunderstood without preventing communication. Cohen
characterises this transition as operating between the realm of truth, occupied by free spir-
its, and that of illusion, occupied by culture. As for why culture is receptive to these truths,
Cohen citesHH 272 as evidence that culture has an excess of energy as the result of educa-
tion.3 Every generation learns the entire corpus of science and has a little energy left over.
This energy needs to be directed to new ideas and the free spirit is there to provide them. To
sum up, culture contains individuals who are hungry for new ideas and the free spirit pro-
vides ideas, which those individuals convert from humble claims to unconditional truths
in their adoption of them. There are a number of points here that I have already agreed
with in this thesis. Free spirits do have a different attitude than the masses. They treat
1The idea that science is concerned with the collection of small facts is deeply misleading.Those facts always
fall within the framework of a larger theory, something that is true of Nietzsche’s work. His work is not
a collection of minor observations: it also contains claims such as ‘there are no opposites’ (HH 1), ‘there
is no essential difference between waking and dreaming’ (D 119), and ‘Through immense periods of time,
the intellect produced nothing but errors’ (GS 110). It is only within the context of Nietzsche’s theoretical
commitments that his activity of accumulating unpretentious ‘truths’ even makes sense.
2Cohen, Science, Culture, and Free Spirits, ch. 5 sec. VI.
3Ibid., ch. 5 sec. III.
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perspectives as temporary interpretations rather than windows into a mind-independent
world. I also agree that Nietzsche’s future culture will rely on science. Regarding the details
of Cohen’s view I think there are several issues that I will now address.
The first problem is that Cohen’s division between truth and illusion is suspect given
Nietzsche’s position on truth in HH . Cohen writes:
And so when Nietzsche argues that illogicality, injustice, and error
are necessary to life and mankind, he is saying they are necessary
to the well-being of culture. It is thus possible to distinguish be-
tween the sphere of truth, in which the free spirits operate, and
the sphere of illusion, which is the proper greenhouse in which to
grow culture.4
Cohen takes the injustice referred to here to be that mentioned inHH 32, whereNietzsche
claims that we judge the nature of the world on the basis of ‘aversions and partialities’, and
laments ‘if only it were possible to live without evaluating’. This commits Cohen to the
untenable position that free spirits live without evaluating. Not only does this contradict
Nietzsche’s own lament, but it runs counter to his whole conception of living things as
evaluating entities. How are we to understand drives if not in terms evaluation or even
aversions and partialities of any kind? Do free spirits lack drives? Nietzsche sometimes
suggests that one might be removed from such things, but far more consistently he states
that transcending the evaluative realm of life is impossible. Being above illusion puts the
free spirit outside of the world of appearances; but this amounts to the cutting off of the
human head that he mocks in HH 9.
As for the attitudes that supposedly lift free spirits out of illusion, Cohen cashes them
out in terms of taking truth claims to be ‘conditional’, ‘probable’ and ‘at most enduring’.5
He does not spell these out, making his reading difficult to assess. ‘Conditional’ is ambigu-
ous if we do not know on what a claim is conditional. It could mean that a claim is true
only if certain of its assumptions are correct.We should adopt such a claim cautiously until
a sort of due diligence has been undertaken. But this suggests that potentially, once this
due diligence is complete, we might be able to endorse a claim as true. But true in what
sense? If the answer is that our claim does in fact pertain to a mind-independent world,
then Nietzsche’s scepticism rears its head again. The same problem arises with ‘probable’
truth claims. Does this imply a good chance that the claim does in fact pertain to a mind-
independent world? Given that Nietzsche thinks that all such claims employ falsification,
they are almost certainly not true in this sense. Temporariness is also problematic, since it
suggests that we might accurately map a brief window of a mind-independent world. So,
for example, we might make claims about a species of animal knowing that such animals
4Cohen, Science, Culture, and Free Spirits, ch. 5 sec. V.
5Ibid., ch. 5 sec. VI.
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only exist temporarily in the course of evolution. But this again does a disservice to the
depth of Nietzsche’s scepticism, which holds truth claims to be part of a framework that
is itself subject to historical change. This framework is responsible for the constituting the
objects of experience, and all such objects, whether seen as temporary or otherwise, are
interpretation-dependent.
A further problem with Cohen’s account is in his placing science on the side of truth,
with the rest of culture on the side of illusion. For Cohen, the difference between a scientist
and a free spirit lies in the fact that it is ‘their involvement with science that gives science
its cultural significance’.6 They ‘formulate the truths of science and convey them to the
general public so that they can be utilized in the production and enhancement of culture’.7
Yet the free spirit is still a ‘paragon of science’.8 Later in this chapter I will put pressure
on this reading, suggesting that science has a different approach to truth than Nietzsche’s
great individuals. In anticipation of that, I want to highlight a few weaknesses with this
position. First, it leaves unspecified exactly what the free spirits do to the truths of science
to make them acceptable to culture. Perhaps Cohen has in mind a selecting of ideas that
will lead to particular behaviours. Or perhaps ideas are made palatable to culture. If the
former, then we have to wonder how these individuals that are thirsty for new ideas do
not come across the rest of science, given that it is conducted in a relatively public forum.
If the latter, then why invoke the thirst for ideas at all? This thirst was supposed to explain
why ideas are taken up, but if those ideas are made palatable, then they should be taken
up anyway. Furthermore, this thirst was supposed to result from learning the curriculum
of mankind; it should surely then be possessed by the ‘learned and scientific men’ that the
free spirit directs (HH 282). But since they are already scientists, what is the benefit of
formulating scientific truths for them? The cultural energy that is supposed to drive the
masses is actually only present in those who are already scientists or are, at least, well versed
in science.
These problems do not detract from the fact that Cohen gets a lot right about HH .
Moreover, many of these problems result from his attempt to do justice to a book that
contains deep contradictions. This attempt to bring some systematicity to bear inevitably
leaves gaps, as no doubt could be said of this thesis. Nevertheless, in the remainder of this
chapter I present an account based on the skeleton of Cohen’s, but which avoids some of
the problems mentioned. My first move is to question the assumption that what is at stake
in the interaction between free spirits and culture is communication.
6Cohen, Science, Culture, and Free Spirits, ch. 5 sec. II.
7Ibid., ch. 5 sec. I.
8Ibid., ch. 5 sec. II.
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6.2 The Interaction with Culture
We need not rule out entirely the possibility that the free spirit communicates with culture.
But since there are major barriers to such communication, it makes sense to ask whether
this is the best way to characterise the interaction. Furthermore, if communication is taken
to involve propositions, then focusing on it implies that the main activity of free spirits is
the generation of propositions. This would be the case if, for example, free spirits were
primarily engaged in forming new beliefs. In chapter 4, I argued that this was not the best
way to understand Nietzsche’s vision. Rather, incorporation plays the central role. On any
plausible reading of incorporation it involves more than simply forming beliefs. This is
particularly true for my account, which centres on experience rather than belief. In any
case, culture is not best understood as a collection of opinions or beliefs. Even on the
‘common sense’ picture, it has more to do with customs and habits. That is not to say that
beliefs do not feature, but they are only a fraction of the whole. The correct relationship
between the individual and culture should be understood as taking place on all cultural
frontiers, and belief is a fairly small part of this story. It is more useful to focus on the
effect that the free spirit is able to have on the cultural framework, rather than talking in
terms of the communication of propositional content or even the attitude to such content.
Re-describing this interaction delivers interpretive results for key aphorisms in HH ,
notably HH 224. There, Nietzsche claims that communities contain a stabilising, conser-
vative force that helps them to survive, but which also leads to stagnation. This force is
referred to as ‘established authority’ and ‘strong communal feeling’. The key to cultural
progress is to strike a balance between the stabilising force and experimentation with new
things. This experimentation, undertaken by free spirits, has the following value:
It is the more unfettered, uncertain and morally weaker individual
upon whom spiritual progress depends in such communities: it is
the men who attempt new things and, in general, many things. . . .
they effect a loosening up and from time to time inflict an injury
on the stable element of the community.
There is no mention here of truth or the communication of positive content; rather, we
see the negative idea of ‘loosening up’.9 This negative activity is treated separately from
the positive one of introducing new things into culture. Communication as a model for
free spirits, at least as Cohen presents it, is obscure. Elsewhere in HH , free spirits are not
restricted to a negative role: they help create a new culture. But that does not warrant
collapsing the negative and positive activity.
9This need not exclude the possibility of positive content having a negative effect, but this is clearly not what
Cohen has in mind.
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If the negative role is not best understood in terms of communicating truths, how
should we think of it? At this point it is useful to re-examine TL. Here we find Nietz-
sche characterising what he calls there ‘intuitive man’, whom he describes as a ‘liberated
intellect’:
For the liberated intellect, the huge structure of concepts, to whose
beams and boards needy man clings all his life in order to survive,
is only a scaffolding and a toy with which to perform its bold-
est tricks: by smashing, jumbling up and ironically reassembling
this structure, joining the most alien elements and separating the
closest, it demonstrates that it can do without those makeshift re-
sources of neediness and is now guided not by concepts but by
intuitions. (TL 2)
We see in this one passage some core ideas of the current thesis. There is no mention of
perspectivism, but the individual engages in a continual reorganisation of the concepts that
govern experience. The emphasis is on transference and metaphor, not value or meaning,
because the latter were not Nietzsche’s focus at this time. The whole enterprise is carried
out in order for the individual to demonstrate his ability to live without the stability that
others require, which lines up well with the notion of great health as that identity that
reasserts itself no matter how much its stable world is challenged. We should not be too
surprised by these similarities given that TL is one of the foundations of FSW . The rele-
vance of this passage for current purposes is that it depicts a negative activity that makes
more sense of HH 224. First, the activity here is not separate from culture at large. The
intuitive man employs the structure that culture maintains, it is just that he disassembles
it where the community fights to preserve it. There is no problem of communication here
since both individual and community use the same framework, and the free spirit is not
trying to ‘communicate’ a particular attitude. Second, the activity is a negative one in the
sense that it is ‘destructive’ of what is present in culture. There is positivity here, since this
activity forms the identity of intuitive man; but this positive identity is defined by negative
activity in relation to the cultural framework.
Such behaviour should only be cautiously labelled as ‘destructive’. One of the behav-
iours listed is reassembling, which is a more accurate way to understand what is going on
here. In chapter 4 the process of incorporating truth continually undermined perspectives.
But this was achieved by moving from one perspective to another, not by simply casting
off a perspective. This latter activity makes little sense given that perspectives are required
for conscious experience, nor can we simply cease to consciously experience something in
some way or other. We cannot discard a conceptual scheme and then look for a new one.
Any change that we effect must dovetail with what is already present. We can think of this
as analogous to trying to repair a ship at sea. The work we can carry out at any one time is
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limited by the fact that the ship needs to stay afloat. However, over time, the entire vessel
can be radically altered. Nietzsche clearly recognises this in GS 58:
What kind of a fool would believe that it is enough to point to
this origin and this misty shroud of delusion in order to destroy
the world that counts as ‘real’, so called ‘reality’! Only as creators
can we destroy! – But let us also not forget that in the long run it
is enough to create new names and valuations and appearances of
truth in order to create new ‘things’.10
The creation new names and appearances fits squarely with the activity of TL, where
metaphors gradually come to be regarded as truths. Values are an addition of FSW . It
is clear now why it is so important for free spirits to know the preconditions of culture,
including the mechanisms of experience constitution. Their personal activity of incorpo-
ration relies upon such knowledge, but so to does their effect on the wider cultural frame-
work.
The way I have presented GS 58 is clearly positive in the sense that creation is as rel-
evant as destruction. But it still fits within the negative project as I delineated it earlier.11
Before addressing the positive cultural project, I want to look more closely at the interac-
tion between free spirits and culture. How does the free spirit positively influence culture?
The groundwork for answering this question was laid down by Katsafanas’ paper, which I
addressed at the beginning of chapter 2. The key claim was that our behaviour, even that
which results from rational deliberation, takes its cue from the experienced world, which
is at the interpretive whim of drives. I extended this claim to say that the world that we
consciously experience is fully constituted by the interpretive activity of drives. Moreover,
this activity is best understood with reference to the communal forces that shape it. TL
andGS 58 make clear that the processes that go into constituting the world of appearances
can be commandeered by certain individuals; the world of appearances can be remodelled.
This gives individuals the power to change behaviour in subtle ways. It does not require,
although it may include, communicating propositions that can be adopted as beliefs. It
need only change people’s experience. It is this kind of cultural change that goes unno-
ticed in the daily activities of the majority of people, but which has the deepest effect on
the way we behave. The key aspect of this that I want to focus on is its affective dimension.
Rewiring of the cultural framework that casts things in a new affective light and thereby
changes how we behave towards them. I will now spend some time on this idea.
10Clark and Dudrick claim that the project of GS is to understand how to confer values on the natural
world. But Nietzsche is clear that we never experience a world free of values that we have to struggle to
implant values in. Only as creators of value can we destroy them in the first place. See Clark and Dudrick,
‘Nietzsche and Moral Objectivity,’ 202.
11Denat gives amore detailed account of the employment of various linguistic practices to bring about change
and to create new thoughts and feelings. See Denat, ‘“To Speak in Images”: The Status of Rhetoric and
Metaphor in Nietzsche’s New Language.’
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So far, I have discussed the interaction between individuals and culture with refer-
ence to two figures: the free spirit of FSW and the intuitive man of TL. But the most
practitioner about whom we know the most is Nietzsche himself. Not only does employ
common literary devices, but even his apparently direct philosophical engagements can
often be interpreted as self-consciously crafted for ends other than merely communicating
the relevant content.This is part of what makes Nietzsche’s ideas so slippery for those seek-
ing to grasp them in the normal way. We might call these the philosophical and literary
dimensions of the texts, but although at times useful, these distinctions are ultimately in-
adequate. They separate what arguably cannot be separated cleanly; nevertheless, they are
implicitly adopted by some writers on Nietzsche. For some, the literary devices are flour-
ishes added to the text that, although of aesthetic or literary value, get in the way of the
solid philosophical content; for others, there is no such content: there is only rhetoric and
literature. The alternative to adopting these extremes is to recognise the various roles of
the literary devices in Nietzsche’s works or the overall strategy that explains their general
deployment. In fact, his use of such devices follows directly from his cultural philosophy,
which is to say that the literary practices that he engages in are instances of the activity that
he takes to be necessary in reshaping culture. Nietzsche is both engaged in a descriptive
enterprise and one of affecting the reader in ways that bring about a change in them. This
is the key feature that distinguishes Nietzsche from a scientist, even when science is taken
asWissenschaft. My engagement with this question of Nietzsche as scientist is divided be-
tween the remainder of this section and section 5, in which I look more closely at the idea
of a scientific culture.
Nietzsche’s affective engagement with the reader has been explored by several writers,
but the standout work in my view is by Christopher Janaway, who also engages with the
question of Nietzsche as a scientist. In one paper, Janaway positions his views on this
affective engagement as a response to Brian Leiter’s influential reading of Nietzsche as a
naturalist.12 Specifically, he targets what Leiter calls ‘methods continuity’, which is one
criterion on which to decide whether a thinker should be labelled as a ‘naturalist’. The
claim is that Nietzsche is a naturalist insofar as his work is continuous with the methods
of natural science, i.e. that his work emulates scientific enquiry. Janaway’s engagement
with Leiter is nuanced and I do not have time to address it all. One point is of particular
interest though, which is that the practice of genealogy is distinct from history in that
the former involves engaging the affects, whereas the latter, like most sciences, involves
quietening them to bemore ‘objective’.13 Janaway goes on to give an account of the function
of Nietzsche’s affective engagement in GM , expanding on his 2003 essay, which goes into
12Christopher Janaway, ‘Nietzsche and Genealogy,’ in A Companion to Nietzsche, ed. Keith Ansell Pearson
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 337–52.
13This is not the only distinguishing feature. See: ibid., 347.
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great depth on the same topic.14 There he claims that the object of study in genealogy is
one’s own affective states. One treats oneself as both a repository of the historical affects
that precede one and as capable of bringing those states back into conscious awareness for
study. On several occasions, Nietzsche is deliberately controversial because he wishes to
lead the reader to feel disgust, shame or other negative emotions. In eliciting this feeling,
Nietzsche exposes the reader’s prejudices, affects and so on, making the psyche available
for study. This is similar the process that I outlined in chapter 3, where literature served to
externalise and make available for study the individual’s psyche, as well as allowing them
to break with perspectives.
I agree with Janaway that Nietzsche’s affective engagement represents a break with the
methods of science, but not necessarily with all of his reasoning. I would argue that insofar
as Nietzsche’s work involves revealing the affects as an object of study, it is continuous with
science. Science cannot proceed without something to study. Many scientific endeavours
involve a great deal of work simply to reveal that which is to be studied.The palaeontologist
who spends an inordinate amount of time carefully exposing a fossilised skeleton in a dried-
up river bed is engaged in scientific practices. His hours of painful labour are comparable
to the gradual unmasking of the self that occurs in the therapy of Nietzsche’s work, at least
for those affected in the intended way. Janaway is very careful in his final formulation of
his criticism:
To the extent that scientific method is conceived as an impersonal,
affect-free search for truth, Nietzsche is critical of it, because he
holds that it disables the identification of one’s affects through feel-
ing them, and so obscures the truth about the causal role of affects
in the production of one’s values.15
If science is by definition affect-free then of course practices that invoke the affects are
unscientific. But this is begging the question somewhat. If the only way to reveal the
object of study in the case of affects is to invoke them, and doing so does not prevent their
study in other ways, then a case could be made for invoking the scientific principle that
one must reveal one’s object in order to study, overruling in certain cases the definition of
science as affect-free. I take it Janaway sees the definition of science as affect-free as coming
from Nietzsche’s own rejection of Rée, which he deals with in the essay. If this is right,
then it is on Nietzsche’s own terms that he would not consider genealogy to be science,
in which case I think Janaway’s position is stronger. Moreover, this is only one of a host
of arguments that Janaway brings to bear against Leiter’s position. Nonetheless, where I
think affective engagement most prominently distinguishes Nietzsche from a scientist is
14Christopher Janaway, ‘Nietzsche’s Artistic Revaluation,’ in Art and Morality, ed. José Luis Bermúdez and
Sebastian Gardner (London: Routledge, 2003), 260–76.
15Janaway, ‘Nietzsche and Genealogy,’ 350.
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in his prescriptive project; he uses affects to bring about certain behaviours in his readers
by manipulating them at a level below that of rational engagement and is involved in
something that scientific practice does not formally acknowledge. Although one could
make the case that even scientists engage in metaphor and persuasion, what Nietzsche
does is much more calculated and comprehensive than this.
In chapter 2, I proposed something called the transitivity of affectivity, which was
the claim that the affectivity could be transferred between things through various kinds
of association. This can also occur in the symbolic realm, where a symbol carries with it
the affectivity of that which it signifies and can interact with other symbols, as well as
being connected with other concrete things. Nietzsche engages in symbolism throughout
his work. For example, he uses knights to symbolise the free spirits. On reflection, the
use of this symbol is odd given that knights have not existed, at least in their fairytale
form, for hundreds of years. Knights are not part of my experienced world other than as
symbols or depicted in art. Yet they have a strong symbolic presence in western culture.
They are part of a deep tradition of romantic mythology. This lends them a great deal
of affectivity. While we might give propositional content to that affectivity by listing the
various ideas associated with knighthood, our experience contains none of that explicitly:
we simply find the symbol to have a kind of aura of nobility. When Nietzsche uses the
knight symbol, he transfers its aura onto the free spirit. In those for whom knighthood
is an alluring prospect, but who recognise it as no longer a viable career choice, seeking
knowledge might serve as a replacement if conceived of in the same light. To this end,
Nietzsche could simply describe the free spirit as noble, or detail free-spirited activities that
look noble. But he recognises that culture contains a great deal of accumulated affective
capital and he uses that as leverage in encouraging the behaviour he wants. He cashes in
the ‘accumulated treasure’ mentioned in HH 16, using it to affect the degree and manner
in which knowledge is sought. The colouration of the world that arises through culture is
the palette with which Nietzsche paints his cultural vision.
Symbolism such as described cannot be arbitrary.The knight works as a symbol not just
because it invokes a certain mood, but also because there are similarities between knights
and seekers of knowledge that permit comparison. Both struggle with adversaries, experi-
ence solitude, and make sacrifices. One can enumerate many such comparisons, the point
being that it is these that allow the symbol some degree of purchase. However, in the case
of the knight, Nietzsche is not employing the metaphor as we sometime do, namely to
invite potentially fruitful structural comparisons. He specifically has in mind the bravery
and nobility of the knight. His purpose here is clearly not one of instruction but of inspi-
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ration.16 I am proposing that many such symbols are present in his work, where shared
properties allow for the application of the symbol, but the aim is to transfer the affectiv-
ity of the symbol to a new object. We should contrast this with cases such as use of the
garden to symbolise the drives. Although gardens have a cultural symbolic significance,
Nietzsche employs this metaphor to instruct us in the management of drives.17 Just like
the knight, birds shares qualities with the free spirit, but this is not why Nietzsche employs
it as a symbol. It is because of the affectivity of the experience of a bird in flight and the
prevalent romanticising of such flight in culture serves to inspire the reader with borrowed
affectivity. There are of course many cases where both benefits of comparison are present,
but that does not undermine the existence of a valid and useful distinction.
In practice, employing symbolism is more complicated than this. I stand bymy analysis
of these simple cases, but it would struggle with an image such as the desert in which the
wanderer ventures. The aptness of the desert for comparison with the life of the free spirit
is easy to locate, as is its affective dimension: those have never even been in a desert have
still had it presented to them in many cultural contexts as a harsh, unforgiving environ-
ment. The numerous paintings, books and poems that take it as their setting and build up
an affective relation that goes beyond mere beliefs about it. When we think of wandering
in the desert, however, the work that stands out is the Bible. In a Christian culture biblical
imagery is pervasive and powerful. Given that Nietzsche is heavily invested in undermin-
ing Christianity, his use of the desert as a symbol acquires extra layers of complexity. Does
Nietzsche imply that the free spirit is to start a new religion? Or that the commitment
of religion to solitude, albeit misguided, is not to be thrown out with the death of God?
Is he inverting the idea of wandering in search of to God to suggest searching for god-
lessness? The work of deciding such questions is that faced daily in the study of literature
and art more broadly. But this does not make the simple analysis I have given redundant.
Firstly, the use of the desert symbol still achieves the transfer of affectivity that I have de-
scribed. Secondly, this discussion of biblical references merely serves to show that cultural
frameworks are incredibly complex historical entities and that employing them effectively
to produce the desired effect is difficult. Anyone who has invested significant effort in
the art of writing knows how precious such devices are and how difficult they are to use,
however effortlessly Nietzsche does so.
The way I have presented this symbolic engagement in Nietzsche should not strike
the reader as a particularly original insight given that such practices are both widespread
16The idea of inspiration over reasoning by employing existing cultural elements has been addressed by other
interpreters. Railton highlights this practice and, moreover, allows that Nietzsche is well aware that only
certain people will be affected by it to the level of becoming great individuals. My addition is to claim
that Nietzsche does not merely discount those who are not affected. He simply seeks different effects for
different kinds of people. Some he wants to practice science, others he wants to become free spirits proper.
See Railton, ‘Nietzsche’s Normative Theory,’ 47–49.
17For one account of the symbolic importance of the garden image in Nietzsche, seeMichael Ure,Nietzsche’s
Therapy: Self-Cultivation in the Middle Works (Lexington: Lexington Books, 2008), 202.
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and conspicuous in society. Transferring the affective aura from one thing to another is
a staple of modern advertising. When a celebrity is paid to be seen wearing a brand, the
underlying premise is that some of that individual’s aura will come to be associated with
the brand. When the consumer is faced with a decision between two products, they are
unconsciously drawn to one as a result of these associations. Although unconscious, these
change conscious experience and, thereby, behaviour. This applies at very subtle levels. For
instance, advertisers tailor advert voice-overs to their target market. But this is not just
because familiarity breeds liking: certain accents and ways of talking have associations that
give them a certain phenomenal character that cannot be captured in propositional terms.
Someone learning a language can be told that a particular accent is, say, associated with a
particular social class, but that is not the same as them experiencing it in the relevant way.
These associations are rich material for those seeking to manipulate behaviour.
This reaches its pinnacle in advertisers who cannot communicate the benefit of their
product in propositional terms at all, or in those whose products have little to separate
them from their competition. In the case of something like perfume, its one distinguishing
feature – fragrance – cannot be conveyed in propositions. As a result, perfume adverts are
highly stylised and richly symbolic, capitalising on their target culture’s romantic imagery
and including celebrities who have built an affective aura around themselves. In short, these
companies engage every association they can to build an aura around their product. In the
other category are companies that sell, for example, sportswear. Often their product is little
different from their competition’s so they focus heavily on branding and image. They want
their product to stand out on the shelf not in virtue of its features, but the affectivity built
around its brand. In most cases, different marketing strategies are combined such that
distinguishing features and affectivity are relevant. Just like these advertisers, Nietzsche
engages the reader on both rational and sub-rational fronts. He is not selling a product, but
he is selling a vision. This activity is the result of his recognition that culture’s accumulated
treasure of affectivity is key to its cultural transformation.
This is one example of a broader manipulation of the cultural framework. Not only can
new associations be formed to create new valuations, but conceptual relations can be chal-
lenged, broken and reforged. All such activity serves to alter the consciously experienced
world in relation to which behaviour is formed. This is the same process by which artists
are able to change the perspectives within a culture. Indeed, Nietzsche’s work as I have
depicted it is heavily invested in artistic practices. This leads to a clash with the view of
Nietzsche’s middle period as favouring science over art, particularlyHH . Although I have
argued that Nietzsche is not best viewed as a methodological naturalist, the inclusion of
art to this extent could be seen as an unacceptable swing the other way. This criticism can
be mitigated by highlighting the many places even in HH where Nietzsche finds a place
for art.
One use for art inHH is in its ability to reintroduce past perspectives into culture: ‘Art
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as necromancer. – Among the subsidiary duties of art is that of conserving, and no doubt also
of taking extinguished, faded ideas and restoring to them a little colour: when it performs
this task it winds a band around different ages and makes the spirits that inform them
return’ (HH 147). The artist does not necessarily create a perspective here, but renders a
past perspective phenomenologically approachable, i.e. makes it something through which
we might experience the world. Art, then, fits squarely with the project of incorporation
outlined in chapter 4. Past perspectives provide additional cultural material that can be
employed as leverage. Nietzsche is clearest about the need to preserve and restore this
cultural heritage of affectivity in HH 251, where he talks about the ‘double-brain’, which
is formed by science on the one side and metaphysics, art and illusion on the other: in
‘one domain lies the power-source, in the other the regulator’. The power here is a matter
of being drawn into the world in various ways. Science is said to act as a limiter on such
commitments and while I think this persists through FSW , I will argue in the final section
that the opposition between metaphysics and science is actually complex. Science does not
simply regulate our engagement with the world of appearances, but itself needs to be deeply
invested in that world in order to remain a central cultural activity. Nonetheless, science
will prove to be the positive content of Nietzsche’s project of cultural incorporation. Before
addressing that, and having outlined the negative and positive aspects of the interaction
between free spirits and culture, it is necessary to locate this in the theory of health given
in chapter 4.
6.3 Cultural Health
As Gregory Moore has pointed out, ‘The analogy between the organism and the state
is of course an ancient one’, and he does a fine job of tracing Nietzsche’s own take on
this analogy. He identifies Lange’s Der Geschichte des Materialismus, which Nietzsche read
in 1866, as the likely first source of the idea. Lange describes the theories of Rudolph
Virchow, who proposes the idea of theZellenstaat [cell state].The body is composed of cells
organised like citizens of a state.This idea will resurface when Nietzsche discovers Roux in
1881. Most of Moore’s material comes from notebooks in 1882 and onwards, wherein we
find the second phase of Nietzsche’s engagement with Roux.Moore is right to focus on the
notebooks that he does given that his book does not prioritise one period in Nietzsche’s
work and that the later engagement with Roux is the clearest expression of these ideas.
For my purposes, however, which pertain to FSW , it is important to decide whether the
analogy between individuals and larger entities – cultures, states, nations – is applicable
before 1882. I will argue that it is and from there explore the possible configurations of
culture and how they relate both to the individual and to the idea great health.
The metaphorical application of the state to the individual could hardly be absent from
Nietzsche’s first engagement with Roux since it forms a significant pillar of the latter’s
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work. Indeed, this is what we find in the notebooks, where ‘The free person is a state and
community of individuals’ (NF 1881 11[130]).18 However, this works both ways, with
larger organisations being described as organisms. Peoples, states and communities are
described as the ‘last organisms whose cultureb we see’ (NF 1881 11[316]).19 There is a
chain of development that sees evolution after the single cell yielding ever more compli-
cated entites: ‘Herds and states are the highest known to us – very imperfect organisms’
(NF 1881 12[163]).20 Coupled with this, we find Roux’s emphasis on struggle being ren-
dered in Nietzsche’s language of power. This is not restricted to biology: Nietzsche applies
it to all kinds of social and cultural relations (see NF 1881 11[303]). Just as the individual
is said to be a struggle of drives in D, the wider organising structures in which individuals
find themselves play host to struggles that are only kept in check by the executive control
of custom or state. So the Nietzsche who was writing GS was also fervently engaged in
the idea that individuals have the same basic structure as larger organisations. Individuals
are states unto themselves; states are individuals unto themselves.
Nietzsche also employs this analogy much earlier in his writing. In an 1870 notebook
we find him describing states and churches as ‘large organisms’ (NF 1870 5[79, 110]). In
HL, Nietzsche is concerned with the conditions that preserve and enhance life, but his
prescriptions apply ‘whether this living thing be a person or a people or a culture’ (HL 1).
Twice more in this essay Nietzsche iterates this list, the final time making clear that his
concern is the health of these entities. Since the conditions for life are the same for each, it
is safe to assume that Nietzsche takes them to have a similar structure. It is the unity and
organisation in these entities that Nietzsche is concerned with.There is nothing here about
cells, metabolism or evolution, but this later language is less a new strand in Nietzsche’s
thought and more a new way to couch the thoughts that had obsessed him since the early
1870s: how best do we preserve and enhance life with the means that life itself has given
us. Life, even in these early works, is a concept that ties us to nature. It does not simply
refer to the human experience, but to that which connects all living things. Indeed, it is
the human incarnation of this that has first given rise to the problems of modernity; but it
is also that incarnation that is capable of life’s greatest manifestation. Nietzsche’s adoption
of Roux is driven not by the discovery of a new fundamental direction, but by that of a
new way to propel himself in the direction that he is already going.
Given this evidence, it makes sense to read cultural health as analogous to individual
health, which was based on Nietzsche’s understanding of biology. To be healthy was to
command a range of diverse material. At a more determinate level, this involved biological
processes such as metabolism and excretion. The strongest individual turned over perspec-
tives while maintaining his identity. Understanding culture as composed of perspectives
18Der freie Mensch ist ein Staat und eine Gesellschaft von Individuen.
19Die letzten Organismen, deren Bildung wir sehen. . .
20Heerden und Staaten sind die höchsten uns bekannten – sehr unvollkommenen Organismen.
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makes it natural to apply this at the cultural level. A culture that contains the greatest range
of perspectives while also being unified is a culture that exhibits great health. This is the
position that I want to argue for, but to do so requires that the analogy be fleshed out since
cultures are not merely identical to large individuals. What counts as unity and diversity
will differ in some ways, for example. Giving cultural equivalents of the components of
individual health, as well as connecting the project with the idea of incorporation, forms
the body of the rest of this section.
In the individual case, great health was a continual assertion of identity through the
activity of undermining perspectives. For culture, stability is a somewhat more complex
affair. At a deep level, the world of appearances is dependent on a broad convergence in
experiencing of the world. So the commitment to their being external objects is shared by
all cultures. At a more determinate level, there is agreement between even distant cultures
on the rough boundaries of certain things.This is what permits there to be phenomena such
as joint attention, without which it is hard to imagine language learning being possible.21
Words vary across cultures, but the use of language as such is universal. That is not to say
that such things existed before culture: they are part of culture. Through the development
of language as such, consciousness developed. As chapter 3 argued, treating things with
consistency does not amount to true concept possession: that requires connecting concepts.
Similarly, that we can jointly attend to things with human beings of a different culture
does not secure the view that we experience the same object. We might take ourselves to
be experiencing very different things. This combination of agreement and divergence is
key to culture. It is what allows us to make sense of culture as a collection of interacting,
diverse perspectives.
Without some overlap in perspectives, there could be no such thing as diverse, interact-
ing perspectives simply because they could not interact. Nietzsche, for example, presents
alternative perspectives on compassion. His perspective struggles against the existing one.
But in so doing, he has as his object those actions that are traditionally construed as un-
selfish. His perspective is not so much on compassion itself, but on those actions that
are called compassionate. He has to work at providing an alternative perspective while
at the same time overlapping with the existing one. He makes this concession in many
cases. When he talks about the criminal as being sick rather than guilty, he is forced to
employ the prevalent concept of criminality and the grouping it entails. But in doing so,
he presents an alternative perspective wherein the distinction of criminality and sickness
is dissolved. This involves competition between the traditional perspective on the crimi-
nal and Nietzsche’s perspective. Were the Nietzsche’s to win out, there is no saying that
the concept of criminality would survive with it at all. The language of criminality might
be replaced with that of sickness, and the world divided differently. Change in this di-
21Which is not to say that pre-linguistic infants engage with objects qua objects, something that I denied in
chapter 3.
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rection, however, requires disagreement that is based on a common ground. Although a
mere bundle of perspectives would be diverse in one sense, it would also lack the constant
struggle that defines diversity for Nietzsche. Perspectives would not as much clash as pass
like ships in the night. One of the stable elements in culture is the agreement on certain
objects. That is not to say that everyone need agree on the nature of those things, it just
requires a consensus on them such that there is something that disagreeing perspectives
actually disagree about. In addition, there is a host of other elements that must overlap for
a culture of diverse perspectives to exist. These range from the mundane habits that mean
that people actually encounter alternative perspectives to norms that permit language and
the wider symbolic framework to exist. These things taken collectively construct the arena
in which diverse perspectives can fight over the conscious experience of those who play
host to that culture.
The stable base of culture maintains certain meaningful, valuable objects. Free spirits
can create contention and dissent that centres on those objects. This has the effect of, as it
were, knocking those objects from their equilibrium. They are pulled this way and that by
those who employ them in novel ways and in different fields. In the long run, this shifts
the centre of that equilibrium; but there must always be a centre for this process to con-
tinue. The objects of a culture, then, are like many gyroscopes whose motion is continually
challenged but which are kept spinning by the fight for consensus. It is the agreement of
the community that keeps them spinning, but a select group of individuals that continu-
ally complicates their orbit. The result is gradual change in the world of appearances that
mirrors, albeit over a longer period, the metabolic process that Nietzsche sees as essential
to life. The healthy culture contains diversity in the sense that it allows cultural objects
and symbols to be mixed to create something new and different; but it is also diverse in a
temporally extended sense such that over time, the perspectives that monopolise culture
gradually change.
It is no accident that this process resembles evolution. InHH 224, it is the weak spirits
that help culture evolve and although Nietzsche has a problematic relation to Darwin, he
does not dispute the fact of evolution. He sees it as the result of an inherent, expansive
life force. If culture is to be treated as a living thing, evolution is part of the expression
of a strong life force. Exhibiting that force is constitutive of health. This can be thought
of in two ways. First, evolution for Nietzsche amounts to continual change rather than a
march towards an ideal future state. At one point he writes that ‘Evolution does not have
happiness in view, but evolution and nothing else’ (D 108), i.e. the attainment of individ-
ual human goals is irrelevant to a process in which change is continuous. When Nietzsche
advocates cultural evolution, there is a level at which he refers to change for its own sake.
But there is a second sense of evolution for Nietzsche. Since certain individuals have an
insight into how culture comes to be, they can consciously choose a direction for evolution
to take. They can seek to bring about a particular cultural arrangement with an otherwise
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absent degree of planning. Natural selection has lent humanity the stability that allows
for the world of appearances; Nietzsche sees the possibility for a conscious evolutionary
step that changes that introduces new stable perspectives. So we have a rather complex
arrangement here. Evolution for Nietzsche necessarily involves change and natural selec-
tion opposes change. Free spirits enable cultural evolution insofar as they undermine the
stabilising, but also stagnating, force that preserves the species. But change also gives rise
to possibility of producing new perspectives that might become the stable perspectives of
a future culture.
Why does Nietzsche want to introduce new stable perspectives if he values continual
change? If the stabilising force of culture is always present, then is it not enough to engage
in the negative work of undermining perspectives? And if stagnation arises as the result
of a dominant perspective becoming too entrenched, why would Nietzsche seek construct
alternative perspectives that themselves will become entrenched?The answer to these ques-
tions is the same answer given with reference to the individual in chapter 5, namely that
certain perspectives encourage diversity even if their adoption is an instance of stability.
For the individual, this involves conceiving of oneself as an explorer, free spirit, sceptic
and so on. It is a second-order perspective on the self that prevents the individual from
dogmatically committing to first-order perspectives. For culture, this amounts to a stabilis-
ing force that unites people as a community involved in a common enterprise while at the
same time encouraging a diversity of perspectives. In the individual, incorporating truth
amounts to a continual undermining of perspectives undertaken in the name of an over-
arching second-order perspective on that activity as meaningful. The task now is to better
understand the perspective that will form Nietzsche’s new culture. Just as in the case of
the individual, where the struggle between truth and life is transformed into the search
for truth as a higher expression of life, so Nietzsche’s proposed culture will base itself on
truth. However, this will not amount to a culture entirely composed of free spirits: it will
be a scientific one.
6.4 Scientific Culture
In this section I argue that Nietzsche’s future culture will be a scientific one, but that sci-
ence so understood should not be mistaken for the activity of free spirits. What a scientific
culture looks like depends on how we conceive of science. There is a definite change in
Nietzsche’s conception of science within and after FSW . In the first chapter of HH , he is
still working with a correspondence theory of truth in light of which the world of appear-
ances can be described as illusory. Yet he talks about science as giving us truth even though,
as I have argued, we should read him in line with the conclusion of his logic in chapter 1,
namely as claiming that science is a perspective. We do not know whether Nietzsche sim-
ply fails to notice this or he sees science as serving his short term goal there of undermining
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a certain kind of metaphysics. As FSW progresses, Nietzsche’s notebooks reveal that he
is beginning to acknowledge the implications of HH . Far from countering the drive to
create a world of appearances, science simply continues this process (NF 1881 11[18]).
Although ‘Science cannot cope with it’, it is ‘a main source of nourishment’ for the po-
etic drive.22 Elsewhere Nietzsche talks about the need for science to ‘build new beings’
(NF 1881 11[65]).23 Science, Nietzsche claims, ‘continues the process that has constituted
the essence of the species, namely to make endemic the belief in certain things’ and the
‘Uniformity of experience, previously striven for by community and religion, is now striven
for by science: the normal taste fixed to all things, and perception, resting on the belief in
persistence’ (NF 1881 11[156]).24 These new agreements on external objects amount to
giving the world a new ‘skin and surface and the old one forgotten’ (NF 1881 12[50]).25
Skin and surface are in turn aligned with something’s being an ‘object of consciousness’,26
suggesting that it is the conscious world of appearances that science concerns itself.
On the one hand, science recognises that models simplify, and are relative to the ends
of those who construct and employ them; on the other, there is a commitment to the
project of getting in touch with an underlying reality. Science exists somewhere between
the naive realism of the herd who simply take the world to be the way it presents itself and
the free spirit, who seeks to engage in perspectives in way that testifies to their perspectival
nature by refusing to fall for their presentation of a mind-independent world. The free
spirit takes perspectives seriously just as the child at play does with their fantasy, but he
nonetheless sees them as fantastical. The scientist, on the other hand, recognises that there
are epistemological complications that arise from the practice of modelling reality, but
does not go far enough as to say that they engage in fantasy or subscribe to some kind of
pragmatism. This is what, for Nietzsche, science ‘cannot cope with’.
Unlike the scientist, the free spirit adopts a second-order perspective because it is life-
enhancing, i.e. the perspective on himself as a sceptic. He also recognises that perspectives
are models of the world and treats at first-order ones appropriately. Although he cannot
literally change the structure of his experience, he works within that structure, adopting
perspectives, but also experimenting with his experience as testament to its perspectival
nature. At no point does the free spirit aim for a perspective that corresponds to, gets in
touch with, or is verified by a mind-independent world of objects. The scientist, on the
other hand, proceeds on the assumption that his enterprise is one of correctly representing
amind-independent world.This need not amount to the idea that such representations per-
22Die Wissenschaft kann sie nicht schaffen, aber die Wissenschaft ist eine Hauptnahrung für diesen Trieb.
23neue Wesen bilden.
24Die Wissenschaft setzt also den Prozeß nur fort, der das Wesen der Gattung constituirt hat, den Glauben
an gewisse Dinge endemisch zu machen. . . Uniformität der Empfindung, ehemals durch Gesellschaft Reli-
gion erstrebt, wird jetzt durch die Wissenschaft erstrebt: derNormalgeschmack an allen Dingen festgestellt,
die Erkenntniß, ruhend auf dem Glauben an das Beharrende. . .
25neue Oberfläche und Haut gab und die alte vergessen wurde. . .
26Gegenstand des Bewußtseins.
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fectly capture the world without remainder; it is sufficient for the scientist to be committed
to a notion of scientific progress measured by the accuracy of scientific representations of
reality or their verisimilitude relative to such a reality. That free spirits direct the activities
of scientists, as claimed in HH , shows that they are clearly not scientists themselves. That
they take themselves to be incapable of transcending illusion despite taking steps to do
so shows that they are not prepared to countenance progress towards a situation in which
their representation of a mind-independent world is actually adequate to such a world.
This account of science presents three key questions for a view on which Nietzsche
seeks to instigate a scientific culture. If science is still grounded in metaphysics, in Nietz-
sche’s sense, then how is it an improvement on religion? Why not seek to create a culture
based on a free spirited acknowledgement of perspectivism? How does Nietzsche propose
to create and maintain a scientific culture?
The answer to the first question this lies in the fact that science pursues its truth differ-
ently to previous cultures, even if it is still enmeshed in metaphysics. It involves behaviour
that has benefits for cultural health, and it encourages certain virtues such as bravery, mag-
nanimity, and honesty. Although also virtues of the free spirit, these are still required even
in normal scientific practice. Scientists have not yet jettisoned the idea of arriving at a
correct perspective, but their virtue prevents them from simply taking the easiest option
available in the form of faith in, say, religion. Science emphasises experimentation, ques-
tioning the status quo, independent thought and scepticism. Notice, however, that it does
all of this with the assumption that those things will produce perspectives that are a better
fit with reality. A common narrative of scientific heroism that circulate to this day depicts
the lone scientist, convinced of an idea that everyone else dispels, who risks everything
to follow that idea and, eventually, overthrow consensus. This myth contains many things
that Nietzsche values: individual endeavour, valour and experimentation. But he does not
think of this as progress towards the truth. It is simply the turning over of perspectives,
which he values. The overturning of perspectives by scientists convinced they have made a
discovery pertaining to a mind-independent world is an inevitable part of scientific culture.
Science involves a combination of the drive to create consensus around the currently
accepted paradigm in a particular area and the constant challenging, scepticism and exper-
imentation that eventually leads to the undermining of perspectives and their turnover in
culture.This is all done in the name of truth as correspondence; only the free spirit sees the
whole enterprise as a strong expression of life. So when the free spirit seeks to guide culture
by creating diversity, one of the ways he does this is by instilling a certain perspective on
science: it is held in high esteem, recognised as heroic and so on.This leads to a culture that
is constantly turning over perspectives, but which nonetheless soldiers on in the search for
truth by seeking out challenge, experiment and uncertainty. Science, although it aims at
consensus, in doing so fosters originality, and, as Nietzsche claims in the notebooks, to
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enjoy originality ‘would perhaps be the start of a new culture’ (NF 1880 3[151]).27
It might be objected that for Nietzsche, nobility consists in living free from attach-
ments to the notion of truth that grounds science. If this is right, then how can HH 224
– Ennoblement through degeneration – be talking about instilling a scientific mindset that
treats truth in this way? To respond to this, I would like to draw attention to a passage
from GS regarding nobility, GS 3, which speaks of the ‘eternal injustice of the noble’. This
injustice lies in the fact that although the noble person has their own perspective, they
believe that it is a universal one. This fits well with the idea of the trailblazing scientist,
who attempts to ground a new perspective without recognising that this perspective is only
the product of interpretation. It is, according to GS 3, ‘very rare’ that someone is able to
recognise that their perspective is only a perspective.This reflects a distinction between sci-
entists and free spirits. Scientists are noble for various reasons – they often stand outside
and challenge views, they possess certain virtues – but they are not yet just as measured by
the standards of Nietzsche’s ‘new justice’. Only a very small band of individuals actually
incorporates truth in themselves, continually moving through perspectives and therefore
treating the world as genuinely perspectival. This is what Nietzsche means by ‘ultimate
noblemindedness’ (GS 55), namely that one does not try to convince everyone else that
one has discovered the correct perspective on something.28
This ultimate noblemindedness of the free spirit seems to contradict with the idea that
he seeks to create a general valuation of science as noble. Would this not involve imposing
a perspective? This would be the case if Nietzsche thought that a healthy culture should
contain only scientific perspectives. But he is clear that even within a scientific culture
there is a place for religion and metaphysics. In HH , this manifests as the claim that cul-
ture should have both a metaphysical side and a scientific one, and that it requires a ‘double
brain’ (HH 251). The metaphysical side fuels the individual so that they want to discover
and explore; the scientific side provides an outlet for that. Later on, it becomes clear that
rather than simply alternating between illusions and science, there is something of a unity
of the two. The alternation was said to prevent us from losing interest in science, but this
is better serviced by the activity described in this chapter, where symbols borrowed from
elsewhere in culture are applied to science to keep us invested in it. The image of the hero
is but one example of this.This is the line of thought that Nietzsche indeed comes to adopt
in the notebooks, where science is not driven by a pure love of knowledge.The poetic drive
27wird vielleicht einmal das Zeichen einer neuen Cultur sein.
28On the question the distinguishing attitude of great individuals, Gemes is better than Cohen. He claims
that ‘While truth is always created rather than discovered, by pretending otherwise man escapes the re-
sponsibility of authorship and paves the way for passive acceptance of received views. Real philosophers,
according to Nietzsche, explicitly take up the task of creation’. Gemes captures this in the claim that ‘Nietz-
sche’s rejection of the unconditional is itself a conditional rejection’, a claim which Hales andWelshon mis-
represent as being about perspectivism only being true perspectivally. Gemes is clear that perspectivism’s
truth is not Nietzsche’s primary concern. See Ken Gemes, ‘Nietzsche’s Critique of Truth,’ Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 52, no. 1 (1992): 52; Hales and Welshon, Nietzsche’s Perspectivism, 24f.
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is a strong motivation, and Nietzsche compares the seeker of knowledge to the spider that
concentrates only on ‘web-spinning and hunting and sucking blood [Aussaugen]: it wants
to live by means of this art and activity and have its satisfaction’ (NF 1881 15[9]).29 That
there is a significant personal investment in science is repeated in AOM 98: ‘the happy,
inventive ego, even that honest and industrious ego already mentioned, has a very consid-
erable place in the republic of scientific men. . . . Taken as a whole and expressed without
qualification: to a purely cognitive being knowledge would be a matter of indifference’. This an-
swers the question of how science is made the focus of culture. The scientist becomes the
dominant heroic and romatic figure in the narrative of culture.
We are still left with the question of whyNietzsche does not see a culture entirely made
up of free spirits as desirable. There a few ways to respond to this. It could be that Nietz-
sche’s idea for a scientific culture is simply the best next step towards a culture based on
free spirits. Or it could be that he does not think that everyone is capable of free spirited-
ness. Whereas science has a place for even those with limited talent who undertake some
of the more ‘administrative’ research, the careful balance and self-cultivation of the free
spirit requires a great deal of the individual. I tend to favour this latter reading because it
makes sense of Nietzsche’s persistent division of society into higher and lower types. Fur-
thermore, as I claimed in the previous section, and as I will flesh out more later, it is not
necessary for great cultural health that everyone be a maximully healthy individual.
By creating and sustaining a dominant perspective which sees scientific labour as heroic
and noble, the free spirit is able to unify culture. Scientists introduce alternative perspec-
tives and compete as it were to bring theirs to the fore. Artistic and religious individuals
form a minority, and in so doing provide both further alternative perspectives, but also a
great deal of symbolism that can be used in connection with science. Although they can
conflict with science in their content and approach, they have their place in a balanced
culture. Just a balanced ecosystem relies on species that push for dominance – it is a dy-
namic equilibrium – so culture is a continually struggling, diverse balance. The job of the
free spirit is to preserve that balance. This relies on a further distinction between the free
spirit and the scientist, albeit it is something of an extention on what has already been said.
The free spirit is aware of their activity to an extent that the scientist is not. As far as the
scientist is concerned, the scientific culture is in the business of coming to accurately map
the underlying structure of reality. This activity makes their life meaningful. Were they
to accept that in fact they were simply participating in the production and destruction of
perspectives, they might well take their activity to be meaningless. That is not to say that
the work of a scientist who is superseded would necessarily seem meaningless to them;
they might well see this as a necessary chain in the progress of science towards truth. But
to see science as making no such progress would be a deeper blow. For the free spirit, how-
29mit Netze-weben und Jagd und Aussaugen thut: sie will leben vermöge dieser Künste und Thätigkeiten
und ihre Befriedigung haben.
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ever, what makes science a meaningful activity is precisely that it consists in a continuous
struggle to create meaning. Science is a form of life that continues to assert itself despite
its inherent upheaval. The very thing that would render science meaningless to the scien-
tist is what makes it meaningful to the free spirit. The scientist takes seriously the fictions
he creates; the free spirit recognises them as fictions, but takes them seriously because he
takes the creation of fictions to be an expression of life.
This is how I understand Nietzsche’s claims in passages such as the following:
the free spirit is brought into disrepute, especially by scholars, who
miss in his art of reflecting on things their own thoroughness and
antlike industry and would dearly love to banish him to a solitary
corner of science: whereas he has the quite different and higher
task of commanding from a lonely position the whole militia of
scientific and learned men and showing them the paths to and
goals of culture. (HH 282)
I have tried to not only read this in the context ofHH , but to stay faithful to the spirit of it
while extending the account of culture through toGS.The picture of culture is one in which
a multitude of diverse perspectives engage in struggles that centre on objects maintained
by the consensus that exists at any one time.This struggle is partly the result of the activity
of those like Nietzsche who write in such a way as to manipulate various cultural elements
– symbols, concepts, ideas – and there by strain and undermine existing perspectives. It
is also the result of artists who do similar work, and scientists whose own perspectives on
the world are not only continually revised but often clash with non-scientific perspectives.
These elements within culture – the artistic, the scientific, the religious – are balanced in
such a way that they produce the greatest range of perspectives that are permitted the great-
est degree of struggle. But that balance also provides the cultural resources that allow those
who know how to use them to create certain ruling perspectives that, provided they can be
shielded somewhat from the ongoing struggle, actually help to perpetuate andmanage that
struggle. Chiefly, the perspective on the activity of science as a noble enterprise is one that
the free spirit seeks to preserve, but he does so by continually borrowing from other parts
of culture, many of which are created by art or even religion, that have strong affectivity.
This helps keep science in its position as the dominant activity of culture. The entire struc-
ture of culture as I have described it mirrors that of a living organism: diverse struggling
perspectives are kept in check by a regulative perspective, namely that which keeps science
at the forefront of culture. That which for Nietzsche characterises great health, namely the
ability to maintain identity through maximum change, is clearly visible in this scientific
culture. The free spirit seeks to maximise the health of this organism just as he does his
own. I contend that he can only do this because he adopts the theory of culture that I have
laid out. He takes perspectives to be as I have described them, sees their malleability and
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how it is exploited, and sees how deeply embedded human behaviour is in the conscious
world that he is able to manipulate.
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Conclusion
The three foundations of FSW have been drawn together to form a theory of cultural
flourishing. Science, which in the early 1870s was a threat to cultural unity, has come to
form the central activity of culture. Cultural health is no longer simply unity, but a balance
of unity and diversity. Science provides the unifying central ideal, but it is an ideal that
inherently encourages diversity. This is brought about and maintained by individuals who
understand the underlying interpretive processes operate to bring about the communally
determined world of conscious experience. These individuals engage in this world in order
to cultivate themselves, but also to disrupt dogma and establish new dominant perspectives
within the community.
Were Nietzsche’s vision to come to fruition, there would be small group of free spir-
its would be the generals of Nietzsche’s cultural campaign. This elite would guide culture
towards health. Cultural elitism of this kind should be distinguished from political elit-
ism insofar as the latter enforces through policy what the former seeks only to encourage
through influence. HH contains reflections on politics, but the free spirit eschews it in
favour of cultural activities. But even if free spirits only ever cared for their own flourish-
ing, to think that it is beyond the reach of politics is naive. The free spirit, like anyone
living in a modern society, is produced by an education in which state legislation plays a
role; the same is true of his mature existence. While profound change is clearly possible
through cultural control, it is likely to be more effective with the addition of political and
legal compulsion. Perhaps this is why Nietzsche’s project, insofar as it pertains to the re-
lationship between strong and weak individuals, develops the more sinister character of
the later works. There is also evidence that he starts to entertain something like a genetic
account of human development, although of course without the concept of a gene. Some
developments in the species occur ‘in the blood’, and it is in response to this that Nietzsche
talks about breeding and the restriction of the breeding rights of certain individuals.30 But
the logic here is disconcertingly sound: if some change is for the good of humanity and
that change can only be brought about genetically, it is not obvious that such breeding
is wrong. If the aim of the project is to fundamentally change human consciousness to
produce a higher form of life, is a cultural approach, which works behind the back of rea-
30Transmission in the blood: BGE 208, 213, 261, 264; breeding humanity: BGE 203, 251. On restricted
breeding: TI ‘Skirmishes’ 36.
son, different in kind from a sustained political project grounded in force and legislating
breeding and education? These are questions beyond the scope of this thesis, but their rel-
evance to Nietzsche studies is this: that the middle and late Nietzsche might not be easily
distinguished for their acceptability to a modern liberal mindset. The middle works still
propose exploiting the manipulation and influence offered by culture; and the later works,
with their political force and breeding projects, might still, in their own, way aim at the
flourishing of the human race. If Nietzsche’s concept of life is the criterion of progress that
unites these works, then one cannot invoke, at least within Nietzsche, the kinds of rights
that allow us currently to distinguish between breeding and politics, and culture. At least
not unless those rights are grounded in will to power.
There are further lessons for Nietzsche studies that have arisen in the course of this the-
sis. First, that the question of culture should not be reduced to one of behaviours, habits
and practices. Culture is not merely the kinds of things we do as the result of our upbring-
ing; it also pertains to the world that we find ourselves in as a result of such things. This
touches on a bigger issue, namely consciousness. I am by no means them only person to say
that Nietzsche’s project is irreducibly conscious. Not only is consciousness necessary for
us to undertake planned, reflective projects, but conscious experience is a vital domain of
study in coming to know ourselves and an arena in which we have the potential to change
ourselves. The Nietzsche who reduces everything, including consciousness itself, to blind
processes is, in my opinion, on his way out; he is being replaced by one for whom con-
scious experience is an additional level of explanation. The naturalism that underlies the
attempt to reduce all levels of explanation to one is grounded on a commitment to there
not being any difference in kind that renders consciousness, or any other level, a meta-
physical substrate distinct from nature. But acknowledging levels of explanation need not
commit us to anything like this. Although Nietzsche sometimes pushes for a naturalism
that reduces everything to a single explanatory paradigm, discussion of conscious experi-
ence does not disappear from his actual explanatory practice. We should be cautious in
always subscribing to what Nietzsche advocates, rather than what he himself does.
In the wider context of philosophy, this thesis places Nietzsche alongside phenome-
nologists like Heidegger and Husserl, who advocate the study of the experienced world as
a means to understanding the individual. Although committed to science in several ways –
something that marks Nietzsche out against Heidegger – the former comes to share with
the latter the view that science studies that which is determined pre-scientifically in the
activities of human beings who find themselves in a world constituted by their own activ-
ity. On the question of science, Nietzsche, even in FSW , is concerned with its relation to
flourishing. This thesis raises the question of whether philosophy’s engagement with the
sciences should be understood in terms of a continuity of methods. This narrative over-
shadows something else that Nietzsche is deeply invested in, namely the ethical potential
of a life based on science. Whether science should be adopted for reasons other than truth
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value is a question that requires us to look beyond the absolute valuation of truth, which
few since Nietzsche have questioned.
This in turn has ramifications for the study of culture as it proceeds in the various
relevant disciplines, from evolutionary anthropology to cultural studies. Although heavily
invested in a descriptive project, Nietzsche’s work is thoroughly normative. His exploration
of culture seeks to discover the optimum conditions for cultural flourishing. While merely
descriptive projects tend to deliver relativist conclusions, Nietzsche is, by contrast, not a
cultural relativist. This might seem an odd conclusion given his reputation and his legacy,
but while he is concerned to undermine the claim to universality of specific customs, he
does think that cultures can be compared by adopting his criteria of health. He spends
much of his time condemning some cultures and praising others. Just as we might ques-
tion the will to truth, we might also question the emphasis on description in our study if
culture and ask ourselves how cultures might be better or worse qua culture. In addition to
this normative dimension, this thesis hopes to have shown that no matter what discipline
studies culture, the objects of that culture should not be overlooked in favour of descrip-
tions of behaviour or customs. Phenomenological reflection is not an obstacle to a proper
scientific understanding of culture, it is a necessary contributor to a full understanding of
it.
Finally, this thesis has relevance beyond academic circles. The cultural construction of
our shared experience governs our behaviour. In the last half-century we have witnessed
a gradual takeover of this space by corporate interests, with advertising being inescapable
in a Western society. Advertisers incorporate the same knowledge, albeit updated, that
Nietzsche relied on to understand how to influence people through this shared conscious-
ness. This thesis does not restrict Nietzsche to competing to describe this influence. Its
normative dimension calls on us to employ cultural frameworks for the benefit of culture
itself. With the power to harness culture comes the possibility to employ it to promote cul-
tural flourishing. Nietzsche wants to use culture to improve culture; advertisers seek only
profit. Seeking knowledge of culture without the intention of promoting cultural flourish-
ing only provides fuel to fire of those who would exploit cultural influence for their own
ends. Seeking to understand culture so as to take control of it to promote its flourishing is
more important now than it was in Nietzsche’s time.
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